Flowers v. Rebo, LR-C-87-642.
Decision Date | 29 December 1987 |
Docket Number | No. LR-C-87-642.,LR-C-87-642. |
Citation | 675 F. Supp. 1165 |
Parties | Connie FLOWERS, Plaintiff, v. Robert REBO, Individually and In His Official Capacity, and Cliff Peck Chevrolet, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
John Walker, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff.
Ruth W. Woodling, Fisher & Phillips, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.
Pending now is the joint motion of the defendants, Robert Rego and Cliff Peck Chevrolet, to dismiss the plaintiff's state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage) for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow the motion is denied.
The plaintiff, Connie Flowers, a white female, brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In her complaint she alleged, inter alia, that she was discharged by the defendant Cliff Peck Chevrolet in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment by the defendant Robert Rego, a male co-worker. She further alleged that the conduct of the defendants which formed the basis of her Title VII action also constituted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage) as defined by Arkansas law. The defendants have moved to dismiss arguing that the court, in this Title VII case, is without power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim. In the alternative the defendants argue that the court's power to exercise pendent jurisdiction is discretionary and that jurisdiction should be declined.
The defendants rely on Jong-Yul Lim v. International Institute of Metropolitan Detroit, 510 F.Supp. 722 (E.D.Mich.1981), in which the district court held that it was without power to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state law claims in a Title VII case.1 The court reasoned that, in addition to the two-pronged test set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966),2 in deciding whether it has power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims there must also be an examination of the statutory grant of jurisdiction. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). After examining Title VII, and in specific focusing on the limited nature of relief under that statute,3 the Lim court concluded that Congress had impliedly negated the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over non-federal claims.
Accordingly, the court finds that it has the power to hear the plaintiff's pendent state law claim and now must decide whether that jurisdiction should be exercised. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). The court must determine whether considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants will be served by trying the state and federal claims in one proceeding. Other relevant considerations are whether the pendent claims present unsettled questions of state law, whether the state law claims will predominate and whether jury confusion is likely to result. Id. at 725-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1138-39.
Because the plaintiff's Title VII and state law claims are premised on the same allegations of fact and would involve testimony by the same witnesses, the court finds that judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants would best be served by trying both claims in one proceeding. See Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.1983) ( ). It is unlikely that the state law claim will predominate as the Title VII claim alleged is not unsubstantial.5 Moreover, the pendent claim is based upon wellsettled state law.6
Lastly, the prospect of jury confusion is not great. Juries in federal courts routinely hear cases presented under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, for example, while a Title VII case is being tried simultaneously to the court. The Eighth Circuit's confidence in the jury's ability to correctly separate the issues under these circumstances was evidenced in its decision in Garza v. City of Omaha, 814 F.2d 553, 557 (8th Cir.1987), in which it held that a jury verdict on the issue of discriminatory intent in the § 1983 case collaterally estops the court from reaching an inconsistent conclusion in the Title VII case. That court has also said that where pendent state claims are sufficiently interrelated with § 1981 and Title VII claims, as required by Gibbs, "then the plaintiff should not be forced to sue in two different courts." Thompkins v. Stuttgart School Dist. No. 22, 787 F.2d 439, 442-43 (8th Cir.1986).7
Therefore, the court finds that it should properly exercise pendent jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that the defendants' motion to dismiss same should be, and IS HEREBY ORDERED DENIED.
1 Other district courts have adopted the reasoning of Lim. See, e.g.: Kiss v. Tamarac Utilities, Inc., 463 F.Supp. 951 (S.D.Fla.1978); Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 531 F.Supp. 115 (M.D.Fla.1982); Hoferek v. University of Missouri, 604 F.Supp. 938 (W.D.Mo.1985); Frye v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, 555 F.Supp. 730 (D.S.C.1983); Davis v. Devereux Foundation, 644 F.Supp. 482 (E.D.Pa.1986); Guzman Robles v. Cruz, 670 F.Supp. 54 (D.Puerto Rico 1987); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Services Corp., 669 F.Supp. 569 (W.D.N.Y.1987) ( ).
2 Gibbs held that federal courts must first determine the existence of judicial power to hear pendent state claims, and then determine whether to exercise that power. Judicial power exists when there is a substantial federal claim, both the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact and the claims are such that they would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one proceeding. In deciding the proper exercise of discretion, the court must consider judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants. The relevant factors are whether pendent claims present unsettled issues of state law, whether state law claims will predominate, and whether jury confusion is likely to result. 383 U.S. at 725-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1138-39.
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