Fluth v. Schoenfelder Constr., Inc., #28116
Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
Writing for the Court | KERN, Justice |
Citation | 2018 S.D. 65 |
Parties | KAYLA FLUTH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SCHOENFELDER CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant, and LARRY WEISSER, Defendant and Appellee. |
Decision Date | 29 August 2018 |
Docket Number | #28116,#28146 |
2018 S.D. 65
KAYLA FLUTH, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SCHOENFELDER CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant,
and
LARRY WEISSER, Defendant and Appellee.
#28116
#28146
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS ON JANUARY 8, 2018 August 29, 2018
#28116, #28146-rev in pt & aff in pt-JMK
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT DAVISON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
THE HONORABLE PATRICK T. SMITH Judge
MICHAEL E. UNKE
Salem, South Dakota
Attorney for plaintiff and
appellant.
DOUGLAS M. DEIBERT
MELISSA R. JELEN
Caldwell, Sanford, Deibert
& Garry LLP
Sioux Falls, South Dakota
Attorneys for defendant and
appellee, Larry Weisser.
Page 2
KERN, Justice
[¶1.] Kayla Fluth sued Larry Weisser and Schoenfelder Construction, Inc., (Schoenfelder) to recover damages for flooding in her basement caused by a waterline leak on Weisser's property. Prior to trial, Schoenfelder made an offer of judgment for $7,500. Fluth accepted, Schoenfelder paid Fluth, and Fluth filed a satisfaction of judgment. Weisser then moved for summary judgment, arguing a satisfaction of judgment discharges all other joint tortfeasors from liability. The circuit court granted the motion, and Fluth appeals. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
[¶2.] On June 3, 2012, a disgruntled tenant set off a gas explosion in the basement of one of Weisser's Mitchell, South Dakota rental properties. The explosion lifted the house off its foundation and caused extensive damage to the interior. After visiting the site, Weisser contacted Schoenfelder to demolish the home and grade the property to normal elevation.
[¶3.] Shortly after Schoenfelder began tearing down the house, Weisser met with Brian Wendelboe, the Mitchell Water Distribution Department foreman. City officials had attempted to access the waterline themselves the night of or day after the explosion, but tree roots obstructed access to the shutoff valve at the curb. When deposed, Wendelboe claimed he told Weisser that the waterline accessing the property needed to be shut off by a licensed plumber at either the street-curb valve or at the water main beneath the street. Wendelboe also claimed he told Weisser that the waterline could be bent over and hammered shut only as a temporary fix.
Page 3
According to Wendelboe, when he asked Weisser how he intended to deal with shutting the water off permanently, Weisser responded, "Let's not worry about it right now."
[¶4.] Weisser shut off the water in the basement and had the water meter removed. During demolition work on July 3, 2012, Schoenfelder broke the waterline. Schoenfelder bent the pipe over and hammered it shut to temporarily lessen the flow of water. Weisser then hired Krohmer Plumbing to shut off the water permanently at the curb. Schoenfelder dug up the curb stop, and Krohmer attempted to reach the shutoff valve. However, the tree again rendered the shutoff valve inaccessible. Schoenfelder claims that Weisser instructed Schoenfelder to "finish the job, cover it up." Weisser did not subsequently contact the City of Mitchell to have the tree removed or have the water valve shut off.
[¶5.] The following spring, Fluth noticed water penetrating her basement. After tearing out the boards and sheet rock on the west wall, Fluth discovered extensive water damage. On June 28, 2013, Fluth contacted law enforcement after seeing water pooling on Weisser's empty lot. Wendelboe called Weisser and informed him of the situation, and Weisser again hired Krohmer to shut off the water. The Mitchell Parks and Recreation Department cut down the tree in front of the property, enabling Krohmer to access the shutoff valve at the curb. Fluth has not experienced any further trouble with ground water entering her basement.
Page 4
[¶6.] Fluth subsequently brought suit against Weisser and Schoenfelder,1 alleging fraud and negligence. In her January 21, 2015 amended complaint, Fluth alleged the leak caused water to enter her basement, damaging her property and promoting growth of mold hazardous to her family's health. Fluth sought compensatory and punitive damages.
[¶7.] The court scheduled a three-day trial to begin on June 29, 2016. On June 2, 2016—just weeks before trial—Schoenfelder made Fluth an offer of judgment for $7,500. On June 15, 2016, Fluth accepted Schoenfelder's offer, and Schoenfelder later remitted the funds. On July 18, 2016, Fluth filed a satisfaction of judgment.
[¶8.] On June 22, 2016, Fluth, having obtained permission from the court, filed a second amended complaint dismissing Schoenfelder as a defendant and adding claims of deceit and "intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious conduct" against Weisser. Fluth again requested compensatory and punitive damages. The court rescheduled the trial for January 2017 to allow the parties time to complete additional pretrial proceedings. On October 13, 2016, Weisser moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of punitive damages and on Fluth's theories of deceit, fraudulent concealment, and "intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious conduct." At a November 16, 2016 motions hearing, the circuit court granted Weisser's motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of deceit and fraudulent concealment. However, it denied Weisser's motion to dismiss Fluth's
Page 5
claim of "intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious conduct" and her request for punitive damages. The court also allowed discovery of Weisser's financial information prior to trial but barred the jury from considering the issue of proportionate fault, stating that SDCL 15-8-17 only authorized a pro-tanto offset.
[¶9.] On November 30, 2016, Weisser moved the circuit court to permit either a cross-claim or a third-party action against Schoenfelder. On December 15, 2016, Weisser filed another motion for summary judgment pursuant to SDCL 15-6-56(c)(2). Weisser argued that Fluth discharged all other joint tortfeasors from liability when she satisfied her claim with Schoenfelder.
[¶10.] On January 3, 2017, Fluth and Weisser attended a hearing on Weisser's motions. Schoenfelder's counsel also appeared at the hearing. The court orally denied Weisser's motion to permit a cross-claim or third-party action against Schoenfelder, reasoning that "allowing [a third-party action] at this late hour with trial next week and with a party already resolving their exposure through a satisfaction of judgment greatly prejudices that party . . . ." As to Weisser's motion for summary judgment, the court observed that the case presented a question of first impression. Citing the "well-settled rule" established in other jurisdictions that "satisfaction of one judgment precludes action against another joint tortfeasor," the court granted summary judgment. The court set forth its rulings in an order dated January 6, 2017. Fluth appeals, raising the following issue for our review:
1. Whether the circuit court erred by granting Weisser's motion for summary judgment.
Weisser, by notice of review, raises several additional issues, which we consolidate as follows:
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2. Whether Weisser is entitled to a pro-rata offset on the negligence claim as determined by a jury, and whether Weisser should have been permitted to bring a cross-claim or third-party action against Schoenfelder.
3. Whether the circuit court should have granted Weisser's motions for partial summary judgment on Fluth's request for punitive damages for Weisser's alleged intentional, willful, wanton, and malicious conduct.
1. Whether the circuit court erred by granting Weisser's motion for summary judgment.
[¶11.] Fluth argues that the circuit court erred by granting Weisser's motion for summary judgment, contending that SDCL 15-8-16 permits a plaintiff to bring a claim against one joint tortfeasor despite obtaining a satisfaction of judgment against the other. According to Fluth, the words "recovery of a judgment" contained in SDCL 15-8-16 encompass a satisfaction. Thus, Fluth argues that filing a satisfaction of judgment against Schoenfelder had no effect on Weisser's liability. As a case of first impression in South Dakota, Fluth contends the statute's plain meaning and the decisions of out-of-state courts support her position.
[¶12.] "[S]tatutory interpretation is a question of law, reviewed de novo." Upell v. Dewey Cty. Comm'n, 2016 S.D. 42, ¶ 6, 880 N.W.2d 69, 71. In discerning the intent of the Legislature, we examine statutory language by "attempt[ing] to give words their plain meaning and effect . . . ." Gloe v. Union Ins. Co., 2005 S.D. 30, ¶ 8, 694 N.W.2d 252, 256. In construing an ambiguous statute, a court may examine "the legislative history, title, and the total content of the legislation." Zoss v. Schaefers, 1999 S.D. 105, ¶ 6, 598 N.W.2d 550, 552.
Page 7
[¶13.] In 1945, the South Dakota Legislature codified the 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) at SDCL 15-8-11 to 15-8-15 and 15-8-16 to 15-8-22. W. Consol. Co-op. v. Pew, 2011 S.D. 9, ¶ 57, 795 N.W.2d 390, 403 (Zinter, J., concurring specially and concurring in result). "That Act creates and regulates the right of contribution among 'joint tortfeasors.'" Id. (citing SDCL 15-8-11). SDCL 15-8-16, which codifies § 3 of the UCATA, provides that "[t]he recovery of a judgment by the injured person against one joint tort-feasor does not discharge the other joint tort-feasors." SDCL 15-8-17, which codifies § 4, further provides:
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
Although the Uniform Law Commission revised the UCATA in 1955, the Legislature did not amend SDCL chapter 15-8 to reflect those changes. Steven D....
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...in SDCL 21-1-4.1 "is a preliminary, lower-order quantum of proof than must be established at trial." Fluth v. Schoenfelder Constr., Inc. , 2018 S.D. 65, ¶ 31, 917 N.W.2d 524, 534 (quoting Case v. Murdock , 488 N.W.2d 885, 891 (S.D. 1992) ). [¶56.] Here, the circuit court properly recognized......
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Wright v. Temple, #28967
...21-1-4.1 "is a preliminary, lower-order quantum of proof than must be established at trial." Fluth v. Schoenfelder Constr., Page 29Inc., 2018 S.D. 65, ¶ 31, 917 N.W.2d 524, 534 (quoting Case v. Murdock, 488 N.W.2d 885, 891 (S.D. 1992)).[¶56.] Here, the circuit court properly recognized that......
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Wright v. Temple, #28967, #28989
...in SDCL 21-1-4.1 "is a preliminary, lower-order quantum of proof than must be established at trial." Fluth v. Schoenfelder Constr., Inc. , 2018 S.D. 65, ¶ 31, 917 N.W.2d 524, 534 (quoting Case v. Murdock , 488 N.W.2d 885, 891 (S.D. 1992) ). [¶56.] Here, the circuit court properly recognized......
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Wright v. Temple, #28967
...21-1-4.1 "is a preliminary, lower-order quantum of proof than must be established at trial." Fluth v. Schoenfelder Constr., Page 29Inc., 2018 S.D. 65, ¶ 31, 917 N.W.2d 524, 534 (quoting Case v. Murdock, 488 N.W.2d 885, 891 (S.D. 1992)).[¶56.] Here, the circuit court properly recognized that......