Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 1998-KM-01252-SCT.
Citation | 749 So.2d 110 |
Decision Date | 24 November 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 1998-KM-01252-SCT.,1998-KM-01252-SCT. |
Parties | Graham Alexander FLOYD v. CITY OF CRYSTAL SPRINGS, Mississippi. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
Robert Lewis Spotswood, Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.
Robert W. Lawrence, Crystal Springs, Attorney for Appellee.
EN BANC.
SMITH, Justice, for the Court:
¶ 1. This case comes to this Court on appeal following the conviction in the Circuit Court of Copiah County, Mississippi, of Graham Floyd for first offense DUI.
¶ 2. On April 24, 1997, Graham Floyd was operating his vintage red 1966 Ford Mustang convertible in an easterly direction along Highway 27 within the City of Crystal Springs, Mississippi, when he was stopped by members of the Crystal Springs Police Department and subsequently arrested for driving under the influence. Floyd was tried and convicted by the Municipal Court of Crystal Springs, Mississippi, for DUI, first offense, on May 15, 1997.
¶ 3. Floyd then appealed the conviction to the Circuit Court of Copiah County, Mississippi. Circuit Judge Lamar Pickard conducted a de novo bench trial and found Floyd guilty of DUI, first offense, in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a) (Supp.1998). Floyd was sentenced to pay a fine of $500.00 plus State assessments in the amount of $172.00, and was taxed with all costs of the appeal to the circuit court. Floyd now appeals the conviction to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶ 4. Officer Gerome Leflore of the Crystal Springs Police Department was off duty when a citizen approached him at a gas station on Mississippi Highway 27 on April 24, 1997, and reported to him that there was a person in an antique model, red Mustang convertible driving at a high rate of speed in a reckless manner headed into town on Highway 51. Because Officer Leflore was not on duty at the time, he called the Crystal Springs Police Department and relayed the information to the dispatcher. Officer Leflore testified that the citizen who reported the incident, David Rogers, had given Leflore information and complaints in the past.
¶ 5. The police dispatcher radioed the information to Officer Chris Palmer, who proceeded to the intersection of Highway 51 and Highway 27 in Crystal Springs, where he intercepted a vehicle matching the description given by the dispatcher. When Officer Palmer began following the Mustang, there was a vehicle between Officer Palmer's patrol car and the Mustang, and Officer Palmer testified that he did not see the driver of the Mustang violate any traffic laws. As soon as Officer Palmer could safely pass the vehicle, he pulled the Mustang to the side of the road.
¶ 6. Officer Palmer testified that he asked the driver, Graham Floyd, for his license. Officer Palmer stated that the top was down on the convertible, and he noticed a glass on the middle console of the vehicle and an opened bottle of a white substance labeled "vodka" on the passenger side.
¶ 7. Officer Palmer testified that he asked Floyd to step from the vehicle, and that, when Floyd did so, he staggered, and Officer Palmer had to step between Floyd and the highway to keep Floyd safely out of the highway. Officer Palmer stated that Floyd told him he had had a few drinks at the County Line beer joint and was drinking some on the way home. Officer Palmer also testified that Floyd's speech was "really slurred," and that Floyd muttered and talked loudly. Officer Palmer stated that Floyd tried to fix his pants leg and almost fell.
¶ 8. Officer Palmer testified that Floyd had a knot on his head that was bleeding a little, apparently from a fight Floyd had been engaged in earlier that evening. Palmer stated that he asked Floyd several times whether Floyd wanted to see a doctor, but that Floyd refused medical assistance. ¶ 9. Officer Palmer then thought it necessary to transport Floyd to the police department for the intoxilyzer test, so he handcuffed Floyd and drove him to the police station. At the station, Officer Palmer told Floyd he had the right to refuse the test and explained the consequences of refusal. At that time, Floyd asked to use the telephone to call his attorney. Officer Palmer testified that, upon Floyd's request, he gave Floyd the nearest telephone available, which was only five feet from where the two were sitting. Officer Palmer did not leave the room while Floyd called his attorney. Floyd told his attorney on the phone that he had had a few drinks. Subsequent to the telephone conversation, Floyd refused to take the intoxilyzer test.
¶ 10. Floyd was tried and convicted by the Municipal Court of Crystal Springs, Mississippi, for DUI, first offense, on May 15, 1997. Floyd then appealed the conviction to the Circuit Court of Copiah County, Mississippi. Circuit Judge Lamar Pickard conducted a de novo bench trial and found Floyd guilty of DUI, first offense, in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a) (Supp.1998). At trial, Floyd's counsel objected to the introduction of the telephone conversation and moved to dismiss for lack of probable cause to stop Floyd's vehicle. Judge Pickard reserved ruling on the objection regarding the telephone conversation, and never issued a final ruling to that objection. Judge Pickard overruled the motion to dismiss, and stated that there was probable cause to stop the vehicle. From this ruling, Floyd appeals, raising the following issues:
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 11. This Court must utilize a separate standard of review for each of the two issues raised by Floyd. First, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). This Court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. Id. Thus, this Court is restricted to a de novo review of the trial judge's findings using the applicable "substantial evidence"/"clearly erroneous" standard. McNeal v. State, 617 So.2d 999, 1007 (Miss.1993) (citing Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114 (Miss.1991)).
¶ 12. Second, this Court has held that "[t]he standard of review regarding admission [or exclusion] of evidence is abuse of discretion." Thompson Mach. Commerce Corp. v. Wallace, 687 So.2d 149, 152 (Miss.1997). Where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court "will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party." In re Estate of Mask, 703 So.2d 852, 859 (Miss.1997); Terrain Enters., Inc. v. Mockbee, 654 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Miss. 1995).
DISCUSSION
I. WHETHER A POLICE OFFICER HAS THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO STOP A VEHICLE WHEN THE OFFICER DID NOT OBSERVE ANY MOTOR VIOLATIONS OR SUSPICIOUS DRIVING, YET RECEIVED SPECIFIC INFORMATION FROM A THIRD PARTY WARNING THAT THE DRIVER WAS OPERATING THE VEHICLE IN A RECKLESS MANNER.
¶ 13. Floyd argues that the power of a law enforcement officer to perform an investigatory stop without a warrant is limited to those instances when a misdemeanor or felony is committed in the presence of the officer or when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is involved in a felony. Thus, Floyd contends that because reckless driving is a misdemeanor and because Officer Palmer did not personally observe Floyd driving in a reckless manner, the stop performed by Officer Palmer was unlawful as a violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.
¶ 14. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution contain almost identical language expressing a person's right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures "applies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops such as the stop of a vehicle." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969)
; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
¶ 15. By statute in Mississippi, a law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, a suspect for a misdemeanor when the misdemeanor was committed in the officer's presence. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(1) (Supp.1999). However, the statute permits an officer to arrest a suspect for a felony where the officer has reasonable ground to believe the person to be arrested committed a felony, even though not committed in the officer's presence.
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