Flynn v. Vancil

• Decision Date: 22 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 41178,41178
• Citation: 41 Ill.2d 236,242 N.E.2d 237
• Parties: Ronald E. FLYNN, Admr., et al., Appellees, v. Patrick VANCIL, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 237

242 N.E.2d 237

41 Ill.2d 236

Ronald E. FLYNN, Admr., et al., Appellees, v. Patrick VANCIL, Appellant.

No. 41178.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 22, 1968.

Coyle, Stengel, Gilman & Keefe, Rock Island (Edward Keefe, Rock Island, of counsel), for appellant.

Ferguson, Ferguson & Wurbs, Rock Island (James A. Wurbs, Rock Island, of counsel), for appellees.

SOLFISBURG, Chief Justice.

This appeal by defendant Patrick Vancil involves the wrongful death claim by plaintiff Ronald E. Flynn, as administrator of the estate of his two-week-old child. The issue presented is whether the presumption of substantial pecuniary loss to lineal kindred in wrongful-death cases is rebuttable so as to warrant a jury verdict finding liability but awarding no damages.

The wrongful death claim was asserted by plaintiff administrator as a separate count in the original complaint, which also included personal injury claims by said plaintiff and his wife individually, all arising out of an automobile accident allegedly caused by defendant's negligence. The jury found in favor of all the plaintiffs on the issue of liability, but awarded no damages on the wrongful-death count. From the judgment entered on that county by the circuit court of Rock Island County, plaintiff administrator appealed to the appellate court. He presented as the only issue on appeal the following certified question of law, pursuant to former Supreme Court Rule 48 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 110, par. 101.48): 'Can a jury verdict of liability for the death of a two-week old female awarding no damages for the administrator for the benefit of the surviving mother and father be sustained where there is evidence of incurable congenital physical defects impairing the health of the child?'

In reversing that judgment and remanding for a new trial the appellate court filed three separate opinions with varying interpretations of the nature of the presumption of pecuniary loss in cases of wrongful death of lineal kin (89 Ill.App.2d 368, 232 N.E.2d 473), and this court granted defendant leave to appeal.

The relevant portions of the Wrongful Death Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 70, par. 2) provide, in substance, that the jury may give damages for pecuniary injuries from the wrongful death to the widow and next of kin of the decedent. In cases involving the wrongful death of a child, the court, at an early date, recognized the difficulties of proving 'pecuniary loss,' since the child's habits of industry and potential work could not be determined; consequently, the rule was promulgated that where deceased is a minor and leaves a father entitled to his services the law presumes there has been a pecuniary loss for which compensation under the statute may be given. (City of Chicago v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 468.) Such damages included the reasonable expectation of benefits from the continuation of life, (City of Chicago v. Keefe, 114 Ill. 222, 230, 2 N.E. 267) and the presumption has been invoked by the Illinois courts consistently through the years. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73, 78, 174 N.E.2d 157; Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill.2d 26, 31, 147 N.E.2d 352; Jung v. Buelens, 77 Ill.App.2d 391, 397, 222 N.E.2d 707; Maca v. Rock Island-Moline City Lines, Inc., 47 Ill.App.2d 31, 36--37, 197 N.E.2d 463; Ferraro v. Augustine, 45 Ill.App.2d 295, 196 N.E.2d 16.

In no case, however, has the presumption been held conclusive. Quite the contrary, courts invoking the presumption have buttressed it with a recital of supporting evidence relating to the good health, industrious habits and potential longevity of the deceased minor. Wallace v. City of Rock Island, 323 Ill.App. 639, 56 N.E.2d 636; 1964 U.Ill.L.Forum, 683, 686.

In this case, where it is uncontroverted that plaintiff's decedent was a two-week-old child afflicted with an incurable congenital condition affecting her health, it is evident that the jury reasonably could have concluded that those actual facts rebutted the presumption and precluded any pecuniary loss. Consequently, the jury verdict of no damages for the wrongful death should not have been disturbed.

This construction of the presumption is in accordance with the terms and purport of Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 31.01, which requires the jury, in cases where the decedent leaves direct lineal kin, to consider the presumption of substantial pecuniary loss along with other evidence, if there is such evidence, in determining what they will award. The instruction in no way makes the presumption conclusive, or requires the jury to award damages irrespective of contradictory evidence. It vests in the jury the discretion of determining the quantum of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption.

In our view, moreover, plaintiff's contention that the jury was obliged to award damages if it found liability, is not only without support in the case law, but is inconsistent with legal concepts relating to presumptions, damages and jury verdicts.

A presumption is essentially an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other basic fact established by the proof. Presumptions have been classified as either conclusive or rebuttable. (National Zinc Co. v. Industrial Com., 292 Ill. 598, 601, 127 N.E. 135.) Conclusive presumptions cannot be contravened by opposing evidence (29 Am.Jur.2d 203); whereas rebuttable presumptions may be disputed and eliminated if they do not correspond with the circumstances actually proved. A rebuttable presumption, standing alone, may establish a Prima facie case, thereby relieving the party in whose favor it arises from presenting further evidence and requiring the opposing party to produce contrary evidence to avoid an unfavorable verdict. However, such a presumption does not preclude the consideration of contrary facts. Miller v. Pettengill, 392 Ill. 117, 123, 63 N.E.2d 735; Trustees of Schools of Township No. 8 v. Lilly, 373 Ill. 431, 438, 26 N.E.2d 489.

Under those rules relating to presumptions, the presumption of pecuniary loss involved here would, in the absence of any evidence of such loss, establish a Prima facie case for plaintiff, and merely shift to defendant the burden of establishing contrary facts which the jury would be...