Florian v. Lenge

• Decision Date: 13 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 25064.,25064.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: David W. FLORIAN, Sr. v. Frank LENGE.

880 A.2d 985

91 Conn.App. 268

David W. FLORIAN, Sr. v. Frank LENGE.

No. 25064.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 28, 2005.

Decided September 13, 2005.

Thomas J. Mullins, New Britain, with whom, on the brief, was Frank Lenge, pro se, for the appellant (defendant).

Bridget C. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, was Andrew J. Denorfia, for the appellee (plaintiff).

LAVERY, C.J., and SCHALLER and GRUENDEL, Js.

LAVERY, C.J.

The pro se defendant, Frank Lenge, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, David W. Florian, Sr., in this action on a promissory note. The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) applied the law governing promissory notes under the Uniform Commercial Code rather than contract law, (2) held that the defense of laches was unavailable to him, (3) awarded attorney's fees and (4) restricted cross-examination at trial.¹ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the issues on appeal. On July 17, 1991, the defendant executed a promissory note in favor of the plaintiff, in the original principal amount of $15,000. The promissory note provided that the defendant was to pay to the plaintiff, or his order, the sum of $15,000 with interest and costs of collection, including attorney's fees, incurred in any action brought to collect sums due on the note. The defendant was to pay the plaintiff in specified monthly sums until the outstanding balance of the principal was paid in full on September 1, 1998. If the defendant were to default on any monthly payment, for a period of fifteen days after the payment was due, the entire balance of the note could become immediately due and payable at the option of the holder.

The defendant made two payments on the note, with the last payment on September 1, 1992, and thereafter was in default on the note. The plaintiff did not exercise his option to accelerate the note. On September 1, 1998, the note matured without further payment by the defendant, leaving an outstanding principal balance of $14,753.46 due. On January 11, 2002, the plaintiff brought this action to recover the amount due under the promissory note. In response to the complaint, the defendant denied the claims and raised ten special defenses and a five count counterclaim. Among the special defenses he raised were that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and laches. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on those grounds. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's action was barred by the six year statute of limitations pursuant to General Statutes § 52-576(a)² because the cause of action arose on September 1, 1992, the date on which payments on the note ceased, causing a breach of contract. The defendant also argued that the doctrine of laches barred the claim because the plaintiff's delay in bringing the action was unreasonable and resulted in prejudice.

The court issued a memorandum of decision on November 5, 2003, denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the note was a negotiable instrument under General Statutes § 42a-3-104,³ which is part of our Uniform Commercial Code. The court, therefore, determined that the applicable statute of limitations was the six year statute of limitations provided in General Statutes § 42a-3-118⁴ for negotiable instruments and not § 52-576(a), which is applicable to simple contracts. Consequently, under § 42a-3-118, the action was timely because it was commenced within six years of the maturity date of the note, September 1, 1998. In a footnote, the court noted that even if it were to apply the six year contract statute of limitations contained in § 52-576(a), the result would be the same because September 1, 1998, the date the last payment was due, was the date on which the cause of action accrued. Last, the court determined that because the plaintiff's action was an action at law seeking damages as relief, the equitable doctrine of laches was not applicable.

Following denial of the defendant's summary judgment motion and after a full court trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on January 6, 2004. Judgment totaled $35,282.61, an amount comprised of the outstanding principal balance due of $14,753.46, together with interest of $16,908.41, costs of $230.74 and attorney's fees in the sum of $3390. The court rejected the defendant's statute of limitations and laches defenses.⁵

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly applied the law governing promissory notes under the Uniform Commercial Code rather than applying contract law. According to the defendant, as a consequence of that misapplication, the court mistakenly (1) did not find that the plaintiff failed to plead the applicable statute, (2) allowed the plaintiff to first bring his claim as a breach of contract action, then allowed him to recover under the statute governing promissory notes, (3) failed to find that the note at issue did not meet the definition of a negotiable instrument under § 42a-3-104, (4) failed to find that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course and (5) found that the action was not barred because the date the statute of limitations began to accrue was the date the note matured on September 1, 1998, and not the date the initial breach occurred on September 1, 1992. We disagree with each of those arguments and conclude that the court properly applied § 42a-3-104.

A

The defendant argues first that the plaintiff failed to plead § 42a-3-104 in his complaint as required by Practice Book § 10-3 and, therefore, should not have been permitted to recover under that statute.⁶ Section 10-3(a) provides: "When any claim made in a complaint, cross complaint, special defense, or other pleading is grounded on a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by its number." We cannot agree with the defendant.

First, we note the standard of review. "[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court. . . . Our review of the trial court's construction of the pleadings is plenary." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Owen, 88 Conn.App. 806, 813, 873 A.2d 1003 (2005); see also Gilbert v. Beaver Dam Assn. of Stratford, Inc., 85 Conn. App. 663, 671, 858 A.2d 860 (2004) (interpretation of requirements of rules of practice is question of law), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 912, 866 A.2d 1283 (2005).

Our general practice in this state is to require fact pleading only. Amore v. Frankel, 228 Conn. 358, 370 n. 2, 636 A.2d 786 (1994). Practice Book § 10-1 requires only that each pleading "contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved. . . ." In addition, we have held that Practice Book § 10-3 "is directory rather than mandatory, and its primary purpose is to ensure that a defendant is sufficiently apprised of the applicable statute during the proceedings." Gilbert v. Beaver Dam Assn. of Stratford, Inc., supra, 85 Conn. App. at 671, 858 A.2d 860. Finally, in Krevis v. Bridgeport, 80 Conn.App. 432, 435-36, 835 A.2d 123 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 914, 841 A.2d 219 (2004), we held that when a party mentions a statute, or the concepts embodied therein, several times prior to trial, the opposing party was sufficiently apprised that the statute's applicability was claimed.

Here, after a careful review of the record, we conclude that the plaintiff's complaint adequately defined the issue in dispute and that the defendant was sufficiently apprised of the claimed applicability of the statute. In regard to the complaint, the plaintiff plainly and concisely stated the material facts surrounding the cause of action by alleging nonpayment of the matured promissory note by the defendant. Cf. Criscuolo v. Mauro Motors, Inc., 58 Conn.App. 537, 546-47, 754 A.2d 810 (2000) (plaintiff sufficiently pleaded facts underlying breach of warranty claim although she did not cite General Statutes § 42a-2-314 [2][c]). The plaintiff was not required to define promissory notes, nor was he required to establish that the promissory note at issue satisfied the conditions of negotiable instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code. Moreover, the record shows that the defendant was sufficiently apprised of the statute on which the plaintiff relied. In the plaintiff's objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, he specifically referenced § 42a-3-104 and noted the Uniform Commercial Code's applicability to his claim.⁷ Subsequently, the defendant, in his reply memorandum in response to the plaintiff's objection, also addressed the applicability of § 42a-3-104 and the Uniform Commercial Code. We conclude, therefore, that the defendant was sufficiently apprised of the plaintiff's reliance on § 42a-3-104.

B

The defendant next argues that the plaintiff initially brought his claim as a breach of contract action, but thereafter was permitted to prevail under the statute governing promissory notes. We disagree.

A review of the complaint demonstrates that contrary to the defendant's assertion, the plaintiff did not claim breach of contract.⁸ As was required, he merely alleged the material facts surrounding the cause of action. Because the defendant's argument rests on a factually inaccurate premise, we conclude that no further analysis is warranted.

C

The defendant next claims that the court should have applied the law of contracts because the promissory note at issue is not a negotiable instrument. Specifically, the defendant argues that because the promissory note at issue is not a negotiable instrument under § 42a-3-104, the statute of limitations governing the claim is that for simple or implied contracts, § 52-576, which requires that an action be filed "within six years after the right of action...