Floyd Cnty. v. Wolfe
| Decision Date | 07 July 1908 |
| Citation | 117 N.W. 32,138 Iowa 749 |
| Parties | FLOYD COUNTY v. WOLFE ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Floyd County; C. H. Kelly, Judge.
Action to recover on account of moneys expended for the support of the insane ward in the state hospital. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.L. O. Rue, Co. Atty., for appellant.
Eggert & Lockwood, for appellees.
In the year 1895 the defendant Ernestina Wolfe, was married to one Louis Wolfe. In 1893 they became possessed of a house and lot in Charles City, Iowa, which they occupied as a home until the year 1900, when the said Ernestina was adjudged insane, and committed to the state hospital provided for such unfortunates. Since that time the plaintiff Floyd County has expended for her support in said institution the sum of $733.50, no part of which has been repaid. In the year 1905 Louis Wolfe brought suit in the district court of Floyd county to annul said marriage, on the ground that the defendant was at the date thereof insane and incapable of contracting a valid marriage. Upon due notice of the proceeding and trial to the court, a decree was entered granting the relief prayed, and providing for a division of the homestead property, one-third to the defendant Ernestina Wolfe and two-thirds to the said Louis Wolfe. Since that time the property has been sold in partition proceedings, and the proceeds of the one-third interest therein of Ernestina Wolfe, something less than $300, is in the hands of the defendant Eggert, her guardian. In the case at bar the county presents a claim for the moneys expended for the support of the ward, and asks that the fund in the hands of the guardian be applied to its payment. There are no children of said marriage, and the ward is still in the hospital. In the agreed state of facts to the above effect, it is also conceded that said ward is not the head of a family, has no family dependent on her, and is not married. The money thus obtained by the guardian constitutes all the property of the ward, and the guardian offers to “turn it over to the county in part payment of its claim, provided the superintendent of the hospital where the ward is confined will furnish a certificate that she is and will remain incurably insane.” On this showing the trial court held with the contention of the guardian that the moneys sought to be reached were exempt to the ward as the proceeds of the sale of a homestead, and denied the prayer of the petition, without prejudice to the renewal of the application, “in the event that for any reason the funds cease to be exempt.” The one question presented by the appeal is whether under the agreed facts the ward's share in the moneys arising from the sale of the property occupied by her and the said Louis Wolfe as a home previous to the annulment of their marriage is exempt from execution. The claim of exemption is based upon the theory that for the purposes of the homestead statute the ward, after the annulment of the marriage, is entitled to the homestead rights of a divorced wife. The statute as to the homestead rights of a divorced person reads as follows: It is also further provided that no change of the homestead without the concurrence of the husband or wife shall affect his or her rights therein, and that a new homestead to the extent of the value of the old is exempt in all cases where the old one would have been. Appellees seek to further support their contention by reference to the statute regulating the annulment of marriages. Without setting it out in full, it may be said that this statute provides that a marriage may be annulled where either party was insane or idiotic at the time of the marriage (Code, § 3182), and except as otherwise provided the pleadings and practice in such cases shall be the same as in actions for divorce. Code, § 3183. Homestead rights are the creatures of legislative enactment, and, while the statute is to be construed with generous liberality to effect its benevolent purposes, the court may not by interpretation or construction unduly extend its scope for the benefit of persons not expressly or by fair implication included in the list of its beneficiaries. The homestead which the law exempts is “the homestead of every family.” Code, § 2972. The word “family” in its most usual signification is the group comprising the husband and wife and their dependent children. In a somewhat more enlarged sense, it consists of a person acting as head or manager with others living with and depending upon him and occupyingthe same home. Parsons v. Livingston, 11 Iowa, 104, 77 Am. Dec. 135; Arnold v. Waltz, 53 Iowa, 706, 6 N. W. 40, 36 Am. Rep. 248;In re Rafferty (D. C.) 112 Fed. 512; Sheehy v. Scott, 128 Iowa, 551, 104 N. W. 1139, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 365, 111 Am. St. Rep. 184. The definition is still further enlarged by the statute above quoted, and made to include the widow or widower, though without children, while continuing to occupy the real estate used as a homestead at the death of the spouse and the divorced person to whom it is adjudged or given by the terms of the decree of divorce during his or her continued personal occupancy. Code, § 2973. No person can claim the benefit of homestead exemption unless he or she comes within one of the classes above mentioned. The ward in this case is confessedly not the head of a family. It is clearly evident that she is not a widow, and, unless she is to be classed as a wife to whom the homestead has been adjudged in a decree of divorce, she is very clearly not one of those for whom the statute clothes the property with exemption from execution.
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