Flynn v. Flynn

• Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
• Writing for the Court: NEIKIRK
• Citation: Flynn v. Flynn, 469 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1971)
• Decision Date: 02 July 1971
• Parties: Lewis B. FLYNN, Jr., and John B. Flynn, etc., Appellants, v. Eugenia FLYNN, Executrix of the Estate of Lewis B. Flynn, and Eugenia Flynn, Individually, Appellee.

Page 886

469 S.W.2d 886

Lewis B. FLYNN, Jr., and John B. Flynn, etc., Appellants, v. Eugenia FLYNN, Executrix of the Estate of Lewis B. Flynn and Eugenia Flynn, Individually, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

July 2, 1971.

Samuel R. Wells, Marshall, Cochran, Heyburn & Wells, Louisville, Robert Lee Rose, Winchester, for appellants.

William O. Hays, Hays & Hays, Winchester, for appellee.

NEIKIRK, Judge.

Eugenia Flynn filed in the Clark Circuit Court an action seeking a declaration of rights. She sought an interpretation of Item Two of the will of her deceased husband, Lewis B. Flynn. Item One directs that his debts be paid. Item Three appoints his wife executrix without bond. Item Two is as follows:

'I, hereby devise and bequeath all of my property both real and personal, tangible and intangible, wheresoever situate to my beloved wife, Eugenia Flynn, for and during her natural life, in fee simple absolute with the expressed desire that if she does not need to sell same, that she dispose of same to be effective at her death in an equitable manner to our son John, and my son Lewis.'

The devisees, Lewis B. Flynn, Jr., and John B. Flynn, contended that Item Two is so ambiguous as to defy interpretation, wherefore the will is a nullity; in the alternative, they contended that under Item Two Eugenia Flynn received only a life estate. The circuit court entered judgment declaring that the will gave Eugenia Flynn the property in fee simple. It is from this judgment that Lewis B. Flynn and John Flynn appeal. We affirm.

Lewis B. Flynn obviously intended to die testate. What he said in his will is confusing. We find, however, that the meaning can be ascertained by applying the general rules relating to construction and interpretation of wills.

We have considered the many cases cited by the appellants in support of their contention that the will is so ambiguous as to defy legal interpretation. Each case cited is distinguishable from the instant case by reason of variance in the language and phrases used in the wills. It is true that a will must be sufficiently clear in meaning to enable a court to determine the testator's intention, Whitehead v. Donnelly, Ky., 368 S.W.2d 337; However, to declare void a provision in a will, the court must be persuaded that a reasonable determination of the testator's intentions cannot be made. Johnson v. Johnson, 312 Ky. 773, 229 S.W.2d 743.

In order to determine the intention of the testator, it is necessary to...