Fogarty Bros. Transfer, Inc. v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 25 February 1959
• Citation: Fogarty Bros. Transfer, Inc. v. Boyd, 109 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1959)
• Parties: FOGARTY BROS. TRANSFER, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. Alan S. BOYD et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 883

109 So.2d 883

FOGARTY BROS. TRANSFER, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. Alan S. BOYD et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 25, 1959.

Rehearing Denied April 9, 1959.

Wayn K. Ramsay, Dan R. Schwartz, Norman J. Bolinger, Jacksonville, John M. Allison, Tampa, and George E. Turner, Jacksonville, for petitioners.

Lewis W. Petteway, Tallahassee, for Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, respondents.

O. C. Beakes, Jacksonville, for intervenor.

HOBSON, Justice.

This is a proceeding by six motor freight common carriers holding Florida certificates of authority, seeking a writ of certiorari to review Order 4241 of the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission prescribing rules and regulations governing household goods carriers in leasing motor vehicles from others, in the domiciling of their motor vehicle equipment and in using agents.

The historic development of Order 4241 is as follows: After extensive hearings into certain abusive practices by household goods carriers, the Commission, on December 30, 1952, issued Order 2791. Said order revoked all 'For Hire' permits and all certificates of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission, 'except such certificates which conform' to the Commission's findings in said order. The order also provided, in lieu of the revoked certificates and permits, for the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity for limited common carriage of household goods non-radially over irregular routes to, from, and between all points and places in Florida. Each household goods carrier operating under the jurisdiction of the Commission was granted operating authority with reference to one specific domiciling city. A certificate authorizing operation 'to, from, and between all points and places' within the State was defined as to merely authorize non-radial operation and not to include multiple domiciles.

Order 2791 further prescribed rules controlling the leasing of motor vehicle equipment and domiciling the same. ¹ Two of the petitioners herein, Fogarty Brothers and Delcher Brothers, attempted to enjoin the enforcement of the leasing and domicile rules adopted by Order 2791. The Circuit Court of the 2nd Judicial Circuit, on March 9, 1956, dissolved its temporary injunction and dismissed both suits on the ground that Order 2791 was valid. Only Delcher Brothers appealed to the Supreme Court, said appeal being voluntarily dismissed by it on July 3, 1956. On April 4, 1958, after a series of hearings, the Commission revised the rules and regulations governing the practices of household goods carriers, and issued Order 4241, which is herein challenged.

The petitioners' principal contention is that the Commission exceeded its power when it adopted Order 4241. That is to say, that the Commission has, in this order, created classifications of certificates for auto transportation companies not recognized by statute and impaired the validity of existing certificates in a manner other than expressly provided for by the Legislature.

It is clear that the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission has only such powers as are expressly or impliedly conferred upon them by statute. Florida Motor Lines v. State Railroad Commission, 1931, 101 Fla. 1018, 132 So. 851, 860.

However, by the very nature of the problem it is manifestly evident that the difficulty of making a specific enumeration of all such powers as the Legislature may intend to confer upon Railroad Commissions for the regulation of common carriers in the interest of the public welfare renders it necessary to confer some power in general terms; and general powers given are intended to confer other powers than those specifically enumerated. State ex rel. Railroad Com'rs v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 1911, 61 Fla. 799, 54 So. 900.

It is here appropriate to quote and adopt as our own the following significant excerpt from the case of American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 1952, 344 U.S. 298, 73 S.Ct. 307, 314, 97 L.Ed. 337, 355, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States, in determining whether the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power to control and regulate the leasing practices of interstate carriers, said:

'Our function, however, does not stop with a section-by-section search for the phrase 'regulation of leasing practices' among the literal words of the statutory provisions. As a matter of principle, we might agree with appellants' contentions if we thought it a reasonable canon of interpretation that the draftsmen of acts delegating agency powers, as a practical and realistic matter, can or do include specific consideration of every evil sought to be corrected. But no great acquaintance with practical affairs is required to know that such prescience, either in fact or in the minds of Congress, does not exist. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219, 220, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1010, 1011, 87 L.Ed. 1344 [1364, 1365]; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 313 U.S. 177, 193, 194, 61 S.Ct. 845, 852, 85 L.Ed. 1271 [1282, 1283], 133 A.L.R. 1217. Its very absence, moreover, is precisely one of the reasons why regulatory agencies such as the Commission are created, for it is the fond hope of their authors that they bring to their work the expert's familiarity with industry conditions which members of the delegating legislatures cannot be expected to possess. United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U.S. 612, 65 S.Ct. 471, 89 L.Ed. 499.'

In the exercise of the authority conferred upon it by statute, the Commission may, within the limitations expressly or impliedly defined by organic or statutory law, exercise reasonable administrative discretion and judgment to effectuate the intent of the law as it may legally be applied to varying conditions.

It is here desirable to consider the legislative intent in placing the auto transportation industry under the control of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission.

In the significant case of Riley v. Lawson, 1932, 106 Fla. 521, 143 So. 619, 623, this court found the Legislature had five main purposes when it adopted the Auto Transportation Act. Most pertinent to our inquiry are the following:

'(1) To furnish the traveling and shipping public a well defined method of securing motor highway transportation, both passenger and freight, in keeping with modern developments, and when such facilities are authorized to reasonably regulate and supervise the industry in the interest of the traveling and shipping public.

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'(3) To protect and conserve existing transportation facilities against ruthless, unbridled and destructive competition, which if unregulated might seriously impair and ultimately destroy not only itself but other transportation facilities to the public's damage.'

Order 4241 was adopted after extensive hearings and its purpose was primarily to curb certain abusive practices, to-wit: (a) the expansion of the larger carriers into new domicile points unless they could show public convenience and necessity required it; and (b) the passing on of certificate privileges to noncertificate holders under the guise of 'spot' leasing, intermittent leases and similar evasive devices. These practices are clearly within the abuses which the Legislature intended to correct in its enactment of Chapter 323, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Order 4241 attempts to accomplish these purposes by limiting the places a carrier may domicile his equipment, controlling the appointment and conduct of the carriers' agents, and limiting the manner in which a carrier may lease equipment.

With reference to the leasing practices of the household goods carriers, Rule 2 of Order 4241 provides that a household goods carrier can only lease vehicles to replace a disabled vehicle or to augment its motor vehicle equipment. ² A lease for the purpose of augmenting the carrier's equipment must be in writing and must be for a period of not less than 90 days. The power of the Commission to issue such a leasing rule is herein challenged.

Section 323.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides in part:

'The commission may supervise and regulate every auto transportation company in the state operating under the authority of this chapter, fix or approve the rates, fares, charges, classifications, rules and regulations for such auto transportation companies, regulate the service and safety of operations, of each such auto transportation company, * * * and supervise and regulate auto transportation companies in all other matters affecting the relationship between such companies and the traveling and shipping public.' (Emphasis supplied.)

From the above quoted statute it is evident that the Commission's power extends to the service and safety of the autotransportation industry and to all matters affecting the relationship between such companies and the shipping public. Although the statutes do not specifically mention the right of the Commission to regulate the leasing of motor equipment, this right is implied within its duties to regulate those practices of the carriers which affect the service and safety of the auto transportation industry.

As a practical matter short term or intermittent leases are often a means by which household goods carriers holding state-wide certificates pass a portion of these certificated rights on to owners of motor vehicle equipment who have no such rights. Rule 2 provides a measure of protection to the shipping and motoring public by forcing the lessee-carrier to assume full responsibility and liability for the operation of the leased vehicle and for all cargo transported during the term of the lease. The Commission's power to control these leasing practices is clearly within the scope of its implied powers and in keeping with the spirit of its statutory authority.

The principal contention of the petitioners is that the Commission has no power to regulate the domiciling of household goods...