Florida Power Corp. v. Webster

• Decision Date: 18 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. SC95122.,SC95122.
• Citation: 760 So.2d 120
• Parties: FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. William WEBSTER, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

760 So.2d 120

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. William WEBSTER, Respondent.

No. SC95122.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 18, 2000.

Daniel A. Amat of Hart & Gray, Ocala, Florida; and Daniel J. Fleming of Melkus & Fleming, Tampa, Florida, for Petitioner.

J. Michael Shea of Shea and Associates, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for Respondent.

SHAW, J.

We have for review Webster v. CSX Transportation, 725 So.2d 462 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision in Massey v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 132 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1961). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The petitioner asks us to revitalize what has come to be termed the "standing train doctrine" with respect to moving trains. Consistent with our treatment of the doctrine, we decline such an invitation. Instead we take the opportunity to formally abolish the doctrine as anachronistic to our system of comparative fault. Accordingly, we approve the Fifth District's decision in Webster and disapprove Massey.

On October 11, 1995, at approximately 5 a.m. the respondent, William Webster, was driving southbound on State Road 495 in Citrus County. Webster alleges that when he was approximately one mile from a railroad crossing, its warning lights first flashed, then dimmed out. Believing the train had passed through the intersection he continued towards the crossing, which had no gates or other barriers, at approximately 40-45 m.p.h. When he was within thirty feet of the tracks, he discovered the train was still traversing the crossing. Webster alleges that because of the poor weather conditions (rain, fog, and darkness) he was unable to see the train until he was within thirty feet of the tracks. Unable to stop in time, he reached the tracks and was struck by the last car of a ninety-car train.

In his second amended complaint,¹ Webster sued respondent, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), the owner of the railroad crossing. He alleged that FPC was negligent in failing to maintain the flashing warning signals at the crossing and that it had a nondelegable duty to maintain the crossing area. FPC moved for summary judgment based on the standing train doctrine as articulated by this Court in Brown v. Loftin, 154 Fla. 621, 18 So.2d 540 (1944), and applied by the Second District in Massey.

In its motion for summary judgment, FPC incorporated affidavits indicating that the train's lights were burning, that its horn was sounding, and that its bells were ringing at the time of the accident. The trial court granted FPC's motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, the Fifth District reversed, holding that the standing train doctrine had been modified since its articulation in Brown, removing its application from the instant case. See Webster, 725 So.2d at 463-65

. In so holding, the Fifth District refused to adopt the Second District's interpretation of the post-Brown modifications of the doctrine:

Massey held that the standing train doctrine had been modified with respect to standing (i.e., stationary) trains, but that the standing train doctrine had not been modified with respect to trains in motion. We believe that Massey failed to recognize the evolution in the law and Hutton's clear repudiation of a hard and fast rule. Further, the distinction made in Massey between a moving train and a stationary train is untenable because the Brown court held it to be a distinction without a difference.

Webster, 725 So.2d at 465. We agree with the Fifth District's reading of the doctrine's development.

The Standing Train Doctrine

"[O]ne who drives headlong into a train standing across a highway cannot be heard to complain of negligence because of the absence of any special warning, since the position of the train itself is the warning...." Hutton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 92 So.2d 528, 530 (Fla.1957). This is the substance of what has come to be termed the "standing train doctrine."

As originally conceived, this Court consistently applied the doctrine to preclude plaintiffs from recovering damages from accidents with stationary trains or railcars occupying crossings regardless of any special conditions the plaintiff alleged. See, e.g., Kimball v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 132 Fla. 235, 181 So. 533 (1938) (affirming sustaining of demurrer despite plaintiffs allegations of poor visibility and that an incline downwards in the road prevented the plaintiffs truck lights from illuminating the stationary freight cars); Clark v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 141 Fla. 155, 192 So. 621 (1939) (affirming sustaining of demurrer where plaintiff alleged that night was dark, foggy, and the road was wet and there were no street lights burning); Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628 (1939) (affirming sustaining of demurrer where plaintiff claimed extreme darkness obscured the train).

This rigid and unforgiving application of the doctrine could be understood by reference to the doctrine itself. The doctrine as applied in the early cases absolved the railroad of any duty to warn because the train provided adequate notice of its presence. See, e.g., Kimball, 132 Fla. at 238-39, 181 So. at 534 ("The train remaining stationary on the crossing, ipso facto, could not be the proximate cause of the injury, but the proximate cause was the driving of the car into the freight train while it was standing on the crossing, or the plaintiff's own negligence.").

In Brown v. Loftin, this Court addressed the question of whether the doctrine encompassed accidents with moving trains. The plaintiff in Brown drove her automobile into the seventeenth car of a thirty-two car freight train while it traversed a street crossing. The trial court, relying on Kimball and its progeny, dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The plaintiff argued that the rule of Kimball and subsequent cases was limited to accidents with standing trains. In Brown the Court found such a distinction unavailing, applying the doctrine and affirming the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.

Post-Brown Treatment of the Doctrine

Despite Brown's affirmation and extension of the doctrine, this Court gradually eroded the unforgiving approach of the earlier cases. Instead it began to consider the allegations of special circumstances previously deemed irrelevant. In Goff v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 53 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla.1951), this Court distinguished Brown on the grounds that the accident involved a car and a train simultaneously approaching a crossing:

In the instant case, the facts are clearly distinguishable from those in Brown.... In [Brown], the train was fully occupying the crossing at the time such crossing came within the range of vision of the driver of the automobile; in the instant case, the train and the automobile were simultaneously approaching the crossing, which could not have been fully occupied by the train more than a few seconds prior to the impact and, it appears, not until some time after the crossing itself (as distinguished from the approach thereto) was within the range of vision of the driver. Under such circumstances, we do not think the "standing train doctrine" is applicable.

The plaintiff in Goff alleged that the railroad company negligently permitted a dense growth of trees and bushes to grow on either side of the track so that the train was partially obscured.

We further narrowed the doctrine in Horton v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 61 So.2d 406 (Fla.1952), in setting aside the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss in favor of the railroad. In Horton the plaintiff, whose son was killed when he drove his motor bike underneath a standing box car, alleged that the light on the motor bike did not reflect high enough to show the box car standing across the highway. See also Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. v. Church, 212 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir.1954)

(holding that circumstances affecting the plaintiffs opportunity to observe the crossing created a jury question as to whether the railroad's stopping and standing of the train constituted negligence).

In Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Johnston, 74 So.2d 689 (Fla.1954), this Court affirmed judgments against a railroad arising out of an accident with a standing train where the plaintiff alleged that it was dark and raining, and that the crossing was obstructed by trees and underbrush. The railroad maintained that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Rather than preclude recovery based on the standing train doctrine, this Court opted to look at the circumstances surrounding the accident:

The answer to [the] question [of whether the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident] turns on the proof as to (1) whether or not the crossing was hazardous, (2) visibility at the time and place of the accident, (3) location of the locomotive and freight cars at the time of the accident and (4) condition of the approach to the crossing.

Id. at 689-90.

We again applied those factors in Hutton, where we formally acknowledged the shift from the strict application of the standing train doctrine to a fact-sensitive approach: "Although at one time this Court may have been committed to the `standing train doctrine' ... we have since engrafted upon that rule qualifying criteria capable of removing its harshly strict application when the facts warrant jury consideration." 92 So.2d at 530. The Hutton court, employing the Johnston factors, reversed the trial court's grant of the railroad's motion to set aside the verdict in favor of the plaintiffs where the plaintiffs claimed that the gondola car they collided with was dark and dingy, blending in with the color of the roadway surface, and that it was a dark night (there were no street lights illuminating the crossing): "[I]t is clear that the jury could have believed testimony and could have accepted evidence tending to prove that, under the facts of this case, the mere presence...