Florida v. Harris

• Decision Date: 19 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–817.,11–817.
• Parties: FLORIDA, Petitioner v. Clayton HARRIS.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

568 U.S. 237

133 S.Ct. 1050

185 L.Ed.2d 61

FLORIDA, Petitioner

v.Clayton HARRIS.

No. 11–817.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 31, 2012.

Decided Feb. 19, 2013.

Gregory G. Garre, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Joseph R. Palmore, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioner.

Glen P. Gifford, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

Gregory G. Garre, Counsel of Record, Brian D. Schmalzbach, Special Assistant Attorneys General, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General of Florida, Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Chief–Assistant Attorney General, Susan M. Shanahan, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Counsel for Petitioner.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider how a court should determine if the "alert" of a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court held that the State must in every case present an exhaustive set of records, including a log of the dog's performance in the field, to establish the dog's reliability. See 71 So.3d 756, 775 (2011). We think that demand inconsistent with the "flexible, common-sense standard" of probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

I

William Wheetley is a K–9 Officer in the Liberty County, Florida Sheriff's Office. On June 24, 2006, he was on a routine patrol with Aldo, a German shepherd trained to detect certain narcotics (methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy). Wheetley pulled over respondent Clayton Harris's truck because it had an expired license plate. On approaching the driver's-side door, Wheetley saw that Harris was "visibly nervous," unable to sit still, shaking, and breathing rapidly. Wheetley also noticed an open can of beer in the truck's cup holder. App. 62. Wheetley asked Harris for consent to search the truck, but Harris refused. At that point, Wheetley retrieved Aldo from the patrol car and walked him around Harris's truck for a "free air sniff." Id., at 63. Aldo alerted at the driver's-side door handle—signaling, through a distinctive set of behaviors, that he smelled drugs there.

Wheetley concluded, based principally on Aldo's alert, that he had probable cause to search the truck. His search did not turn up any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect. But it did reveal 200 loose pseudoephedrine

pills, 8,000 matches, a bottle of hydrochloric acid, two containers of antifreeze, and a coffee filter full of iodine crystals—all ingredients for making methamphetamine. Wheetley accordingly arrested Harris, who admitted after proper Miranda warnings that he routinely "cooked" methamphetamine at his house and could not go "more than a few days without using" it. Id., at 68. The State charged Harris with possessing pseudoephedrine for use in manufacturing methamphetamine.

While out on bail, Harris had another run-in with Wheetley and Aldo. This time, Wheetley pulled Harris over for a broken brake light. Aldo again sniffed the truck's exterior, and again alerted at the driver's-side door handle. Wheetley once more searched the truck, but on this occasion discovered nothing of interest.

Harris moved to suppress the evidence found in his truck on the ground that Aldo's alert had not given Wheetley probable cause for a search. At the hearing on that motion, Wheetley testified about both his and Aldo's training in drug detection. See id., at 52–82. In 2004, Wheetley (and a different dog) completed a 160–hour course in narcotics detection offered by the Dothan, Alabama Police Department, while Aldo (and a different handler) completed a similar, 120–hour course given by the Apopka, Florida Police Department. That same year, Aldo received a one-year certification from Drug Beat, a private company that specializes in testing and certifying K–9 dogs. Wheetley and Aldo teamed up in 2005 and went through another, 40–hour refresher course in Dothan together. They also did four hours of training exercises each week to maintain their skills. Wheetley would hide drugs in certain vehicles or buildings while leaving others "blank" to determine whether Aldo alerted at the right places. Id., at 57. According to Wheetley, Aldo's performance in those exercises was "really good." Id., at 60. The State introduced "Monthly Canine Detection Training Logs" consistent with that testimony: They showed that Aldo always found hidden drugs and that he performed "satisfactorily" (the higher of two possible assessments) on each day of training. Id., at 109–116.

On cross-examination, Harris's attorney chose not to contest the quality of Aldo's or Wheetley's training. She focused instead on Aldo's certification and his performance in the field, particularly the two stops of Harris's truck. Wheetley conceded that the certification (which, he noted, Florida law did not require) had expired the year before he pulled Harris over. See id., at 70–71. Wheetley also acknowledged that he did not keep complete records of Aldo's performance in traffic stops or other field work; instead, he maintained records only of alerts resulting in arrests. See id., at 71–72, 74. But Wheetley defended Aldo's two alerts to Harris's seemingly narcotics-free truck: According to Wheetley, Harris probably transferred the odor of methamphetamine to the door handle, and Aldo responded to that "residual odor." Id., at 80.

The trial court concluded that Wheetley had probable cause to search Harris's truck and so denied the motion to suppress. Harris then entered a no-contest plea while reserving the right to appeal the trial court's ruling. An intermediate state court summarily affirmed. See 989 So.2d 1214, 1215 (2008) (per curiam ).

The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that Wheetley lacked probable cause to search Harris's vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. "[W]hen a dog alerts," the court wrote, "the fact that the dog has been trained and certified is simply not enough to establish probable cause." 71 So.3d, at 767. To demonstrate a dog's reliability, the State needed to produce a wider array of evidence:

"[T]he State must present ... the dog's training and certification records, an explanation of the meaning of the particular training and certification, field performance records (including any unverified alerts), and evidence concerning the experience and training of the officer handling the dog, as well as any other objective evidence known to the officer about the dog's reliability." Id., at 775.

The court particularly stressed the need for "evidence of the dog's performance history," including records showing "how often the dog has alerted in the field without illegal contraband having been found." Id., at 769. That data, the court stated, could help to expose such problems as a handler's tendency (conscious or not) to "cue [a] dog to alert" and "a dog's inability to distinguish between residual odors and actual drugs." Id., at 769, 774. Accordingly, an officer like Wheetley who did not keep full records of his dog's field performance could never have the requisite cause to think "that the dog is a reliable indicator of drugs." Id., at 773.

Judge Canady dissented, maintaining that the majority's "elaborate and inflexible evidentiary requirements" went beyond the demands of probable cause. Id., at 775. He would have affirmed the trial court's ruling on the strength of Aldo's training history and Harris's "fail[ure] to present any evidence challenging" it. Id., at 776.

We granted certiorari, 566 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1796, 182 L.Ed.2d 615 (2012), and now reverse.

II

A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when "the facts available to [him] would ‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief’ " that contraband or evidence of a crime is present. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) ); see Safford Unified School Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370–371, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009). The test for probable cause is not reducible to "precise definition or quantification." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). "Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence ... have no place in the [probable-cause] decision." Gates, 462 U.S., at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. All we have required is the kind of "fair probability" on which "reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act." Id., at 238, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating whether the State has met this practical and common-sensical standard, we have consistently looked to the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Pringle, 540 U.S., at 371, 124 S.Ct. 795; Gates, 462 U.S., at 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). We have rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach.

In Gates, for example, we abandoned our old test for assessing the reliability of informants' tips because it had devolved into a "complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules," any one of which, if not complied with, would derail a finding of probable cause. 462 U.S., at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. We lamented the development of a list of "inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case." Id., at 230, n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Probable cause, we emphasized, is "a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set...