Flynn v. US

• Decision Date: 04 March 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. No. C-86-354W.
• Parties: Donald W. FLYNN, Donald Kevin Flynn, Gilbert Wayne Flynn, and Tracy Jannette Flynn McCormack, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Kenneth PARTRIDGE, Joyce Robertson, Estate of Helga Robertson, and Estate of Betty Daniels, Third-Party Defendants. The ESTATE OF Helga ROBERTSON, Fourth-Party Plaintiffs, v. Amy Jo KAVENY, Glenn McFarland, and the Estate of Betty Daniels, Fourth-Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

681 F. Supp. 1500

Donald W. FLYNN, Donald Kevin Flynn, Gilbert Wayne Flynn, and Tracy Jannette Flynn McCormack, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Kenneth PARTRIDGE, Joyce Robertson, Estate of Helga Robertson, and Estate of Betty Daniels, Third-Party Defendants.

The ESTATE OF Helga ROBERTSON, Fourth-Party Plaintiffs, v. Amy Jo KAVENY, Glenn McFarland, and the Estate of Betty Daniels, Fourth-Party Defendants.

Civ. No. C-86-354W.

United States District Court, D. Utah, C.D.

March 4, 1988.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Paul W. Mortensen, Moab, Utah, Robert H. Wilde, Midvale, Utah, for plaintiffs.

Joseph W. Anderson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah, for U.S.

Gary B. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Estate of Helga Robertson.

Glenn C. Hanni, Joseph J. Joyce, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Estate of Betty Daniels.

Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, Utah, for Kenneth Partridge.

Amy Jo Kaveny, pro se.

Karen J. McClurg, Gregory J. Sanders, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Glenn McFarland.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

WINDER, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the Government's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, and third-party defendant Joyce Robertson's motion for summary judgment. On February 10, 1988, the court heard oral argument on these motions and the Estate of Betty Daniels' motion for summary judgment. Joseph W. Anderson appeared on behalf of the Government. Paul W. Mortensen appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Darwin C. Hansen appeared on behalf of Joyce Robertson. Glenn C. Hanni and Joseph J. Joyce appeared on behalf of the Estate of Betty Daniels. Also present at the hearing were Gary B. Ferguson and George T. Naegle, representing the Estate of Helga Robertson.

Prior to the hearing the court had carefully reviewed all memoranda, exhibits, and affidavits submitted with respect to these motions. At the hearing the court granted the Estate of Betty Daniels' motion for summary judgment and took the other motions under advisement. The plaintiffs waived oral argument on their motion for partial summary judgment and submitted their motion to the court on their pleadings and memoranda.

The court has made a thorough review of all materials in the file, including all depositions and affidavits. In addition, the court has carefully studied all statutes and case law pertinent to the issues presented to the court. Being now fully advised, this court grants the Government's motion for summary judgment and thereby denies plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment against the Government. Because the court hereby orders that the plaintiffs' action against the Government be dismissed with prejudice, the Government now has no claim for contribution against any of the third-party defendants. Consequently, this court need not address Joyce Robertson's motion for summary judgment as it pertains to the Government's third-party claims against her.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

In the evening hours of March 13, 1985 at approximately 7:50 p.m., a car driven by Helga Robertson struck Betty Daniels while she was crossing an unlighted portion of Highway 191, south of Moab, Utah (hereinafter referred to as the "Daniels' accident"). Joyce Robertson was a passenger in Helga Robertson's vehicle. Helga and Joyce Robertson were traveling southbound on Highway 191, a four lane highway with a center, double yellow line and a broad shoulder. After striking Mrs. Daniels, the Robertson vehicle came to rest on the center double lines. Fearing that their car may be involved in another accident, Joyce insisted that Helga move the car to the side of the highway, which was done. Helga and Joyce then returned to the middle of the highway where Mrs. Daniels remained disabled. There, Joyce began to direct traffic around the accident scene.

Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs' decedent Joan Flynn, who was driving a van northbound on the highway, arrived at the Daniels' accident. After seeing Mrs. Daniels in the roadway, she stopped her vehicle near Mrs. Daniels in the outside lane and turned on the van's emergency flashers. Mrs. Flynn entered the roadway and went to the assistance of Mrs. Daniels, lying near the center line of the highway. After Mrs. Flynn arrived to render assistance, Joyce Robertson went to call for help at a nearby building.

Within minutes of this first accident, three National Park Service employees (the "NPS employees"), who were driving southbound in a National Park Service ("NPS") truck equipped with an overhead bar of emergency lights, came upon the scene of the accident. The NPS employees were traveling to an evening firearms training in Moab, Utah. The federal employees were outside the boundaries of the National Park System and were not within their jurisdiction of authority.¹ Robert E. Cornelius, the driver of the NPS truck, pulled the vehicle over to the shoulder and activated the emergency lights of the vehicle as it slowed to a stop. As Mr. Cornelius was turning on the emergency lights, he activated the vehicle's siren momentarily.²

Within three to five seconds³ after the NPS vehicle stopped on the shoulder, a pickup truck driven by Kenneth Partridge swerved into Helga Robertson, Joan Flynn and Betty Daniels who were positioned in the middle of the highway (hereinafter referred to as the "Partridge accident"). Mr. Partridge was driving in a southbound lane at a speed of approximately 52 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone. Mr. Partridge testified that he had been driving directly behind the NPS truck with two semi trucks following behind him.⁴ Mr. Partridge stated that he swerved into the center of the highway and into the three women immediately after seeing the NPS truck's brake lights flash on.⁵ Mr. Partridge stated that he was also distracted by the NPS vehicle's flashing, overhead emergency lights.⁶ Because the Partridge truck drove into the women almost immediately after the NPS vehicle came to a complete stop, the NPS employees had not yet disembarked from their vehicle to render assistance or control traffic.

Although Mr. Partridge was distracted by the emergency lights of the NPS vehicle, several other significant factors impaired his ability to respond to the Daniels' accident in a reasonable manner. The Daniels' accident had occurred on an extremely dark night along an unlighted portion of Highway 191.⁷ Mr. Partridge was driving his pickup at approximately 52 miles per hour and was legally intoxicated.⁸ Consequently, Mr. Partridge failed to decrease the speed of his truck and approach the Daniels' accident scene with caution despite the fact that within his field of vision was the Flynn van's flashing emergency lights, the group of women in the middle of the highway, and the NPS vehicle's brake lights and flashing emergency lights. Tragically, because of his impaired response to the Daniels' accident, Mr. Partridge failed to apply his vehicle's brakes until after he drove into the group of three women in the center of the highway.⁹ After the Partridge collision, plaintiffs' decedent, Helga Robertson and Betty Daniels died.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard on Summary Judgment Motions

The standard this court must apply in ruling on summary judgment motions is contained in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) reads in pertinent part:

A summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) the granting of summary judgment is proper when there are no material factual issues to be determined by a jury and judgment in favor of the moving party is appropriate as a matter of law.

Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, if there is a dispute over a genuine issue of material fact regarding an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, then summary judgment is not appropriate. A genuine material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). As to materiality, the substantive law will determine which facts are material. Id.

At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. There is no such issue unless there is sufficient evidence in the record favoring the nonmoving party's claim. In essence, the inquiry is whether the evidence presents a genuine disagreement to require submission to a trier of fact or whether the evidence is so one-sided that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law. Id. at 2512.

The burden of showing that there is no "genuine issue of material fact" rests with the party seeking a summary judgment in its favor. Any doubt as to whether an issue of fact genuinely exists or whether that fact is material must be resolved in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment motion. See generally, 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2725 at 93-95 (1983). All evidence relied on in deciding a summary judgment motion must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Any facts asserted by the party opposing the motion must be regarded as true, and that party is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts.

B. Government's Motion for Summary...