Floyd v. Suntrust Banks, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 May 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:10–CV–2620–RWS.
• Citation: 878 F.Supp.2d 1316
• Parties: Susan FLOYD, Plaintiff, v. SUNTRUST BANKS, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

878 F.Supp.2d 1316

Susan FLOYD, Plaintiff,

v.SUNTRUST BANKS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:10–CV–2620–RWS.

United States District Court,

N.D. Georgia,

Atlanta Division.

May 15, 2012.

Matthew C. Billips, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Brian Matthew Herman, David Richard Kresser, Fisher & Phillips, LLP, Elizabeth Johnson Bondurant, Nikole Marie Crow, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

RICHARD W. STORY, District Judge.

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment [68, 71], Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [70], and Defendants' Motion to Strike [75]. After a review of the record, the Court enters the following order.

I. Factual Summary¹

Plaintiff Susan Floyd is an attorney who was hired by SunTrust Banks, Inc. (“SunTrust”)in January 2006 to serve in SunTrust's legal department. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶¶ 1–2. In 2009, Plaintiff was granted a medical leave of absence under SunTrust's Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) policy, and she took continuous FMLA-plan leave from April 13, 2009 to June 29, 2009. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 4. On July 17, 2009, Plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in this Court against SunTrust and one of her former colleagues, David Miraldi (“underlying litigation”). Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 5. In that complaint she raised, inter alia, sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 13. Specifically, in paragraphs 45 and 56 of the complaint in the underlying litigation, Plaintiff alleged that as a result of SunTrust's practices “Plaintiff has suffered undue mental and physical anguish and physical symptoms related to extreme stress. As a further direct result of [SunTrust's] employment practices, Plaintiff has been humiliated, embarrassed and otherwise mentally degraded.” Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 15.

Starting in early 2009, Aetna Life Insurance Company (“Aetna”) became the administrator of SunTrust's leave management program, which included ensuring compliance with FMLA. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 16. Aetna maintained and stored documents related to SunTrust's FMLA record-keeping requirements, and it operated as SunTrust's agent. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 27. However, if SunTrust had not retained Aetna to service its FMLA obligations, SunTrust would have had Plaintiff's FMLA documents in its direct possession. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 28.

On October 1, 2009, SunTrust sought access to the Plaintiff's confidential medical and psychotherapy information and records via interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Dkt. No. [68–3] at ¶ 27; Dkt. No. [75] at 12. On November 3, 2009, Plaintiff objected to the requests, citing her right to privacy, confidentiality, and privilege in the requested documents. Dkt. No. [68–3] at ¶ 28; Dkt. No. [75] at 12.

Theresa Hammond, a Defendant in this action, was also employed as an in-house counsel for SunTrust and managed Plaintiff's underlying litigation. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 9. On November 19, 2009, Hammond sent an email to Christina Alexander at Aetna requesting FMLA records for Plaintiff and another employee. Dkt. No. [68–3] at ¶ 30; Dkt. No. [75] at 12. Specifically, the email stated:

Christina,

I need to get FMLA records for two employees in relation to a lawsuit and a threatened lawsuit we have. Is there someone in particular to whom I should direct these requests? Also, I assume Aetna has a document retention protocol such that records are preserved if they are necessary for litigation, but please let me know if we need to do anything in particular to ensure record preservation on matters.

The employees are Susan Gerin [the Plaintiff] (EEID 129608) and [redacted].

As always, I appreciate your help in pointing me in the right direction on this.

Theresa

Dkt. No. [68–3] at ¶ 30; Dkt. No. [75] at 12. Hammond did not make this request for the purpose of administering the FMLA plan, but instead made it for purposes of pursuing the underlying litigation. Dkt. No. [68–3] at ¶ 32; Dkt. No. [75] at 12. The Defendants also did not alert Plaintiff that they were seeking her FMLA file. Dkt. No. [68–3] at ¶ 33; Dkt. No. [75] at 12. Hammond received the seventy-eight page file on December 3, 2009. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶¶ 30–31. That same day, Hammond forwarded the file to SunTrust's outside counsel, Fisher & Phillips, LLP. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 32.

On November 20, 2009, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint, seeking to delete any claim for mental or psychological damages. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶¶ 16–20. On December 2, 2009, Plaintiff served written discovery requests on SunTrust which requested “[t]he complete personnel file(s) of Plaintiff ... including ... salary and benefit information.” Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 24.

On December 18, 2009, Magistrate Judge C. Christopher Hagy held a discovery conference “regarding Plaintiff's failure to respond to certain discovery requests by Defendant concerning Plaintiff's medical records.” Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 36. At the conference, Judge Hagy directed SunTrust to file a motion to compel. Id. Three days later, Judge Hagy granted Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint thereby deleting all mental and psychological damages claims. Civil Action No. 1:09–CV–1951–RWS, Dkt. No. [20]. On December 22, 2009, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned from SunTrust. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 12.

On January 11, 2010, SunTrust filed its motion to compel, and in doing so, attached three pages of the Plaintiff's FMLA file in support. Dkt. Nos. [70–2, 77] at ¶ 38. On February 24, 2010, Judge Hagy ruled that Plaintiff had not waived the psychologist-patient privilege, hinging his analysis on the fact that Plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed any claim based on mental health damages. Civil Action No. 1:09–CV–1951–RWS, Dkt. No. [46] at 7–11. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the underlying litigation on June 10, 2010. Civil Action No. 1:09–CV–1951–RWS, Dkt. No. [53].

On August 20, 2010, Plaintiff then filed this action against Hammond, SunTrust, Aetna, and Alexander. Aetna and Alexander moved to dismiss all claims against them, and the Court granted their motion. Dkt. No. [56]. On August 11, 2011, the Court held a telephonic conference with the parties. Following that conference the parties entered into the following consent order:

A conference call was conducted between the parties and the Court on August 11, 2011 in the above matter to discuss Plaintiff's request for a stay in order to brief a potentially dispositive issue. Plaintiff seeks to brief the following issue: Whether Defendant Theresa Hammond's request for the SunTrust FMLA file relating to Plaintiff from Aetna ... on November 19, 2009 and its receipt by Hammond and production to defense counsel on December 3, 2009 violated the [ADA], 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). The FMLA file at issue in this briefing is the file Defendants agree was received on December 3, 2009 and produced in this case, Bates-stamped 1–78. If the Court determines that no ADA violation occurred, the Court will enter a dismissal with prejudice of all counts and claims against all Defendants.Dkt. No. [66]. The parties have now filed partial motions for summary judgment on the ADA question.

II. DiscussionA. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party bears ‘the initial responsibility of informing the ... court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.2004) ( quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences which are reasonable. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) ( quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (once the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”).

Finally, the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not give rise to any presumption that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Rather, “[c]ross-motions must be considered separately, as each movant bears the...