Florez on Behalf of Wallace v. Callahan, Docket No. 97-6133
| Citation | 156 F.3d 438 |
| Decision Date | 29 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 97-6133 |
| Parties | Jorge FLOREZ, on Behalf of Raul WALLACE, SS# 131-66-2488, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John J. CALLAHAN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
Christopher James Bowes, Center for Disability Advocacy Rights (CeDAR), Inc., New York City, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Lorraine S. Novinski, Assistant United States Attorney, New York City (Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, Gideon A. Schor, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, New York City, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: KEARSE, CARDAMONE, Circuit Judges, and LEISURE *, District Judge.
This appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Duffy, J.), which affirmed the rulings of the acting Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner), raises issues of first impression in this Circuit. We must decide whether Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits for a child under age 18, who suffers from psychological disabilities, were calculated correctly under governing statutory and regulatory law.
The plaintiff stepfather took on the care and support of his emotionally disabled stepson after his wife, the child's mother, abandoned her family. When the stepfather applied for SSI disability benefits on behalf of his stepson, the Social Security Administration (the agency) determined the child qualified for help, and calculated benefit payments in two parts: (1) for the period of time that the child lived at home prior to his admission to a psychiatric center; and (2) for the period of time after the child was admitted to the center.
Plaintiff, in assuming the sole responsibility of caring for his wife's child after she left home, shows himself to be a person who plainly believes that in passing through life, any kindness he can show to another must be shown now, and not put off until another day. One would suppose that a social services agency would encourage such a generous attitude. But, the Social Security Administration adopted quite the opposite position and penalized the stepfather by ruling that his income, prior to the child's entering the psychiatric center, was attributable to the child and thereby reduced the amount of monthly SSI benefits. The stepfather appeals this first ruling, and also appeals a second ruling that interpreted the regulations to authorize a reduced flat-rate payment of SSI benefits once his stepson was admitted to the medical care facility.
We agree with the stepfather that with respect to the time when the child lived at home, in counting a portion of the stepfather's income as the child's own (also known as "deeming"), the Social Security Administration failed to give effect to the plain language of its own regulations. With respect to the agency's second ruling, we find no error in either the substance or interpretation of the regulations regarding what SSI payments should be awarded for the time in which the child lived at the psychiatric center. Hence, we reverse in part, and affirm in part.
Raul Wallace is now a teenager, born on October 28, 1982 in New York City. His natural father is deceased. On January 13, 1984 his natural mother married plaintiff Jorge Florez. A daughter was born out of that marriage. Raul's mother, who apparently suffers from alcoholism, abandoned her home, husband and children in 1985. Her only contacts with the family since then have consisted of uninvited late night drunken visits to Florez' apartment.
On May 8, 1985 Florez sought and obtained in New York State Family Court a temporary order of protection against Raul's mother and temporary custody of Raul. Later, Family Court awarded Florez full custody and issued a final order of protection against Raul's mother not to interfere with Florez' custody of the children. Even so, another temporary order of protection was issued on April 5, 1994 instructing her to stay away from Florez' residence and his place of business. Florez has unsuccessfully tried to obtain a divorce, but remains legally married to Raul's mother.
Raul lived with his stepfather, who cared for him from 1985 until July 31, 1991, when he began voluntary inpatient psychiatric treatment at the Manhattan Children's Psychiatric Center (MCPC). For the period of time relevant to this appeal, Raul lived at MCPC from Monday afternoons through Friday mornings of each week. He would then be given a pass to spend the weekend at Florez' apartment.
Florez first applied for SSI benefits on behalf of his stepson on August 4, 1989. An initial review resulted in a denial of benefits. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990), Florez re-applied for benefits on March 24, 1992, and used the original application date as a protective filing date.
Upon this second review, the Commissioner determined that Raul satisfied the disability requirements retroactive to August 1, 1989. Nevertheless, in calculating benefits owed, the agency determined that Florez' income was too high to award Raul any payments for the 16-month period between August 1989 (the original filing date) and December 1990. But when plaintiff's income dropped for seven months from January 1991 through July 1991, Raul became income-eligible for SSI payments at a rate of $66.98 per month. From August 1991 forward, while Raul was a patient at MCPC, the agency awarded a flat-rate payment of $35 per month.
After receiving notice of the Commissioner's decision, Florez retained MFY Legal Services, Inc. and, on March 17, 1993, submitted a Request for Reconsideration of the benefit amount. That request was denied on two grounds: (1) before Raul received inpatient treatment at MCPC, Florez' income as a stepparent was deemable to Raul; and (2) after Raul received inpatient treatment at MCPC, he was under the jurisdiction of the hospital.
Florez' attorney then asked for a hearing, which was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on May 3, 1994. The ALJ issued his decision on June 22, 1994, in which he found the agency had correctly calculated Raul's SSI benefits. This became the final decision of the Commissioner on January 23, 1995, when the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied Florez' request for review.
Having exhausted administrative remedies, Florez filed this action on his stepson's behalf in the Southern District of New York on March 29, 1995, seeking a reversal of Raul's SSI benefits determination. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court upheld the Commissioner's rulings and calculations in a judgment entered March 26, 1997. In a written endorsement, the court affirmed the agency's application of the regulations providing for the deeming of a stepparent's income and for a reduction in payments when the recipient is a resident of a publicly-funded institution. From this judgment, Florez appeals.
Substantial deference is to be accorded an agency when it interprets its own regulations. Reversal is warranted only when that interpretation is "plainly erroneous," that is, where the plain language of the regulation itself or some other indication of the agency's intent at the time of promulgation compels a different result. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994). Our reading of the regulations at issue on the deeming aspect of the appeal leads us to believe that the Commissioner and the district court failed to account for the language set out in the applicable regulations.
The SSI program for the aged, blind and disabled is administered under regulations found at 20 C.F.R. Part 416 (1997). Subpart K (§§ 416.1100-416.1182), entitled "Income," explains how income is treated for purposes of SSI eligibility. The rules governing the deeming of income are found at §§ 416.1160-416.1169.
Section 416.1160 sets forth what it means to deem income, and presently reads
(a) General. We use the term deeming to identify the process of considering another person's income to be your own.
...
(2) Ineligible parent. If you are a child to whom deeming rules apply (See § 416.1165 [] ), we look at your parent's income (and that of your parent's spouse) to decide whether we must deem some of it to be yours. We do this because we expect your parent to use some of his or her income to take care of your needs.
20 C.F.R. § 416.1160 (1997). An "ineligible parent" for deeming purposes is defined as a "natural or adoptive parent, or the spouse (as defined in § 416.1101 ) of a natural or adoptive parent, who lives with you and is not eligible for SSI benefits." 20 C.F.R. § 416.1160(d) (1997) (emphasis added).
It is in this definition of an "ineligible parent" that the crux of the appeal lies. If Florez qualifies as a "spouse" under § 416.1101, then he is also an "ineligible parent" and the agency acted properly in deeming part of his income to his stepson. In looking to § 416.1101 to find the answer, we learn that this section defines "spouse" as that term is used throughout subpart K, to mean 20 C.F.R. § 416.1101 (1997) (emphasis added). Florez focuses on the phrase "lives with another person" and argues that because he no longer lives with his wife, his income should not be attributable to Raul.
The Commissioner maintains this logic fails to account for the reference to § 416.1806. That section, found in Subpart R...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rock of Ages Corp. v. Secretary of Labor
...II. Standard of Review "Substantial deference is to be accorded an agency when it interprets its own regulations." Florez v. Callahan, 156 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir.1998). We will reverse an agency's interpretation of its own regulation "only when that interpretation is 'plainly erroneous,' tha......
-
Cruz v. Zucker
...or some other indication of the agency's intent at the time of promulgation compels a different result." Florez ex rel. Wallace v. Callahan, 156 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir.1998). Here, the Court will give no deference to the June Guidance because the plain language of § 505.2(l ) unambiguously f......
-
Giovanniello v. ALM Media, LLC
... ... Earle GIOVANNIELLO, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, ant, v. ALM MEDIA, LLC, DefendantAppellee. Docket No. 103854cv. United States Court of Appeals, ... Before: RAGGI, LOHIER, and WALLACE, * Circuit Judges. Judge WALLACE concurs in the ... ...
-
Accounting Outsourcing v. Verizon Wireless
... ... The named Plaintiffs are suing on behalf of themselves and proposed classes of Louisiana ... Implementing the TCPA of 1991, CG Docket ... ...
-
SSR 96-1p: Application by the Social Security Administration (SSA) of Federal Circuit Court and District Court Decisions
...Benefits Paid to Social Security Claimants—Title II of the Social Security Act (Rescinded 4/14/2000) AR 99-1(2): Florez v. Callahan , 156 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1998)—Supplemental Security Income— Deeming of Income From a Stepparent to a Child When the Natural Parent is Not Living in the Same Ho......
-
SSR 96-1p: Application by the Social Security Administration (SSA) of Federal Circuit Court and District Court Decisions
...Benefits Paid to Social Security Claimants—Title II of the Social Security Act (Rescinded 4/14/2000) AR 99-1(2): Florez v. Callahan , 156 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1998)—Supplemental Security Income—Deeming of Income From a Step-parent to a Child When the Natural Parent is Not Living in the Same Ho......
-
Issue Topics
...F. Supp. 340, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (examining a POMS provision governing guardianship). See also Florez on Behalf of Wallace v. Callahan , 156 F.3d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying, in part on POMS §SI 01310.145B in reversing the agency’s construction of its regulation pertaining to deeming ......
-
Issue topics
...F. Supp. 340, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (examining a POMS provision governing guardianship). See also Florez on Behalf of Wallace v. Callahan , 156 F.3d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying, in part on POMS § SI 01310.145B in reversing the agency’s construction of its regulation pertaining to deeming......