Flynt v. Jasper Cnty.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:20-cv-180-TBM-MTP
• Parties: KENNETH FLYNT PLAINTIFF v. JASPER COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, JASPER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF RANDY JOHNSON, and DEPUTY R.H. STOCKMAN DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

KENNETH FLYNT PLAINTIFF
v.
JASPER COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, JASPER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF RANDY JOHNSON, and DEPUTY R.H. STOCKMAN DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-180-TBM-MTP

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division

September 30, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAYLOR B. McNEEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Kenneth Flynt was leaving a funeral in Jasper County when he was pulled over by Deputy Stockman for alleged traffic violations. Deputy Stockman asked to search Flynt's vehicle, but Flynt declined. Deputy Stockman then placed Flynt under arrest and searched his vehicle. Flynt was taken to jail and issued two tickets, which were ultimately dismissed. Flynt filed suit in this Court arguing that Deputy Stockman and Jasper County violated his constitutional rights and Mississippi state law. Now before the Court are three motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by Deputy Stockman and Jasper County. For the reasons discussed fully below, Deputy Stockman's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [23] based on qualified immunity is denied in part and granted in part; Deputy Stockman and Jasper County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [25] as to Flynt's state law claims is denied; and Jasper County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [27] as to Monell liability is granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of a July 8, 2019, traffic stop in Jasper County, Mississippi around 1:00 pm. Flynt had just left the funeral of retired Sheriff's Deputy Jimmy Dale Reynolds and was on his way to the Jasper County Courthouse to obtain absentee voting forms for his elderly mother

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when he was stopped by Deputy Stockman for alleged “careless driving” and a “defaced tag.”^[1]Flynt denies that either of these traffic violations occurred.

After pulling him over, Deputy Stockman asked if Flynt was traveling with any large sums of money. Flynt told Deputy Stockman that he was not answering any questions or consenting to a search, but to write him a ticket if Deputy Stockman had a reason to stop him. Deputy Stockman then ordered Flynt out of his vehicle and requested permission to search the vehicle, which Flynt denied. Deputy Stockman placed Flynt under arrest. Flynt asserts that in effecting the arrest, Deputy Stockman “intentionally tightened the handcuffs on Mr. Flynt's wrists to the point where they were causing significant pain.” [20], pg. 3. Flynt argues that Deputy Stockman arrested him not because of any careless driving or a defaced tag, but because Flynt exercised his constitutional right to decline Deputy Stockman's request to search his vehicle. Flynt alleges that there was “no probable cause for the search of Mr. Flynt's car prior to the arrest, and no probable cause for the arrest which ultimately led to the search.” [20], pg. 7. During the search, Deputy Stockman seized two lawfully possessed firearms. No illegal contraband was found.

After Flynt was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, Flynt advised Deputy Stockman that the handcuffs were too tight multiple times. Despite making Deputy Stockman aware that the handcuffs were causing him significant pain, Flynt claims that Deputy Stockman ignored him. Flynt asserts that he was then transported to jail and was processed. He was issued two tickets- one for “careless driving” and one for “defaced tag.” Flynt asserts that neither is an arrestable offense, as they are punishable by fine only. After paying a twenty-five dollar, nonrefundable “turn

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the key fee” in order to be released from jail, Flynt was required to pay two-hundred dollars to retrieve his vehicle, which had been towed. Flynt states that any charges for traffic violations against him were subsequently dismissed.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In his Complaint, Flynt asserts claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Flynt also alleges a host of other state law claims. On December 3, 2020, Sheriff Randy Johnson and Deputy Stockman filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [11]. The Court granted the Motion [11] and required Flynt to file a Schultea reply and plead his alleged constitutional violations with more detail. The Court required Flynt's Schultea reply to be “tailored to the defense of qualified immunity,” and that Flynt “support his claims ‘with sufficient'” facts. [18], pg. 5 (citing Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430-32 (5th Cir. 1995)).

After Flynt filed his Schultea Reply [19], Sheriff Randy Johnson and Deputy Stockman filed a Motion [21] to Re-urge their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court granted in part and denied in part Sheriff Randy Johnson and Deputy Stockman's Motion to Re-urge their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. See [22]. With consent of Plaintiff's counsel, the Court dismissed Sheriff Randy Johnson, in his individual capacity, without prejudice and dismissed Flynt's Fifth Amendment and Thirteenth Amendment claims without prejudice. Id. As a result of certain procedural anomalies, and because of the untimely death of Flynt's original attorney, the Defendants and Flynt were given another opportunity to re-brief the Defendants' motions.

Deputy Stockman filed his Renewed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [23] based on qualified immunity arguing that Flynt's Schultea Reply failed to plead facts establishing a

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constitutional violation to overcome qualified immunity.^[2] Deputy Stockman and Jasper County also filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [25] as to Flynt's state law claims arguing that Flynt's Notice of Claim [1-2] did not provide sufficient details as to the extent of his injuries in violation of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act pre-suit notice requirement. Finally, Jasper County filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [27] as to Monell liability arguing that Flynt failed to plead specific facts that would state a claim.

Flynt has since admitted that the official capacity claims against Sheriff Randy Johnson and Deputy Stockman should be dismissed as they are duplicative of the claims against Jasper County itself. [34], pg. 1. Flynt has also admitted that the Jasper County Sheriff's Department is not a proper party and should be dismissed. [33], pg. 3. Accordingly, Flynt's claims against Jasper County Sheriff's Department and the official capacity claims against Sheriff Randy Johnson and Deputy Stockman are dismissed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). “Section 1983 claims implicating qualified immunity are subject to the same Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal as all other claims; an assertion of qualified immunity in a defendant's answer or motion to dismiss does not subject the complaint to a heightened pleading standard.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)

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(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It follows that “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary claims or elements.” In re S. Scrap Material Co., LLC, 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

IV. DEPUTY STOCKMAN'S MOTION [23] FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS BASED ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

“The question of qualified immunity must be addressed as a threshold issue because this issue determines a defendant's immunity from suit, that is, his or her ability to avoid a trial altogether, rather than merely his or her immunity from damages.” Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1994). “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quotation omitted). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

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A law enforcement officer “is entitled to claim the cloak of qualified immunity ‘unless it is shown that, at the time of the incident, he violated a clearly established constitutional right.'” Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). As the Supreme Court has articulated, “[w]hen qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the precise factual basis for the plaintiff's claim or claims may be hard to identify,” and deciding whether a violation has occurred “is an uncomfortable exercise where . . . the answer [to] whether there was a violation may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 238-39 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, when...