Floyd ex rel. Their Minor Child San Francisco v. City of Hous.
| Decision Date | 26 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:15-cv-795-FtM-38CM |
| Parties | TRISHA FLOYD and CHRISTOPHER FLOYD, on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor child S.F., Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF SANIBEL, COMMUNITY HOUSING AND RESOURCES, INC. and KELLY COLLINI, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 68), Defendant City of Sanibel's Amended Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc. 86), and each party's respective responses thereto (Docs. 92; 93). For the following reasons, the Court denies both motions for summary judgment.
This action stems from mold found in Plaintiffs Trisha Floyd, Christopher Floyd, and their minor child's apartment. (Doc. 37). The Floyds are suing the City of Sanibel, Community Housing and Resources, Inc. ("CHR"), and Kelly Collini for, among otherthings, not providing them a reasonable accommodation after discovering the mold in their apartment.2 (Doc. 37).
The Floyds lived in an apartment in the Woodhaven, a twelve-unit apartment building. The Woodhaven is part of the City's Below Market Rate Housing program ("BMRH"). The City created the BMRH to provide housing to low and moderate-income persons. (Doc. 86 at 3). The City outlined its vision for the BMRH in the Sanibel Plan (Doc. 80-1) and codified the program in its Ordinances, which secures the housing element of the Sanibel Plan. (Docs. 86 at 3; 80-2). Pertinent here, the Ordinances allowed the City to hire a non-profit housing foundation to enact the BMRH. (Doc. 80-2).3 The City did just that with CHR in 1983. (Doc. 87-1 at 11).
As the operator of the BMRH program, CHR agreed to perform all reporting, administrative, and like obligations outlined in the Ordinances and Sanibel Plan. (Docs.87-1 at 2; 68 at 24; 93; 80-3 at 1; Doc. 80-2). The City and CHR also executed a separate contract for CHR to build the Woodhaven with the City giving money for the building's construction costs. (Docs. 81-1 at 2; 81-4; 81-8).
After the Woodhaven was built, CHR transferred to the City the property on which the building sat. (Doc 87-1 at 60). The City, in turn, leased the property back to CHR for fifty years for the limited purpose of enacting the BMRH. (Doc. 87-1 at 62).
Enter the Floyds now. They applied to the BMRH housing program. (Doc. 86 at 6). Kelly Collini, CHR's executive director, testified that CHR reviewed the Floyds' application and sent a redacted copy to Judie Zimomra, the City's manager, for approval. (Doc. 81-3 at 26-27). Around this time, T. Floyd told CHR representatives that she and her child were sensitive to mold. (Doc. 69-1 at ¶ 8).
After the Floyds were accepted into the program, they signed a lease agreement with CHR and moved into the Woodhaven in early 2015. (Doc. 69-1 at 7). Within months, however, T. Floyd and her child began to experience signs of toxic mold exposure. (Doc. 69-1 at 3). On June 18, 2015, C. Floyd took samples from the apartment to be tested for mold - the samples were positive. (Doc. 68 at 26). T. Floyd then informed Patti Bohm, CHR's former housing administrator, of the results. (Docs. 69-1 at ¶ 13; 81-1 at ¶ 16). T. Floyd and her child were later diagnosed with biotoxin exposure and toxic mold exposure, respectively. (Doc. 68 at 27).
On July 7, 2015, Bohm told Collini about the mold-positive tests in T. Floyd's apartment. (Doc. 81 -1 at ¶ 17). According to the Floyds, no action was taken to remediate the mold for several months - a point that Collini disputed. (Docs. 81-1 at 18; Doc. 94-1at 6). On November 7, 2015, T. Floyd told CHR that her family would withhold rent if the conditions were not fixed. (Docs. 68 at 27; 93 at 7).
Two days later, T. Floyd met with Zimomra at Sanibel City Hall to discuss her issues as a CHR tenant and her and her child's mold-related illnesses. (Doc. 81 at 95). Zimomra thereafter emailed a summary of her meeting with T. Floyd to CHR members and Jim Jennings, a City council member. (Docs. 82-1; 81 at 100-103). Several days later, Bonnie McCurry, a CHR employee, emailed a proposed plan to remediate the mold to the Floyds. (Doc. 82-2). This plan included installing a new air conditioning system and running oxidizers for a minimum of eight hours to kill the mold. T. Floyd, through her attorney, said the proposed plan was incomplete and proposed an alternative one. (Doc. 83 at 1-5). Ultimately, neither plan was agreed upon. The Floyds then moved out of the Woodhaven apartment and brought this action.
The Amended Complaint alleges violations of the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Florida Fair Housing Act ("FFHA"). (Doc. 37). It also alleges state law claims for breach of the Florida Landlord-Tenant Act, breach of lease, unlawful retaliation under Florida Statute § 83.64, and negligence.4 (Doc. 37). Both parties now move for summary judgment. The Floyds move for partial summary judgment on liability, whereas the City seeks summary judgment on all claims. (Docs. 68; 86; 92; 93).
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the party shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.See Fed R. Civ. P. 56. When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) ([citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56]). An issue of fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under the applicable law, and an issue of fact is genuine if a rational trier of fact, taking the record as a whole, could find for the nonmoving party. See Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
If the moving party meets the initial responsibility, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and cannot rely on mere allegations or denials. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the opposing party's position is not enough. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted). The nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed and all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor. See Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Therefore, if a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party, a summary judgment motion is defeated. See id.
Cross motions for summary judgment may be indicative of the nonexistence of a factual dispute. Shook v. United States, 713 F.2d 662, 665 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). "Indeed, when both parties proceed on the same legal theory and rely on the same material facts the court is signaled that the case is ripe for summary judgment." Id. But where parties take inconsistent legal theories and disagree as to the facts, the mere filing of cross motions for summary judgment does not warrant entry of summary judgment. See id. Courts are not bound by the parties' assertion that no material facts exist and may discover questions of fact on its own. See Griffis v. Delta Fam.-Care Disability, 723 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir. 1984).
The parties' motions for summary judgment hinge on two major liability issues. First, whether the City and CHR had an agency relationship when it came to BMRH. Without an agency relationship, the Floyds cannot catch the City on the hook for its claims through vicarious liability. Second, whether the City directly controlled the Woodhaven. Naturally, the parties take conflicting positions on the level of control, if any, the City exerted over CHR and the Woodhaven. And the record before the Court conflicts as well.
In addition, the parties advance alternative arguments. The City argues it cannot be liable because of the common law theory of caveat lessee as it leased the Woodhaven property to CHR. The City also contends that it offered the Floyds a reasonable accommodation and therefore satisfied its obligations under the FHA, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and FFHA. Lastly, the City maintains sovereign immunity bars the Floyds' claims for breach of landlord duties, breach of lease, and retaliatory conduct. The Court will address each argument in turn, starting with agency.
A principal is liable for the tortious conduct of its agent, if the agent acted in the scope of its apparent authority. See Life Ins. Co. of N.A. v. Del Aguila, 417 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. 1982). Control by a principal is required for an agency relationship to exist. See Goldschmidt v. Holman, 571 So.2d 422, 424 n.5 (Fla. 1990) (); Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1162 (11th Cir. 1993) (). Notably, it is the right to control, rather than the actual control, that determines an agency action. Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So.2d 842, 853 (Fla. 2003) (citation omitted);
Generally, the existence of an agency relationship is reserved for the trier...
To continue reading
Request your trial