Flowers v. Steele
| Decision Date | 23 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:09CV00777 ERW (LMB) |
| Parties | STEVEN T. FLOWERS, Petitioner, v. TROY STEELE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the court on the petition of Steven Flowers for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This cause was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
Petitioner is presently incarcerated at Potosi Correctional Center in Mineral Point, Missouri, pursuant to the judgment and sentence of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. Resp't Ex. C at 58. Petitioner pled guilty on January 2, 2007, to the following three charges: (1) class A felony of felony murder in the second degree, (2) unclassified felony of armed criminal action, and (3) class A felony of arson in the first degree. Id. at 23. On February 23, 2007, petitioner was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years imprisonment. Id. at 53-54.
On May 7, 2007, petitioner filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035. Id. at 64-69. On November 29, 2007, after appointment of counsel, petitioner filed an amended motion. Id. at 85-110. Petitioner raised three claims in his amended post-conviction relief motion. See id. Petitioner first argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that plea counsel advised petitioner to enter a "blind" plea of guilt with the promise that if he pleaded guilty, the judge would sentence him to no more than fifteen years, and by threatening certain conviction and consecutive life sentences if he went to trial. Id. at 86. Petitioner also argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that plea counsel failed to apprise petitioner of the nature of the charges. Id. at 95 Finally, petitioner argued that the court did not assure there was a factual basis to accept petitioner's pleas and thus lacked jurisdiction to sentence petitioner. Id. at 102. On January 31, 2008, the motion court denied petitioner's motion. Id. at 112-117.
On March 11, 2008, petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. Id. at 120. Petitioner raised three points on appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief. See Resp't Ex. A. Petitioner first argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that plea counsel induced him to enter a "blind" plea of guilty with the promise that the judge would sentence him to no more than fifteen years, and if he took his case to trial, he would certainly be convicted and receive life sentences. Id. at 17. Petitioner next argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that plea counsel failed to advise petitioner of evidentiary issues with the State's case, specifically the State's proof of the arson count, proof of accomplice liability, and proof of armed criminal action. Id. at 22. Finally, petitioner argued that the motion court did not assure that there was a factual basis on which to accept petitioner'sguilty plea and that the court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to sentence petitioner. Id. at 29. On November 26, 2008, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. See Resp't Ex. D.
On May 20, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising three grounds for relief. (Doc. No. 1). In his first ground for relief, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that plea counsel induced him to plead guilty by promising that the judge would sentence him to no more than fifteen years and by threatening certain conviction and life imprisonment if he went to trial. In his second ground for relief, petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that plea counsel failed to advise him of evidentiary issues with the State's case. In his third ground for relief, petitioner argues that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient. On August 13, 2009, respondent filed a Response to Order to Show Cause, in which he argues that petitioner's grounds for relief fail on their merits. (Doc. No. 8). Petitioner filed a Traverse on October 15, 2009, in which he provides further argument in support of his petition. (Doc. No. 10).
Petitioner drove himself and three other men to a gas station to fill juice bottles with gasoline. Petitioner then drove the men to an apartment complex at 8990 Torchlamp in St. Louis County. The men approached Apartment C with gasoline filled bottles. Petitioner threw an unlit bottle at the apartment building, which caused gas to spread across the front of the building. Anthony Smith then threw a lit bottle of gasoline at the building, which caused both any unignitedgasoline and the gasoline in Mr. Smith's bomb to ignite, causing the apartment building to erupt in flames. At the time of petitioner's acts and during the apartment fire, Julliet Maina was in Apartment C baby-sitting not only her own child, but also another child, Ronald Payne III. Julliet Maina was able to get her own child to safety, but was unable to reach Ronald. The police and fire departments were called. Ronald, a fourteen-month-old child, died in the fire.
Petitioner was charged with felony murder in the second degree, armed criminal action, and arson in the first degree. Petitioner entered a "blind" plea of guilty to all charges.
A federal court's power to grant a writ of habeas corpus is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides:
The Supreme Court construed § 2254(d) in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). With respect to the "contrary to" language, a majority of the Court held that a state court decision is contrary to clearly established Federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite tothat reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law" or if "the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." 120 U.S. at 413. Under the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d)(1), a writ may issue if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court's] cases but unreasonably applies [the principle] to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Id. at 408. Thus, "a federal habeas court making the 'unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. Although the Court failed to specifically define "objectively unreasonable," it observed that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 410.
As previously stated, petitioner raises three grounds for relief. The undersigned will discuss petitioner's grounds for relief in turn.
In his first ground for relief, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that plea counsel induced him to plead guilty with the promise that the judge would sentence him to no more than fifteen years, and by threatening certain conviction and life imprisonment if he went to trial.
"A defendant's knowing and intelligent guilty plea forecloses 'independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.'" United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1187 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)). "When a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process andenters a plea upon counsel's advice, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Blalock v. Lockhart, 977 F.2d 1255, 1257 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)). "[A]n expectation that movant would receive a lighter sentence does not make a plea involuntary." Gillespie v. State, 785 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). "While a guilty plea taken in open court is not invulnerable to collateral attack in a post-conviction proceeding, the [petitioner's] representations during the plea-taking carry a strong presumption of verity and pose a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings." Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Voytik v. United States, 778 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1985)). A state court's factual findings regarding the plea are presumed to be correct so long as they are fairly supported by the record. Bivens v. Groose, 28 F.3d 62, 63 (8th Cir. 1994).
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must show that (1) his attorney failed to exercise the degree of skill and diligence a reasonably competent attorney would exercise under similar circumstances, and (2), the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. "Deficiency means that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and prejudice means that, but for counsel...
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