Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund v. Department of Labor and Employment Sec., 83-258

• Decision Date: 12 August 1983
• Docket Number: No. 83-258,83-258
• Citation: Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund v. Department of Labor and Employment Sec., 436 So.2d 332 (Fla. App. 1983)
• Parties: FLORIDA SHERIFFS YOUTH FUND, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, State of Florida, Unemployment Appeals Commission, and Mary E. Mikell, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 332

436 So.2d 332

FLORIDA SHERIFFS YOUTH FUND, Appellant, v.DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, State of Florida, Unemployment Appeals Commission, and Mary E. Mikell, Appellees.

No. 83-258.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Second District.

Aug. 12, 1983.

Keith C. Tischler of Madigan, Parker, Gatlin, Swedmark & Skelding, Tallahassee, for appellant.

John D. Maher, Tallahassee, for appelleeUnemployment Appeals Com'n.

BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.

The Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund appeals an order by appelleeUnemployment Appeals Commission(the Commission) ruling appellee/claimantMary E. Mikell eligible for unemployment compensation benefits.We reverse.

Claimant and her husband, James Mikell, were hired by appellant in March 1978 to work at the Girls Villa in Bartow as "cottage" or "group" parents.At the Girls Villa, a team of two group parents lives with a small number of children, providing a stable, family setting.

In order to produce a family environment, appellant requires that each team of group parents be a married couple.With the limited exception of relief or temporary parents, all persons serving as group parents fulfill this requirement.This arrangement is the standard practice in institutions such as this.

The Mikells were advised of their team status when they were hired.It was made clear to them that to continue employment as group parents, both must perform satisfactorily and that the resignation or discharge of one would result in the discharge of the other.

On May 27, 1982, both Mr. and Mrs. Mikell were discharged due to Mr. Mikell's misconduct, i.e., his failure to comply with appellant's guidelines.Claimant was a satisfactory employee not guilty of any misconduct; ¹ her discharge was due solely to the condition of employment requiring a husband and wife team as group parents.

Claimant applied for unemployment compensation benefits and was awarded benefits by the claims adjudicator.Appellant requested a hearing before an appeals referee, who found that claimant had left her employment without good cause attributable to her employer and was therefore disqualified for benefits.She appealed to the Commission, which reversed the referee's decision.This appeal followed timely.

The instant case is one of first impression and does not fit neatly within one or the other of the alternatives set forth in the statute.Accordingly, this court must look to the intent and spirit of the statute to fashion an equitable remedy.

This approach was taken in W.M. Palmer Co. v. Meeks, 354 So.2d 893(Fla. 1st DCA1978), in which the claimant advised her employer that she wished to remain at home to take care of her children.The company asked her to stay on until a replacement for her could be found, and she agreed to do so.Thereafter, once the employer had made arrangements for replacing her, she was advised that her services would no longer be needed after a certain date and was terminated.Because there was no misconduct on her part, the appeals referee and the Commission ruled that she was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.The first district, however, found this ruling "a tortured misconstruction of the letter and spirit of the unemployment compensation law."Id. at 894.

More analogous to the case before us is Paschal v. Florida Department of Labor & Employment Security, 405 So.2d 1020(Fla. 3d DCA1981), petition for review denied, 412 So.2d 468(Fla.1982), which affirmed the Commission's ruling that a county employee was disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits because he had voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer where he was terminated from his job, which required the use of a privately owned vehicle, after his automobile was repossessed and he did not secure another.There, as here, the employee had failed to meet a known condition of his employment.Whether or not this failure was the employee's fault, i.e., whether the employee had the ability to meet the employment condition if he so chose, was immaterial; the issue was whether his failure to meet his job requirements was due to good cause attributable to his employer.See alsoCoolaire Nordick International Corp. v. Florida Department of Commerce, 356 So.2d 1317(Fla. 4th DCA1978).

Section 443.101(1)(a), Florida Statutes(1981), provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits when "he has voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to...