Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Peters

• Decision Date: 21 November 1916
• Citation: 73 So. 151,72 Fla. 311
• Parties: FLORIDA EAST COAST RY. CO. v. PETERS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

73 So. 151

72 Fla. 311

FLORIDA EAST COAST RY. CO. v. PETERS.

Florida Supreme Court

November 21, 1916

Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; H. Pierre Branning, Judge.

Action by Thomas J. Peters against the Florida East Coast Railway Company.Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

In order to maintain an action against a carrier for the recovery of damages occasioned by negligence in the transportation or delivery of goods, either ex contractu or ex delicto, the plaintiff does not have to be the absolute owned of the goods.If the plaintiff has a special interest therein and his legal rights have been invaded, that would entitle him to maintain the action.

Where goods are intrusted to a carrier for transportation and delivery, the carrier thereby has notice of the interest of both the consignor and the consignee; and, if either suffers an injury through the negligent delay in the transportation or delivery of the goods, the person so suffering such injury may bring an action against the carrier to obtain redress for such injury.

As a general rule, the consignee is prima facie entitled to bring an action against a carrier for the loss of or injury to goods or for negligent delay in their transportation or delivery, since it is a presumption of law that on the delivery of goods to a carrier the title thereto vests in the consignee, and when the consignee is the party who has been damaged, with which damage the consignor has no especial concern, the consignee is the proper partyplaintiff especially in an action ex delicto.

The common-law rule was that an action for a tort must in general be brought in the name of the person whose legal right has been infringed.Where the consignee has suffered special damages from the negligent delay in the transportation or delivery of goods by a carrier, the consigness is the proper partyplaintiff in an action ex delicto, being 'the real party in interest' within the intent and meaning of section 1365 of the General Statutes of 1906, providing that 'any civil action at law may be maintained in the name of the real party in interest.'

The liabilities of a carrier depend, not only on its contract but also on obligations imposed by law, and the law imposes the duty upon a carrier to transport and deliver to the consignee within a reasonable time goods which have been entrusted to it.

Any pleading, whether at law or in equity, is to be most strictly construed against the pleader thereof, and this principle applies with especial force to a plea which is in the nature of a confession and avoidance, and, where such a plea has on the face of it two intendments, it must be construed most strongly against the party who pleads it.

A plea in bar of the plaintiff's action must be certain to a common intent; it must be direct and positive in the facts set forth, and must state them with necessary certainty; and a plea which professes to be to the entire declaration, but omits to answer a material part thereof, is bad on demurrer.

Every plea must be simple, entire, connected, and confined to a single point.A plea which contains more than one independent fact, or set of facts, either of which alone is a sufficient answer to the declaration, is bad for duplicity, whether the defense is in bar, or in abatement, or in both.

In an action on the case, since the adoption by this court of rules 71and72 of the rules of circuit court in common-law actions, the defendant has the right to file the plea of not guilty together with special pleas in the nature of confession and avoidance, and, if he would avail himself of the benefit of certain matters of defense, he must file such special pleas.

A plea in justification or excuse admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff, but in effect denies that the plaintiff had at any time a good cause of action, either because the conduct of the defendant is justified in law, or because he is excused from liability in the particular case through some act or conduct of the plaintiff.

All matters in confession and avoidance must be pleaded specially, the plea must confess the facts pleaded, and the plea must avoid, and the avoidance must be pleaded coextensive with the confession, and must be an answer to the whole of what is adversely alleged.

Where a plea in the nature of confession and avoidance interposed to an entire declaration, consisting of a number of counts, is found to answer only some of such counts, it is demurrable.

When an emergency arises and a carrier unexpectedly has more business than it can accommodate, and it receives goods without notice to the shipper on the probable delay, and fails to obtain his assent, express or implied, to the delay, it is bound to transport the goods within a reasonable time, notwithstanding the emergency.

A contract between a carrier and shipper for the transportation of goods, containing the following stipulation: Claims for loss or damage must be made in writing to this company within ten days after arrival of the goods at their place of ultimate destination in case of fruit, vegetables, and other perishable articles, and within thirty days after arrival at ultimate destination in case of other freight, and unless claims are so made this company shall not be liable--even if valid and enforceable--relates only to claims for the loss of or injury to goods, and has no applicability to an action for special damages occasioned by negligent delay in the transportation of goods.

In an action by the consignee against a carrier for the recovery of damages occasioned by the negligent delay of the carrier in the transportation and delivery to the consignee of several shipments of crate material for the use of the consignee in the shipment of his crop of tomatoes, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence the amount of damages which he has suffered as a proximate result of such negligent delay.

This court has committed itself to the doctrine that the rules governing the assessment of damages are the same in tort as in contract, except where a tort is committed under such circumstances as to warrant the allowance of exemplary damages.

In an action against a carrier for the recovery of damages occasioned by the negligent delay in the transportation of goods, whether brought by the consignor or consignee, only such damages may be recovered as were contemplated or might reasonably be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties to the contract of carriage.In order to charge the carrier with any special damages, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that at the time of the shipment of the goods the carrier had notice or knowledge of such special facts and circumstances as to require expedition in the transportation of the goods, and that special damages would ensue by reason of negligent delay.

In an action by a consignee against a carrier for the recovery of damages occasioned by negligent delay in the transportation of goods, it may not constitute reversible error to permit the plaintiff to introduce documentary evidence, consisting of letters and telegrams which had passed between the plaintiff and the defendant, even if this evidence was incomplete in itself, and insufficient to show knowledge or notice to the defendant of any special damages which the plaintiff might sustain by reason of delay in the transportation, since such evidence tended to throw light upon the preliminary negotiations taking place between the plaintiff and the defendant and to explain the subsequent notice which was given to the defendant.This may likewise be true as to testimony of conversations between the plaintiff and the defendant.

It is doubtless true that common carriers are supposed to take notice of such natural events as are familiar to ordinary people.They will be held to a knowledge of seedtime and harvest, and of the general customs relating thereto in the territory where they do business.Even so, knowledge by a carrier of the fact that a shipper on its line has about 400 acres planted in tomatoes would not carry with it the additional knowledge when such tomatoes would be ready for the shipment thereof to begin or when the shipper would need crates, the number thereof that he would need, or that a few days' delay in the transportation thereof would result in special damages to such shipper.

In an action by a consignee against a carrier for the recovery of damages occasioned by negligent delay in the transportation of crate material to be used by the consignee in the shipment of tomatoes, it is error to permit the plaintiff to testify over the objection of the defendant, as to what amount of fertilizing material he had used in making his crop and of what such material consisted; such testimony not being pertinent to the issues.

Where losses and injuries are not a necessary, or a usual and ordinary, but a proximate though unusual, result of actionable negligence, such losses and injuries may be compensated for by the recovery of special damages; but the negligent party cannot lawfully be made to respond in damages for losses that do not usually result from or could not ordinarily have been foreseen as a proximate result of a particular negligence, unless it be shown that there was knowledge or notice on the part of the negligent person that such losses would or might follow as a proximate result of a particular negligence.

In action by a consignee against a carrier for the recovery of damages occasioned by negligent delay in the transportation of crate material, unless the carrier had at or before the receipt of the crates for transportation knowledge or notice of the particular special damages that would result...