Flynn v. N.Y., S. & W. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 September 1917
• Citation: 101 A. 1034,90 N.J.Law 450
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Parties: FLYNN v. NEW YORK, S. & W. R. CO.

101 A. 1034

90 N.J.Law 450

FLYNN

v. NEW YORK, S. & W. R. CO.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Sept. 14, 1917.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari to Court of Common Pleas, Passaic County.

Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act by Mary Flynn, widow of James Flynn, deceased, employé, for compensation for his death; opposed by the New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad Company, employer. Compensation was awarded, and the employer brings certiorari. Judgment awarding compensation reversed.

Argued June term, 1917, before SWAYZE, BERGEN, and BLACK, JJ.

Collins & Corbin, of Jersey City, for prosecutor. Edward F. Merrey, of Paterson, for defendant.

BLACK, J. The writ of certiorari in this case is to review a determination of the court of common pleas of Passaic county, in a proceeding under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act, brought by Mary Flynn, the widow of James Flynn, deceased.

The trial court determined that the petitioner is entitled to $5 per week for a period of 300 weeks, beginning on the 30th day of April, 1916. The trial court further found: The prosecutor is a common carrier, and is engaged both in interstate and intrastate commerce; that James Flynn was not employed by the prosecutor in interstate commerce, and thereupon the federal Employers' Liability Act does not apply. It is to review this latter finding that the controversy is brought under review in this court.

The pertinent facts are: The deceased, James Flynn, on March 23, 1916, was employed by the prosecutor, as a crossing flagman, at the Lyon street crossing in the city of Paterson. While thus engaged in the performance of his duties as a flagman, with respect to a passing train, which was carrying passengers and baggage from points in the state of New York to various points in the state of New Jersey, he was struck and killed by the engine of the train in the course of his employment. Flynn crossed over the east-bound tracks of the prosecutor, on the approach of an east-bound train, to flag the crossing, and, while so engaged, was standing near the west-bound tracks, and was struck and killed by the outer edge of the breast piece of an engine drawing a train on the west-bound tracks, which was an interstate train. The question, therefore, for solution, and the only one, is, Was the deceased at the time of his death engaged in an interstate act? If so, it is firmly settled by the recent decisions of our Court of Errors and Appeals, in the case of Rounsaville v. Central R. R. Co., 101 Atl. 182, and by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Erie R. R. Co. v. Winfield, decided. May 21, 1917, 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. 556, 61 L. Ed. 1057, reversing Id., 88 N. J. Law, 619, 90 Atl. 394, that the federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908 is exclusive of the state act, and ousts the courts of common pleas of the state of jurisdiction, under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act.

The courts, thus far, apparently have been unable to formulate any rule, sufficiently exact, comprehensive, and exclusive by which to test the quality of an act or series of acts as falling within, or without, the domain of interstate business. Upon reflection, it would seem almost impossible to formulate a rule applicable to the almost endless variety of circumstances and facts springing out of the intricacies of everyday modern life that will be of much practical use or aid. The application of the principle must be made to particular facts, as they arise; and by a process of exclusion and inclusion a rule may perhaps be formulated in time from the decision of such cases. There is already a long line of cases in the federal and state courts showing the application of the principle to the facts under discussion. It would serve no useful purpose to collate or cite these decisions. The decisions in the United States Supreme...