Fogel v. United States, 11930.

• Decision Date: 02 August 1947
• Docket Number: No. 11930.,11930.
• Citation: 162 F.2d 54
• Parties: FOGEL v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

162 F.2d 54 (1947)

FOGEL v. UNITED STATES.

No. 11930.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 12, 1947.

Rehearing Denied August 2, 1947.

Webster Atwell and Emil Corenbleth, both of Dallas, Tex., for appellant.

William Cantrell, Jr., Sp. Asst. to U. S. Atty., of Dallas, Tex., for appellee.

Before SIBLEY, McCORD, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

McCORD, Circuit Judge.

On January 22, 1947, an indictment was filed charging Samuel Hannah Fogel with failure to register, in violation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 301 et seq.¹ Fogel waived a jury trial, was tried before the court, was found guilty, and was fined $1,000.00 and sentenced to serve eighteen months in the penitentiary.

On appeal Fogel contends: (1) That the court erred in refusing to hold the prosecution was barred by the three-year statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C.A. § 582; the indictment not being found within three years from the time the offense is alleged to have been committed. (2) That the court erred in refusing to acquit the defendant for the reason that it was not shown that he was between the ages of eighteen and forty-five on or about February 16, 1942, when he was ordered to present himself for and submit to registration under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.

On February 16, 1942,² the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was in full force and effect, and Section 3(a) of the Act, as amended, provided:

"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United States, who is between the ages of nineteen and forty-five³ at the time fixed for his registration shall be liable for training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States."

The evidence shows without dispute that Fogel not only did not register on February 16, 1942, but that he has never registered for service in the armed forces. Fogel's duty and obligation to register did not end on registration day, February 16, 1942. The regulations promulgated under the Act make this exceedingly clear. Section 611.5(d), Selective Service Regulations, 2d Ed., provides: "The duty of every man subject to registration to present himself for and submit to registration shall continue at all times, and if for any reason any such man is not registered on the day fixed for his registration, he shall immediately present himself for and submit to registration before the local board in the area where he happens to be." This regulation was notice to all persons that registration was a continuing obligation and that every day⁴ was a day for registration. The duty of Fogel to register being a continuing obligation, his failure to register was a continuing offense — an offense that continued right up to the date of the finding of the indictment. Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations did not operate to bar the prosecution.

There is no merit in the contention that the evidence was insufficient to show that Fogel was within the age group subject to registration. The evidence shows that on or about February 7, 1946, Fogel, an alien, appeared for a hearing in the office of the Naturalization Examiner at Dallas, Texas, on his application for registration as an alien. At that time he stated under oath that he was born in Poland on July 10, 1898. Again on September 12, 1946, Fogel was in the office of the Naturalization Examiner in Dallas and a number of questions were propounded. Each question was read to him and he again answered under oath, stating that he had been born on July 10, 1898.

Fogel did not take the stand in his own behalf. His brother, Joseph Fogel, said that he had been instrumental in bringing Samuel to this country in 1913. (Immigration officers, however, were unable to find when and where Samuel entered this country.) Joseph further testified that Samuel was much older than the age he had given to the Naturalization Examiner. Joseph admitted that he had left Poland, which was under the domination of Russia, to escape military service, and his evidence was misleading and evasive in many respects.

The evidence was sufficient to establish appellant's age as being within the age group subject to registration on February 16, 1942. Appellant was born in Poland, and his parents were dead. Certainly, birth records were not available. The next best evidence was his own statements made under oath to the Naturalization Examiner. These statements were in no wise confessions or admissions of guilt of the offense charged in the indictment. When these statements were made, no indictment had been returned. The statements were not made in relation to this prosecution, but were voluntarily made and sworn to by appellant at a time when he sought to obtain the protection and privileges of citizenship in this country, while he was at the same time wilfully failing and neglecting to register to serve it in its struggle for survival. The evidence warranted a finding that Fogel's age was below forty-five years on the day fixed for registration.⁵ Cf. Zuziak v. United States, 9 Cir., 119 F.2d 140.

The prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations. The evidence supports the conviction. No reversible error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.

SIBLEY, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

The conviction of Fogel of felony under this indictment and on this evidence I think is unlawful.

1. The charge made is that he wilfully failed and neglected to register under the Selective Service Act on February 16, 1942, he being a person required to register then. We judicially know and the evidence is that this is the date fixed by Presidential proclamation for registration by persons from twenty-one to forty-five years old. Fogel did not register that day and it appears that he had no lawful excuse if he was under forty-five years old. His offense was complete at the expiration of the time fixed by the proclamation. Though there was a continuing duty to register, a subsequent registration would not have cancelled, but would only have mitigated, the completed crime. Prosecution for that crime became barred after three years, on February 16, 1945. This indictment was not filed till Jan. 22, 1947. If the Draft Board or other person authorized had again called on him to register and he had failed to do so, a new crime would have occurred for which he could be prosecuted, but that did not happen. The President however did, as argued to the trial court and mentioned in the majority opinion, by a proclamation on March 19, 1942, call for a registration on April 27, 1942, by persons from eighteen to sixty-five years, and Fogel was certainly between those ages. By again failing to register on that date he committed another crime; but that is not charged in this indictment, and it also was committed more than three years before the indictment was found. The theory of the conviction is that by doing nothing he renewed his crime every day to the date of the trial; which amounts to saying there is no statute of limitations for this offense. This seems to me not to be in accord with authority, when the thing that is made a crime is the failure to perform a continuing duty, when nothing at all happens after the crime became complete. In United States v. Irvine, 98 U.S. 450, 25 L.Ed. 193, the crime was for an agent or attorney "wrongfully to...