Flowers v. Perales
| Decision Date | 12 September 1988 |
| Citation | 140 A.D.2d 136,532 N.Y.S.2d 395 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Martha FLOWERS, Appellant, v. Cesar A. PERALES, etc., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Leonard S. Clark, Nassau/Suffolk Law Services, Hempstead (Douglas Ruff, of counsel), for appellant.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Mineola (Elizabeth Bradford, of counsel), for respondent State Com'r.
Before THOMPSON, J.P., and BROWN, WEINSTEIN and RUBIN, JJ.
The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 against the Commissioner of the Nassau County Department of Social Services (hereinafter the local agency) and the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services (hereinafter the state agency) to discharge the local agency's bond and mortgage against her property as well as its claims for reimbursement of public assistance benefits received by the petitioner and her household prior to September 15, 1973, and declaring that certain of the local agency's practices relating to the mortgage and reimbursement claims were contrary to law. Prior to the commencement of this proceeding, the petitioner had requested a hearing before the New York State Commissioner of Social Services to review a notification that the local agency had a lien of $77,809.18 against the petitioner's property. The State Commissioner thereafter determined that the contested notification by the Local Agency was not an agency determination subject to review. Consequently, the petitioner also sought to review the State Commissioner's Decision After Fair Hearing and a declaration that the State Agency had jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue.
Consistent with our power pursuant to CPLR 103(c), we hereupon convert this proceeding into a declaratory judgment action with the petition deemed the complaint. For the reasons which follow, we make the following declarations: (1) the liens taken pursuant to Social Services Law § 106 are governed by the 10-year Statute of Limitations set forth in Social Services Law § 104, (2) the Nassau County Department of Social Services is entitled to take both a deed and a mortgage as a condition for providing public assistance, (3) the decision of the New York State Department of Social Service not to enforce its interpretation of the applicability of the 10-year Statute of Limitations set forth in Social Services Law § 104 to liens taken under Social Services Law § 106 did not violate the general principle of "single state agency" supervision of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereinafter AFDC) plan as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 602, (4) the lien of the Nassau County Department of Social Services was lawful even to the extent that it included AFDC benefits received by the dependent children of the petitioner, and (5) the petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services.
By way of pertinent factual background, the petitioner, Martha Flowers, had, at various times since 1965, received medical assistance and public assistance in the category of AFDC on behalf of herself and her two minor children. At the time of the determination of the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services which is the subject of this proceeding, the petitioner was not a recipient of any form of aid other than medical assistance.
In January 1982, while the petitioner was not receiving public assistance, she became the owner of real property located at 13 Covert Street, Hempstead, New York. When she subsequently became in need of public assistance, the Nassau County Department of Social Services required the petitioner to execute a deed and a bond and mortgage in its favor on the Covert Street property as a condition of providing such assistance. The bond and mortgage dated September 15, 1983, were recorded September 16, 1983. In those documents the petitioner acknowledged her indebtedness to the local agency for the sums which had been and which were to be advanced to her by the local agency on behalf of herself and the relatives for whom she was legally responsible. The petitioner further agreed to pay such sums and, as security for such payment, granted the mortgage on her property.
By letter dated September 4, 1985, the local agency, at the petitioner's request, sent the petitioner a "Statement of Assistance Granted". In the statement, the local agency set forth the amount of public assistance granted to the petitioner's family from February 1965 through March 18, 1985, and indicated that the amount of the local agency's lien was $77,809.18. There was no demand for payment attached, and the local agency has taken no steps to foreclose on the mortgage.
By letter dated January 3, 1986, the petitioner, through her attorney, disputed the amount claimed by the local agency as its lien, maintaining that Social Services Law § 104 imposed a 10-year Statute of Limitations on the local agency's lien, which was taken pursuant to Social Services Law § 106. Attached to the letter were letters from officials from the state agency which essentially agreed with the position of the petitioner. By letter dated March 13, 1986, the local agency responded to the petitioner, expressing disagreement with her interpretation of the law and declining to revise the amount of the lien.
Shortly thereafter, the petitioner requested a fair hearing before the State Commissioner to review the local agency's notification of September 4, 1985. A hearing was held on April 15, 1986. At the hearing, the petitioner, by her attorney, asserted that the local agency's notification of September 4, 1985, constituted an agency "determination" which was subject to review on the merits. The local agency, however, claimed that the notification was not a final agency determination in that the notice proposed to take no action and that no agency action was contemplated with respect to the lien.
By Decision After Fair Hearing dated May 23, 1986, the State Commissioner held that the local agency notification sought to be contested was not a final agency determination subject to review. The State Commissioner further noted that, if there had been an agency determination to enforce a recovery under a bond and mortgage, such determination would not have been subject to review on the merits by means of a fair hearing as it would not be within the jurisdiction for a fair hearing review as set forth in Social Services Law § 22 and 18 NYCRR part 358.
Thereafter, the petitioner commenced the instant proceeding seeking, inter alia, to compel the local agency to discharge both its mortgage against her property and its claims for reimbursement of certain public assistance payments, and declaring that the local agency's mortgage and claims were contrary to law.
The petitioner contended that: (1) pursuant to Social Services Law § 22 and the regulations thereunder, the State Commissioner's determination that he lacked jurisdiction to review the local agency's September 1985 notification was arbitrary and capricious, (2) pursuant to Social Services Law § 360(1) the Local Agency could require only a deed or mortgage and not both, (3) pursuant to Social Services Law § 101 the Local Agency could not claim a lien for reimbursement of assistance granted to the petitioner's minor children, (4) pursuant to Social Services Law § 104(1), the local agency could not claim a lien for reimbursement of assistance payments made more than 10 years earlier than the date of the lien, (5) the State Commissioner's determination violated the "single state agency" provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 602, and (6) by virtue of all the foregoing the respondents had deprived the petitioner of due process of law.
The State Commissioner, representing the State Agency, filed an answer together with objections in point of law contending that the Decision After Fair Hearing was supported by substantial evidence, that the petitioner's claims were premature, that it was appropriate for the Local Agency to seek reimbursement of payments made to the petitioner's minor children and that she had waived her right to claim otherwise, that the State Commissioner had not violated any constitutional or Federal statutory right of the petitioner and was, therefore, not liable for attorneys' fees, and that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The State Commissioner further contended that there were valid differences of opinion as to whether the 10-year Statute of Limitations applies to the enforcement of liens on real property and that since the local agency was procedurally the correct party to defend its lien, it was the responsibility of the local agency to defend its position that the 10-year Statute of Limitations did not apply. The State Commissioner stated that the issue should be resolved by the courts, which resolution would then be implemented by the State Commissioner on a state-wide basis.
The Local Commissioner, representing the local agency, also filed an answer and memorandum of law which essentially reiterated the contentions of the State Commissioner. The Local Commissioner additionally asserted that "[t]here is no Statute of Limitations involving liens pursuant to Social Services Law Section 106" and that the Local Agency may not accept less from recipients of public assistance for discharge of a mortgage than the full cost of public assistance granted.
The Supreme Court, Nassau County (Molloy, J.), by judgment dated March 12, 1987, held that the State Commissioner's determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Supreme Court found that the Local Agency's notice did not constitute final agency action since the Statement of Assistance issued to the petitioner at her own request "did not propose to enforce the lien against the petitioner's property". The Supreme Court also upheld the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Deem v. Bane
... ... To remand the matter simply so that the agency could reiterate this conclusion (Long v. Perales, 172 A.D.2d 667, 568 N.Y.S.2d 657 [2d Dept., 1991], lv. to app. den., 78 N.Y.2d 854, 573 N.Y.S.2d 644, 578 N.E.2d 442) would be contrary to both ... D'Elia, 95 A.D.2d 817, 463 N.Y.S.2d 860 [2d Dept.1983]; Little Flowers ... ...
-
Andersen ex rel. Himself v. Roberts, 1412-17
... ... at 6-7).In response, Plaintiff argues that these arguments are foreclosed by the Second Department's decision in Matter of Flowers v. Perales, 140 A.D.2d 136, 532 N.Y.S.2d 395 [2d Dept. 1988]. In that case, petitioner brought an article 78 proceeding "against the Commissioner of ... ...
-
Barrett v. Lubin
... ... Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 271 N.E.2d 528, rearg. denied 29 N.Y.2d 749, 326 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 276 N.E.2d 238; Matter of Flowers v. Perales, 140 A.D.2d 136, 142-143, 532 N.Y.S.2d 395; McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 129)" (Matter of Buffalo Columbus Hosp. v ... ...
-
Buffalo Columbus Hosp. v. Axelrod
... ... 165 A.D.2d 605 ... Matter of BUFFALO COLUMBUS HOSPITAL, Respondent, ... David AXELROD, M.D., Commissioner of Health, Cesar A ... Perales, Commissioner of Social Services; and ... Dall W. Forsythe, Director of the ... Budget, Appellants ... Supreme Court, Appellate Division, ... Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 271 N.E.2d 528, rear'g denied, 29 N.Y.2d 749, 326 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 276 N.E.2d 238; Matter of Flowers v. Perales, 140 A.D.2d 136, 142-143, 532 N.Y.S.2d 395; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 128). Here, respondents' interpretation of ... ...