Flynn v. 3900 Watson Place, Inc., CIV.A. 99-365 (RWR).

• Decision Date: 05 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 99-365 (RWR).,CIV.A. 99-365 (RWR).
• Citation: 63 F.Supp.2d 18
• Parties: William B. FLYNN, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. 3900 WATSON PLACE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

63 F.Supp.2d 18

William B. FLYNN, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. 3900 WATSON PLACE, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 99-365 (RWR).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

August 5, 1999.

Steven Gary Polin, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Adam Lipton, Kass & Skalet, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERTS, District Judge.

On August 10, 1998, plaintiff William B. Flynn, Jr., a co-owner and resident at a local cooperative apartment building, hit the building receptionist, called her a "bitch," and was arrested and charged with assault.¹ This was neither his first nor last act that triggered a complaint.² Between November of 1997 and August 18, 1998, the cooperative board received complaints that Mr. Flynn harassed a resident; harassed, yelled at, insulted, threatened and was verbally abusive toward the receptionist; damaged a car blocking his parking space; attempted to force entry into the switchboard cage; was drunk in public areas of the building; vandalized a resident's car, and twice stole plates from a resident's car.³ Mr. Flynn did not attend a meeting to which the board had invited him where it considered his behavior and his continued residency.⁴ The cooperative ultimately sued in D.C. Superior Court to evict plaintiffs.

One day before the scheduled Superior Court trial, plaintiffs filed in federal court a motion for a temporary restraining order essentially seeking to stop the local court trial.⁵ They argued that the cooperative was illegally discriminating against them because of Mr. Flynn's alcoholism, a condition he first claimed only days before the scheduled trial.⁶ Following a hearing the same day, this court denied the motion. The trial proceeded and the Superior Court awarded judgment to the cooperative.

Plaintiffs William and Francine Flynn allege in the instant complaint that the defendant housing cooperative, 3900 Watson Place, Inc., violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., by discriminating against them on the basis of Mr. Flynn's alcoholism and hearing impairment. The defendant asserts that this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the claim arises out of a cause of action already litigated between the parties in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of D.C. Superior Court. The court concludes that District of Columbia law precludes relitigation of plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claim in federal court because that claim arises from the same nucleus of facts as those adjudicated in the landlord-tenant court, and the plaintiffs had an opportunity to raise their Fair Housing Act claim as a defense in that proceeding. Therefore, as a matter of law, plaintiffs' claim must be dismissed with prejudice.⁷

I. BACKGROUND

On February 17, 1999, trial was held in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to determine whether the Flynns' residency rights could be lawfully terminated under the bylaws of 3900 Watson Place, Inc. and the terms of the Flynns' perpetual use and equity contract. 3900 Watson Place sought to terminate the Flynns' residency rights based upon the complaints received about Mr. Flynn's conduct.⁸

The Flynns were represented by counsel at trial and were permitted to call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and file a post-trial brief with that court before that court issued its decision on the merits of the case.⁹ The Flynns were granted limited discovery fifteen days before trial,¹⁰ and received discovery documents one week before trial.¹¹ The Flynns planned to but did not call a witness from the Psychiatric Institute because that witness reportedly was unavailable on the afternoon of February 17, 1999.¹²

While the Flynns were prohibited by the Landlord and Tenant Branch's procedural rules from filing a counterclaim alleging a violation of the Fair Housing Act, see Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. L & T 5(b), the Flynns did raise their Fair Housing Act claim as a defense in the landlord-tenant possession action.¹³ The Flynns voluntarily withdrew that defense at the end of the trial.¹⁴

In a Memorandum and Order issued on March 18, 1999, Judge Burgess of the D.C. Superior Court determined that the Board of Directors at 3900 Watson Place "acted within their authority in terminating the residency rights of the [Flynns]."¹⁵ Judge Burgess entered judgment for possession in favor of 3900 Watson Place and against the Flynns.

On February 16, 1999, the day before trial commenced in landlord-tenant court, the Flynns filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that 3900 Watson Place violated the Fair Housing Act by failing to accommodate Mr. Flynn's alcoholism and hearing impairment and by wrongfully terminating the Flynns' residency because of Mr. Flynn's disabilities. Defendant 3900 Watson Place has filed a brief urging this Court to dismiss plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claim with prejudice because it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, an affirmative defense asserted in defendant's Answer. The Court will treat defendant's brief as a motion for summary judgment.¹⁶ Plaintiffs argue that res judicata does not bar their Fair Housing Act claim because they were not provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate their discrimination claim in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the D.C. Superior Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment may be granted in defendant's favor if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the defendant demonstrates that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is the defendant who bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In reviewing the defendant's motion for summary judgment, this Court must draw all justifiable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The facts in this case are largely undisputed. The question which must be resolved is whether, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the doctrine of res judicata bars plaintiffs' from pursuing their Fair Housing Act claim in federal district court.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts are required "to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged." Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). This Court must therefore look to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for guidance on the question of claim preclusion. In the District of Columbia,

[u]nder the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a prior judgment on the merits raises an absolute bar to the relitigation of the same cause of action between the original parties or those in privity with them. The doctrine bars relitigation not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented.

Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 618 (D.C.1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C.1989). Under this doctrine, defendant 3900 Watson Place must show that the landlordtenant proceeding resulted in a judgment on the merits, that the parties involved in the landlord-tenant case and those involved in this case are the same, and that the landlord-tenant case and this case arise from the same cause of action. See Shin, 728 A.2d at 618 (citing Amos v. Shelton, 497 A.2d 1082, 1084 (D.C.1985)).

III. ANALYSIS

The parties do not dispute that the landlord-tenant action was decided on the merits and that Judge Burgess entered judgment for possession in favor of 3900 Watson Place.¹⁷ The landlord-tenant action and this action also involve precisely the same parties. The final inquiry, then, is whether both cases arise from the same cause of action or common nucleus of facts.

Under District of Columbia law, a cause of action "comprises `all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.'" Smith, 562 A.2d at 613 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982)). Both the landlord-tenant case and this case arise out of the same series of incidents involving Mr. Flynn's reportedly threatening behavior and the subsequent termination of the Flynns' residency agreement. Furthermore, although the plaintiffs in this case request a court order preventing 3900 Watson Place from enforcing the provisions of its bylaws and terminating plaintiffs' residency rights,¹⁸ whether or not 3900 Watson Place may legally terminate the Flynns' residency has already been adjudicated by the landlord-tenant court.¹⁹ Where "the underlying facts of the case comprise a single occurrence or chain of related events[,]" an identity of claims exists. Id. This Court concludes that both of the lawsuits arise from the same nucleus of facts, namely, Flynn's conduct and the resulting termination of the Flynns' residency rights by 3900 Watson Place.

Plaintiffs argue that even if their Fair Housing Act claim would ordinarily be barred, their inability to assert a Fair Housing Act counterclaim in the landlord-tenant proceeding and the limited nature of discovery in that proceeding denied them due process. Plaintiffs should be able to obtain a judgment on the merits in this federal proceeding, they say, because they did not have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate their discrimination claim in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of D.C. Superior Court.

Plaintiffs fail to establish that they have been denied due process. In Shin v....