FNU Tanzin v. Tanvir, No. 19-71

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
• Citation: 141 S.Ct. 486,208 L.Ed.2d 295
• Decision Date: 10 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-71
• Parties: FNU TANZIN, et al., Petitioners v. Muhammad TANVIR, et al.

141 S.Ct. 486
208 L.Ed.2d 295

FNU TANZIN, et al., Petitioners
v.
Muhammad TANVIR, et al.

No. 19-71

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued October 6, 2020
Decided December 10, 2020

Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey B. Wall, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitors General, Hashim M. Mooppan, Deputy Assistant Attorney, General, Austin L. Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor, General, Benjamin H. Torrance, Sarah S. Normand, Ellen Blain, Mary Hampton Mason, Reginald M. Skinner, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Shayana Kadidal, Diala Shamas, Baher Azmy, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, NY, Jennifer R. Cowan, Erol Gulay, Christopher S. Ford, Sandy Tomasik, William C. Mattessich, Ryan C. Mullally, Omar Debs, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, NY, Ramzi Kassem, Naz Ahmad, CLEAR Project, Main Street Legal Services, Inc., City University of New, York School of Law, Long Island City, NY, for respondents.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

141 S.Ct. 489

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the Federal Government from imposing substantial burdens on religious exercise, absent a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means. 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. It also gives a person whose religious exercise has been unlawfully burdened the right to seek "appropriate relief." The question here is whether "appropriate relief " includes claims for money damages against Government officials in their individual capacities. We hold that it does.

I

A

RFRA secures Congress’ view of the right to free exercise under the First Amendment, and it provides a remedy to redress violations of that right. Congress passed the Act in the wake of this Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 885–890, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), which held that the First Amendment tolerates neutral, generally applicable laws that burden or prohibit religious acts even when the laws are unsupported by a narrowly tailored, compelling governmental interest. See § 2000bb(a). RFRA sought to counter the effect of that holding and restore the pre- Smith "compelling interest test" by "provid[ing] a claim ... to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." §§ 2000bb(b)(1)–(2). That right of action enables a person to "obtain appropriate relief against a government." § 2000bb–1(c). A " ‘government’ " is defined to include "a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States." § 2000bb–2(1).

B

Respondents Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah, and Naveed Shinwari are practicing Muslims who claim that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents placed them on the No Fly List in retaliation for their refusal to act as informants against their religious communities. Respondents sued various agents in their official capacities, seeking removal from the No Fly List. They also sued the agents in their individual capacities for money damages. According to respondents, the retaliation cost them substantial sums of money: airline tickets wasted and income from job opportunities lost.

More than a year after respondents sued, the Department of Homeland Security informed them that they could now fly, thus mooting the claims for injunctive relief. The District Court then dismissed the individual-capacity claims for money damages, ruling that RFRA does not permit monetary relief.

The Second Circuit reversed. 894 F.3d 449 (2018). It determined that RFRA's express remedies provision, combined with the statutory definition of "Government," authorizes claims against federal officials in their individual capacities. Relying on our precedent and RFRA's broad protections for religious liberty, the court concluded that the open-ended phrase "appropriate relief " encompasses money damages against officials. We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 550, 205 L.Ed.2d 353 (2019), and now affirm.

II

As usual, we start with the statutory text. E.g.,

141 S.Ct. 490

Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC , 587 U. S. ––––, ––––, 139 S.Ct. 1652, 1661, 203 L.Ed.2d 876 (2019). A person whose exercise of religion has been unlawfully burdened may "obtain appropriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(c).

A

We first have to determine if injured parties can sue Government officials in their personal capacities. RFRA's text provides a clear answer: They can. Persons may sue and obtain relief "against a government," § 2000bb–1(c), which is defined to include "a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law ) of the United States." § 2000bb–2(1) (emphasis added).

The Government urges us to limit lawsuits against officials to suits against them in their official, not personal, capacities. A lawsuit seeking damages from employees in their individual capacities, the Government argues, is not really "against a government" because relief "can be executed only against the official's personal assets." Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).

The problem with this otherwise plausible argument is that Congress supplanted the ordinary meaning of "government" with a different, express definition. " ‘When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition,’ even if it varies from a term's ordinary meaning." Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers , 583 U. S. ––––, ––––, 138 S.Ct. 767, 776, 200 L.Ed.2d 15 (2018) (quoting Burgess v. United States , 553 U.S. 124, 130, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 170 L.Ed.2d 478 (2008) ). For example, if a statute defines a "State" to include territories and districts, that addition to the plain meaning controls. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 267. So too here. A "government," under RFRA, extends beyond the term's plain meaning to include officials. And the term "official" does not refer solely to an office, but rather to the actual person "who is invested with an office." 10 Oxford English Dictionary 733 (2d ed. 1989). Under RFRA's definition, relief that can be executed against an "official ... of the United States" is "relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1(c), 2000bb–2(1).

Not only does the term "government" encompass officials, it also authorizes suits against "other person[s] acting under color of law." § 2000bb–2(1). The right to obtain relief against "a person" cannot be squared with the Government's reading that relief must always run against the United States. Moreover, the use of the phrase "official (or other person ...)" underscores that "official[s]" are treated like "person[s]." Ibid. (emphasis added). In other words, the parenthetical clarifies that "a government" includes both individuals who are officials acting under color of law and other, additional individuals who are nonofficials acting under color of law. Here, respondents sued the former.

The legal "backdrop against which Congress enacted" RFRA confirms the propriety of individual-capacity suits. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co. , 543 U.S. 481, 487, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 160 L.Ed.2d 932 (2005). The phrase "persons acting under color of law" draws on one of the most well-known civil rights statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1983....