Floyd v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 30 July 2014
• Docket Number: 08 Civ. 1034 (AT),12 Civ. 2274 (AT)
• Parties: DAVID FLOYD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant. JAENEAN LIGON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

DAVID FLOYD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.

JAENEAN LIGON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

08 Civ. 1034 (AT)

12 Civ. 2274 (AT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

July 30, 2014

OPINION AND ORDER

ANALISA TORRES, District Judge:

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded Floyd and Ligon to the District Court to resolve pending motions to intervene in these actions and to "effectuate a settlement" between "such concerned or interested parties as the District Court deems appropriate." Floyd, ECF No. 426; Ligon, ECF No. 166. As a result, two motions are now before this Court.

In the first motion, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., the Detectives' Endowment Association, Inc., the NYPD Captains Endowment Association, and the Lieutenants Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., collectively, and the Sergeants Benevolent Association,¹ separately, move to intervene as defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 for the purposes of (1) appealing three orders issued by theHonorable Shira A. Scheindlin: (a) the first, enjoining the City of New York (the "City") from conducting trespass stops outside of certain Bronx apartment buildings without reasonable suspicion of trespass in Ligon; (b) the second, finding the City liable for violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiff class in Floyd; and (c) the third, ordering remedies in Floyd and Ligon; (2) participating in the settlement of Floyd and Ligon; and (3) participating in the remedial phase of the litigation. Because their motions raise identical issues, the Court addresses them together, referring to all of the proposed intervenors collectively as the "Unions" and noting variations only where relevant. The Floyd and Ligon plaintiffs are collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs." Plaintiffs and the City oppose the Unions' intervention.²

In the second motion, Plaintiffs and the City, having reached an agreement to resolve the City's appeals in Floyd and Ligon, move for an order modifying the remedies order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and the Court's inherent authority, such that the term of the court-appointed monitor is limited to three years, provided that the City shows substantial compliance with its obligations by the end of that term.

The motions to intervene are DENIED for three reasons: (1) the motions are untimely; (2) the Unions have no significant protectable interests relating to the subject of the litigation that would warrant intervention; and (3) even if their alleged interests were cognizable, the Unions lack standing to vindicate those interests on appeal.

The parties' motion for an order modifying the remedies order is GRANTED. The modifications shall be set forth in a separate order to be issued forthwith. The Unions' request to participate in the settlement of Floyd and Ligon is, therefore, DENIED as moot.

The Unions' request to participate in the remedial phase of Floyd is also DENIED asmoot because the remedies order already offers "police organizations" the opportunity to participate in the development of reforms to NYPD stop-and-frisk policies and procedures through the "Joint Remedial Process." The Unions' request to participate in the remedial phase of Ligon is DENIED for the same reasons the Court denies their motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the remedies order.

BACKGROUND

Nearly fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court of the United States endorsed the practice that became known as "stop-and-frisk." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). There, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops, questions, and frisks a suspect without probable cause if the officer has reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot" or a reasonable belief that the person "may be armed and presently dangerous." Id. at 30. In the decades since, the contours of Terry's exception to probable cause have been vigorously litigated in the courts.

In this current iteration, two sets of plaintiffs challenge the legality of the New York City Police Department's (the "NYPD") stop-and-frisk tactics. In Ligon, after a seven-day evidentiary hearing, on January 8, 2013, the Court issued a preliminary injunction against the City, finding that plaintiffs would likely succeed in proving that the City has a policy of stopping, frisking, and arresting persons for trespass based primarily on their presence in or near Bronx apartment buildings enrolled in the Trespass Affidavit Program ("TAP")—which permits the NYPD to patrol private buildings with their owners' consent—in violation of the Fourth Amendment (the "Injunction Order"). Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 486 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013), amending and superseding, Ligon v. City of New York, 12 Civ. 2274,2013 WL 71800 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013). In Floyd, after years of litigation culminating in a nine-week trial, on August 12, 2013, the Court issued an opinion holding that the City had a policy of conducting race-based stops-and-frisks that ran afoul of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (the "Liability Order"). Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Because of the similarities in the City's constitutional violations in Floyd and Ligon, the Court issued a second opinion on August 12, 2013, which ordered certain remedial measures to cure the constitutional infirmities identified in both cases (the "Remedial Order"). Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

Initially, the City appealed the Injunction, Liability, and Remedial Orders. Several weeks later, the Unions moved to intervene and also filed notices of appeal. Then, in January 2014, newly-elected Mayor Bill de Blasio announced the City's intention to withdraw the appeals and settle the cases.³ The Unions, nevertheless, still seek intervention to prosecute the appeals the City no longer wants to pursue. The Injunction, Liability, and Remedial Orders are the product of fifteen years of litigation, against the backdrop of decades of public discourse on the issue of stop-and-frisk. Thus, because a full account of these cases would fill libraries, the Court chronicles only those facts that aid in addressing the Unions' motions to intervene.

I. Daniels, Floyd, and Ligon

A. Daniels v. City of New York

As the Second Circuit observed, the Floyd and Ligon actions "descend[] directly" from an earlier lawsuit, Daniels v. City of New York, 99 Civ. 1695 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. 1999). See Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 122, 122 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013), vacated in part, 743 F.3d 362 (2dCir. 2014). On March 8, 1999, Kelvin Daniels and Robert Roe filed a putative class action against the City, the NYPD, the mayor, the police commissioner, and John Doe officers, alleging that the City had a policy, custom, and practice, carried out by the NYPD's Street Crimes Unit,⁴ of suspicionless, racially-motivated stops-and-frisks that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Complaint, Daniels, ECF No. 1. The Daniels plaintiffs sought injunctive relief prohibiting the Street Crimes Unit from improperly using race or national origin in conducting stops-and-frisks and reforming relevant training, supervision, and monitoring procedures. Id. In particular, they sought to enforce the requirement that officers complete UF-250 forms⁵ for each stop they conduct, that UF-250s be periodically reviewed for compliance with the Constitution, and that UF-250s be computerized and maintained in a database. Am. Compl. 45, Daniels, ECF No. 8. Over the next five years, the parties engaged in extensive discovery and litigated several major motions, including a motion to dismiss and a motion for class certification. Daniels, ECF Nos. 18, 21, 75.

At the same time Daniels was being litigated, the United States Department of Justice (the "DOJ") conducted an investigation of the NYPD's stop-and-frisk practices.⁶ As part of the investigation, the DOJ moved to intervene in Daniels pursuant to Rule 24(b) in order to access the UF-250s the City had provided to the Daniels plaintiffs during discovery. See Daniels, ECF Nos. 93, 94. The court denied the DOJ's motion, reasoning that the proper avenue to obtain the material was for the DOJ to file its own civil action rather than disrupting Daniels. Daniels v.City of New York, 200 F.R.D. 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

In September 2003, the parties in Daniels reached a settlement. Daniels, ECF No. 153. Notice of the settlement was published in three newspapers, El Diario, The New York Post, and The New York Amsterdam News, see Daniels, ECF No. 150, and a public hearing was held on December 12, 2003, see Daniels, ECF No. 154. Pursuant to the settlement, plaintiffs released their class claims against the City, and the City agreed to implement stop-and-frisk audit procedures, revise training, ensure that all stops be documented on a revised UF-250 form, conduct joint community forums, and provide class counsel with quarterly updates. Daniels, ECF Nos. 151, 152. The Daniels settlement remained in effect through December 31, 2007. Id.

B. Floyd v. City of New York

In January 2008, a month after the Daniels settlement period ended, David Floyd and Lalit Clarkson commenced a lawsuit against the City, the mayor, the police commissioner, and several individual NYPD officers. Compl., Floyd v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2008), ECF No. 1. The complaint alleged that the City had a policy, custom, and practice of suspicionless and race-based stops-and-frisks and sought city-wide injunctive relief, including changes to the NYPD's policies and practices governing training, supervision, discipline, and monitoring of officers with respect to stop-and-frisk and racial profiling. Id. The New York...