Flynn v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8032 (E.D. Pa. 10/__/2003)

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: William Yohn
• Decision Date: 01 October 2003
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8032.
• Citation: Flynn v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8032 (E.D. Pa. 10/__/2003) (E.D. Pa. 2003)
• Parties: RICHARD FLYNN Plaintiff, v. OSRAM SYLVANIA, INC. Defendants.

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RICHARD FLYNN Plaintiff, v. OSRAM SYLVANIA, INC. Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8032.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

October __, 2003.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM YOHN, Jr., District Judge.

Plaintiff, Richard Flynn, sues defendant for monies due as a result of his termination from employment with Sylvania Lighting Services, Inc. ("SLS"), a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant Osram Sylvania, Inc., on or about July 22, 2002. Presently before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part. More specifically, I will enter summary judgment on plaintiffs claims for accrued vacation pay, reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses incurred during his employment, severance pay, and for detrimental reliance. However, I will deny defendant's motion for summary judgment on the remainder of plaintiff s claims, i.e. for payment of his earned bonus and an accounting for the bonus monies owed.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff, Richard Flynn, was the branch manager of the Mid-Atlantic branch of SLS, which is in the business of performing lighting retrofit, relamps and lighting maintenance services at its customers' locations. As a branch manager, Flynn was eligible to receive incentive payments (bonuses) under the terms of Osram's bonus plan, which reads in pertinent part:

A Branch Manager whose termination results from a reduction in force, transfer, leave of absence, death, or retirement shall receive a full proportionate share of the annual bonus calculated for each full month of employment.

A Branch Manager whose termination during sales incentive plan year results from resignation, release without prejudice, release for cause, or discharge for misconduct, will forfeit any future bonus earnings. Payment for any incentive earned for the partial period will be determined by the bonus committee.

Def. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 10. Flynn was also covered by Osram's severance pay plan, which provides that employees will receive severance payments if their permanent termination results from: "a substantial, permanent workforce reduction; the elimination of the employee's position with the Company; a reorganization of the Company;. . . or for such other reasons as the Committee may, in its sole discretion, deem appropriate." Def. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 18. Employees are also required to execute an agreement and general release form.

During his tenure at SLS, Flynn developed a reputation for being someone with whom it was difficult to work, as he acknowledged in a letter to his supervisor. Flynn Dep. Ex. 7. In October, 2001, Flynn was reprimanded for violating the company's harassment policy and was required to attend training on supervisory skills, enter an employee assistance program and execute a copy of the harassment policy. SLS National Operations Manager James Colantoni received numerous complaints from one of Flynn's major customers about the service it was receiving, and Colantoni spoke to Flynn about these complaints. Colantoni arranged for two managers of other branches to visit Flynn's branch in June, 2002 to evaluate operational concerns there and to advise Colantoni of how to assist Flynn. On July 18, 2002, Flynn was removed as branch manager and was offered the choice of accepting a project coordinator position or terminating his employment. A severance package was offered to Flynn in the event he did not accept the new position, under which he would be entitled to seven weeks pay. The severance package also listed the amount of vacation time Flynn was owed, but did not mention anything about bonuses or reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses. Flynn called another branch manager, Brian Pivar, to tell him what happened. Pivar then called Colantoni to advise him of the conversation. Colantoni thereafter decided to withdraw the offer to Flynn of the project coordinator position, and to make his termination effective July 19. This was communicated to Flynn on July 22. The same severance package was offered to Flynn after this termination. A few weeks after Flynn's dismissal the support staff of the Mid-Atlantic branch was laid off and the territory was divided and reassigned to other branches. The position vacated by Flynn was never filled or even posted.

Flynn never accepted the severance package because neither it nor the general release form upon which the severance pay was conditioned mentioned reimbursement for Flynn's out-of-pocket business expenditures or the bonus monies he claimed to be owed. Flynn was eventually paid for the accrued vacation days defendant believed it owed him. Flynn was not, however, paid for out-of-pocket expenses, nor did he receive any payments for bonuses. Since Flynn did not sign the agreement and general release form, he never received any severance pay. Thus, Flynn brought the instant action, asserting claims for breach of contract, violation of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Act ("WPCL"), 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 260.1 et seq. (West 2003), and detrimental reliance. Plaintiff seeks the seven weeks of severance pay he was offered, payment for accrued but unpaid vacation time, reimbursement for out-of-pocket business expenses, the bonus monies he believes he is owed, and an accounting from defendant to determine the exact amount of the bonus monies owed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Either party to a lawsuit may file a motion for summary judgment, and the court will grant it "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Facts that could alter the outcome are `material,' and disputes are `genuine' if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct." Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Lebatt, LTD., 90 F.3d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). When a court evaluates a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and "all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the non-movant's] favor." Id. Additionally, "[s]ummary judgment may not be granted . . . if there is a disagreement over what inferences can be reasonably drawn from the facts even if the facts are undisputed." Ideal Dairy, 90 F.3d at 744 (citation omitted). However, "an inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat entry of summary judgment." Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1990).

To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings, but rather that party must go beyond the pleadings and present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Similarly, the non-moving party cannot rely on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions in attempting to survive a summary judgment motion. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). Further, the non-moving party has the burden of producing evidence to establish prima facie each element of his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. The non-movant must show more than "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" for elements on which he bears the burden of production. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Thus, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Because this is a diversity action, the court will apply federal procedural law as reflected in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which establishes the standard for summary judgment, but state substantive law-in this case, Pennsylvania contract law. Erie v. Tompkins R.R. Co., 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Although the parties to the present litigation do not specify a particular state's juris as being that from which the court should glean the applicable principles of contract law, one of Flynn's claims is for violation of the Pennsylvania Wage and Payment Collection Law ("WPCL"), 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 260.1 et seq. (West 2003), implying that Flynn believes Pennsylvania law governs this suit. Compl. ¶ 32. Because defendant does not contest this supposition, I will apply Pennsylvania contract law. Notably, however, the application of Pennsylvania law-as opposed to the law of any other state-is unlikely to be of great significance.¹

I. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact

Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence in support of a number of his claims, such that there are no genuine issues of material fact which require a trial on those claims.

A. Plaintiff's Claim for Accrued Vacation Pay

Flynn claims he was owed fifty-eight hours of accrued, but unpaid, vacation for the year 2002 and forty such hours for 1999. Compl. ¶ 30. Defendant claims that Flynn was only owed 18.48 hours of vacation time for 2002, but admits that he was owed forty hours for 1999. Def. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 21-23. Defendant has since paid plaintiff for the 58.48 hours it does not dispute. Piper Aff. Exh. A. In support of its contention, defendant has produced its records of Flynn's vacation time, Id., as well as the vacation pay policy in effect at the time of Flynn's termination. Id. Flynn has not disputed defendant's calculation of how much vacation time he had used during 2002 before his dismissal. Rather, his...