Florida v. Burr 487 1201, 108 2840 487 1250, 109 13 518 903 550 444
Decision Date | 11 June 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-1320,89-1320 |
Citation | 110 S.Ct. 2608,110 L.Ed.2d 629,496 U.S. 914 |
Parties | FLORIDA, petitioner v. Charles Lewis BURR. Former decision, 487 U.S. 1201, 108 S.Ct. 2840; 487 U.S. 1250, 109 S.Ct. 13. Case below, 518 So.2d 903; 550 So.2d 444. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Former decision, 487 U.S. 1201, 108 S.Ct. 2840; 487 U.S. 1250, 109 S.Ct. 13.
Case below, 518 So.2d 903; 550 So.2d 444.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida.
June 11, 1990. The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further consideration in light of Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990).
For the reasons stated by Justice STEVENS, I agree that the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court should not be vacated. In any event, adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), I would direct that the proceedings on remand be circumscribed such that the State may not impose the death sentence.
Respondent was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a firearm. To establish respondent's identity, at the guilt phase of the trial the prosecution relied on "collateral crimes evidence"—three witnesses testified that respondent had committed similar crimes after the fatal shooting involved in this case. At the sentencing phase of his trial, the prosecutor offered no additional evidence; the jury recommended that respondent be sentenced to imprisonment for life with no possibility of parole for 25 years.
The trial judge overrode the jury's recommendation and sentenced respondent to death. He unequivocally stated that his decision to impose the death sentence was based on the collateral crimes evidence that had been received for the limited purpose of proving respondent's identity at the guilt phase of the trial.1
Respondent was later tried and acquitted of one of the collateral crimes, and the State abandoned its prosecution of a second. Thereafter, in state collateral-review proceedings, respondent sought to set aside his conviction on the ground that the subsequent acquittal of one of the collateral crimes demonstrated that the evidence had been improperly admitted.2 Over the dissent of Justice Barkett, the Florida Supreme Court rejected that conten- tion; it held that evidence that was properly received at the time it was offered had not been rendered "retroactively inadmissible." 3
In her dissent, Justice Barkett did not directly challenge that conclusion. She contended, however, that the State Supreme Court should have considered the propriety of the trial judge's reliance on that evidence at the penalty phase of the trial even though respondent's counsel had not squarely raised that point. She wrote:
. . . . .
Burr v. State, 518 So.2d 903, 907-908 (1987).
While respondent's petition for certiorari was pending in this Court, we decided a case with somewhat similar facts. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988). In that case a death sentence had been imposed on the basis of three aggravating circumstances, one of which was a prior New York conviction of a violent felony. In state collateral proceedings, Johnson had challenged his death sentence on the ground that the New York Court of Appeals had subsequently held that the prior conviction was invalid. The Mississippi Supreme Court, over the dissent of three justices, rejected that contention holding, in effect, that the subsequent invalidation of the felony conviction had not made the evidence retroactively inadmissible. See Johnson v. State, 511 So.2d 1333 (1987). We reversed, concluding that the death sentence could not stand when "the jury was allowed to consider evidence that has been revealed to be materially inaccurate." 486 U.S., at 590, 108 S.Ct., at 1989.
Our holding in Johnson did not directly resolve the issue presented in Burr's pending petition for certiorari; in Johnson the only evidence of the collateral crime that had been received was a certified copy of the invalid conviction, whereas in Burr's trial a witness had testified about the conduct that was later made the basis of an unsuccessful criminal prosecution. This Court nevertheless concluded that there was enough similarity between the cases to justify a remand of the Burr case to the Florida Supreme Court to reconsider its judgment in the light of our opinion in Johnson. See Burr v. Florida, 487 U.S. 1201, 108 S.Ct. 2840, 101 L.Ed.2d 878 (1988).
As the Court itself demonstrates by its action today, an order remanding a case to a lower court does "not amount to a final determination on the merits," Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777, 84 S.Ct. 1042, 1043, 12 L.Ed.2d 79 (1964), but only a conclusion that an intervening decision is sufficiently analogous to make re-examination of the case appropriate. That action was proper after Johnson for three important and independent reasons. First, of course, is the paramount importance of reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in any capital case.4 In Johnson, as in this case, that concern was implicated by a post-trial development that cast doubt on the reliability of evidence that played a critical part in the sentencing decision. Johnson made clear, what was apparent before, see Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 887-888, n. 23, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2748-2749, n. 23, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358-359, 362, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204-1205, 1206, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion), that a death sentence cannot stand when it is based on evidence that is materially inaccurate. Second, because the case had not yet reached the stage of federal collateral review, it was obvious that its ultimate disposition would be expedited by giving the Florida Supreme Court the first opportunity to consider the impact of Johnson; a different disposition would almost certainly have generated additional collateral proceedings in both state and federal courts. Third, the arguments in Justice Barkett's dissenting opinion, which were based partly on Florida law and partly on federal law, were buttressed by our reasoning in Johnson and had not been expressly rejected by the State Supreme Court's opinion which focused on respondent's contention that the collateral crimes evidence was inadmissible at the guilt phase of his trial.
Following our remand in light of Johnson, the Florida Supreme Court denied Burr's request for a new trial, but vacated his...
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