Florida Citrus Packers v. State of Cal.
Decision Date | 04 October 1982 |
Docket Number | No. C-81-4218 EFL.,C-81-4218 EFL. |
Citation | 549 F. Supp. 213 |
Parties | FLORIDA CITRUS PACKERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, Occupational Safety and Health Standard Board, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
On July 26, 1982, the Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment to Count I of plaintiffs' amended complaint and denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment thereto. Florida Citrus Packers v. State of California, 545 F.Supp. 216 (N.D.Cal.1982). The Court reserved judgment on the remaining aspects of the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and now grants defendants' motion.
This Court dismisses Counts II and III of the plaintiffs' amended complaint and grants summary judgment on Count IV.
The facts of the case are fully set out in the earlier opinion cited supra. In brief, this case concerns a challenge by representatives of the Florida citrus packing and shipping industry to California's General Industry Order 5219 (GISO 5219) which reduces the permissible worker exposure level of California workers to ethylene dibromide (EDB). When the California state plan was originally approved by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Fed-OSHA) in 1973, it contained a permissible EDB worker exposure level identical to that of Fed-OSHA. Since the date the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal-OSHA) began enforcing GISO 5219's more stringent standard, many workers, employers, retailers and distributors in California have refused to accept, handle and store Florida citrus, allegedly due to the new regulation.
Defendants contend, among other things, that Fed-OSHA should decide whether the EDB standard is within the "product standard" clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651, et seq. (the Act) and move to dismiss this claim.
29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2). The "product standard" clause, the portion underscored above, thus requires a finding of compelling local conditions and the lack of an undue burden on commerce if the standard or standard modification applies to "products which are distributed or used in interstate commerce." The facially broad language of the "product standard" clause seems to conflict with the legislative history of the clause, which indicates that Congress intended a more restrictive application. See Subcommittee of Labor of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, pp. 500-01, 1041-42 (June 1971).
This Court holds that Fed-OSHA, the agency charged with the review of the new California standard under § 667(c), and not the United States District Court, should decide whether the EDB standard change falls within the "product standard" clause and, if so, whether that change is justified by compelling local conditions and not unduly burdensome on commerce. Such agency review is part of the mandated review process; "judicial intervention into the agency process denies the agency an opportunity ... to apply its expertise." FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242, 101 S.Ct. 488, 494, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980); see also Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 595 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1979). Further, "questions of statutory interpretation are better left to an initial review by the agency itself for application of its specialized expertise in the area." Marshall, supra, at 513. Clearly, new standards and standard modifications must be submitted to Fed-OSHA to initiate the review mechanism. 29 C.F.R. § 1953.41.
Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II is therefore granted.
Commerce Clause
Defendants' primary contention is that plaintiffs' Commerce Clause challenge is legally impermissible as a matter of law because Congress exercised in the Act its plenary authority to grant to the state the right to regulate in this area, subject only to the limitations of the "product standard" clause discussed supra, where applicable.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 1520, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945); see also Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1980); Chicago-Midwest Meat Association v. City of Evanston, 589 F.2d 278, 279 (7th Cir. 1978). Unlike Western, supra, which involved the complete abdication of federal regulation of the life insurance industry to the states, the instant situation involves the sharing of power between the states and the federal government. Enactment of the Act preempted that state law covered by the federal program in order to assure "safe and healthful working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). The Act, however, includes "both a broad grant of power to the states and a limitation on the exercise of that power" in section 667. See National Agricultural Chemicals Association v. Rominger, 500 F.Supp. 465, 470 (E.D.Cal.1980).
As discussed above, a state plan or modification of an approved state plan must meet eight criteria. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c). These include, if applicable to a product "distributed or used in interstate commerce," a showing that the standard is compelled by local conditions and not an undue burden on commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2). Other than these several express limitations, however, the Act grants and promotes1 a broad authorization to the states to protect the health and safety of its workers. See Rominger, supra, at 470-71.
Rominger, supra, at 471; see also H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Brown, 519 F.Supp. 1383, 1391 (E.D.Cal.1981). Thus, an attack based upon unduly burdening commerce is limited to those situations where the product standard applies. Defendants' motion to dismiss Count III is granted.
Due Process and Equal Protection
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