Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Bradley

• Decision Date: 26 November 1935
• Citation: 121 Fla. 591,164 So. 360
• Parties: FLORIDA MOTOR LINES, Inc. v. BRADLEY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

164 So. 360

121 Fla. 591

FLORIDA MOTOR LINES, Inc. v. BRADLEY.

Florida Supreme Court

November 26, 1935

Error to Circuit Court, Orange County; Frank A. Smith, Judge.

Action by Dorothy Floyd Bradley, a married woman, by her next friend, D. N. Floyd, her father, against the Florida Motor Lines, Inc. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Reversed.

BROWN J., dissenting in part.

COUNSEL

E. W. & R. C. Davis, of Orlando, for plaintiff in error.

Dickinson & Dickinson, of Orlando, for defendant in error.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Dorothy Floyd Bradley, a married woman, by her next friend, D. N Floyd, sued the Florida Motor Lines, Inc., for damages for personal injuries sustained; and was awarded a verdict for $4,000 upon which judgment was entered.

Plaintiff filed her declaration, consisting of four counts, on May 1 1933. The declaration alleged in substance that defendant owned, possessed, and operated a bus line from Miami, Fla along the Dixie Highway to Orlando, Fla., and on to Tampa, Fla.; that defendant operated as a common carrier in the state of Florida; that in Miami, Orlando, and intermediate points defendant maintained ticket offices and stations for the sale of tickets and carrying on the business of a common carrier; that plaintiff in Miami purchased of defendant a ticket to Tampa by way of Orlando, paying therefor a reasonable consideration; that on or about March 4, 1933, in the nighttime, plaintiff boarded one of defendant's busses in Miami and traveled to Orlando, arriving there about 7:30 o'clock on the morning of March 5, 1933; that plaintiff entered defendant's waiting room with her baggage, being required to wait until later in the day for a bus going to Tampa; that a few minutes after arriving at defendant's waiting station and while remaining in the relationship of passenger to defendant, she called a taxi to go visit her father; that while plaintiff was leaving defendant's waiting room to get into the taxi, an agent, servant, and employee of defendant was assisting her with her baggage; that due to the carelessness and negligence of said agent, servant, and employee the said door closed with great force and violence against plaintiff's back as she was proceeding through the doorway, knocking plaintiff through the door onto the sidewalk, striking her left knee with great force and violence against the sidewalk; that due to the negligence and carelessness of defendant's agent, servant, and employee, plaintiff was greatly bruised and wounded, and suffered great pain; that plaintiff has paid and incurred doctor bills and drug bills; that at the time of her injury, plaintiff realized an income of approximately $100 per month; and that plaintiff has not and will not be able for a long time to do or perform any services.

The first two counts were framed on the theory that defendant's porter so carelessly and negligently handled the door while plaintiff was passing out of the station that said porter let the door 'close with great force and violence' against plaintiff's back, causing the injury complained of. The third and fourth counts were framed on the theory that defendant's porter so carelessly and negligently fastened the foot bolt to hold the door open that said door came loose and closed with great force and violence against plaintiff's back as she was passing out of the station, causing the injury complained of.

The parties went to trial upon the plea of the general issue of not guilty.

The evidence adduced showed that plaintiff had been injured in the left knee at the time and in the place alleged; that the injury was of such nature that she was unable 'to flex her leg more than an angle of 35 degrees'; that treatments of 'diathermy' and 'massage' had enabled her to attain that much flex; that since treatments had been stopped 'she had not got that much bend now'; that there is a '35% permanent disability there.'

There was conflicting testimony as to the manner in which plaintiff received her injury. The negro porter, Willie McQueen, testified that the door through which plaintiff walked when she fell and was injured had been fastened back by him by means of a foot bolt attached to the door when the bus in which plaintiff was riding arrived at the station, and that said door was not unfastened by him until after plaintiff had left in the taxi; that he could see through the open door when plaintiff fell and ran to her assistance. Plaintiff testified that she started out of the station door after Willie McQueen, the negro porter, had opened it for her, it being closed before that; that she was about a foot from the door sill on the inside of the station, the door, due to the careless and negligent manner in which said porter was holding it, was let loose, striking plaintiff in the back, throwing her to the sidewalk on her left knee.

The jury awarded plaintiff $4,000 damages. Motion for new trial was denied. Writ of error was taken.

Plaintiff in error assigned fortyeight errors. Only eight assignments are argued, viz., Nos. 2, 4, 7, 13, 17, 23, 24, and 25. The other forty may be considered as abandoned. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Watkins, 97 Fla. 350, 121 So. 95; Burnett v. Green, 97 Fla. 1007, 122 So. 570, 69 A.L.R. 244; McWilliams Co. v. Travers, 96 Fla. 203, 118 So. 54; McClure v. Century Estates, 96 Fla. 568, 120 So. 4; Kloss v. State, 95 Fla. 433, 116 So. 39; Denmark v. State, 95 Fla. 757, 116 So. 757.

The practice of assigning a large and unnecessary number of errors is disapproved. See Hoopes v. Crane, 56 Fla. 395, 47 So. 992; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Whitney, 65 Fla. 72, 61 So. 179; Mitchell v. Mason, 65 Fla. 208, 61 So. 579; Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Knowles, 68 Fla. 400, 67 So. 122.

In the first question presented it is argued that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant on the third and fourth counts of the declaration at the close of plaintiff's testimony. The court did direct a verdict for defendant on the third and fourth counts; but, upon reconsideration, reversed its ruling and allowed the trial to proceed on all four counts.

This question involves the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict in plaintiff's favor on the third and fourth counts of the declaration at that state of the trial.

At that time, there was testimony of plaintiff that she was hit in the back by the door at defendant's waiting room in Orlando, which threw her to the sidewalk on her left knee; and that Willie McQueen, the porter, was holding the door as she attempted to make her exit from said station.

There was also the following testimony of Willie McQueen before the jury:

'Q. Did you see this lady there? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. When she went to go out at the door on Wall Street, and you opened the door, did you fasten the door-stop? A. Yes, sir.'

Cross-examination:

'Q. Did you fasten the door-stop at the time she went to go out or previously? A. When we opened in the morning.

'Q. Was she there at that time? A. No, sir; the bus had just drive in the driveway at the time.'

The trial court, in considering this testimony, thought there was such contradiction that the jury should decide when Willie McQueen did fasten the door stop, or if it was fastened at all. It cannot be said as a matter of law that at the close of plaintiff's testimony there was no evidence before the jury to sustain the third and fourth counts.

A party moving for a directed verdict admits the facts stated in the evidence adduced and every conclusion favorable to his adversary fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom. See E. E. Alley Co. v. Ball, 102 Fla. 1034, 136 So. 704; Briggs v. Mann, 95 Fla. 31, 116 So. 2; Gulf Refining Co. v. Ankeny, 102 Fla. 151, 135 So. 521; Wolfe v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 774, 134 So. 539, 137 So. 892; Stevens v. Tampa Electric Co., 81 Fla. 512, 88 So. 303; Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, L.R.A. 1917E, 715.

In the second question presented it is argued that it was error to allow the physical demonstration before the jury as to the extent that plaintiff could bend her left knee.

Plaintiff had already testified that she could only bend her knee 'about one-eighth of an angle'; and Dr. Christ had testified that she had a 35 per cent....