Fogg v. Boston & L.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1889
• Citation: Fogg v. Boston & L.R. Co., 20 N.E. 109, 148 Mass. 513 (Mass. 1889)
• Parties: FOGG v. BOSTON & L.R. CO.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

148 Mass. 513

20 N.E. 109

FOGG v. BOSTON & L.R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 28, 1889

COUNSEL

Elias Merwin, CW. Bartlett, and E.L. Buffinton, for plaintiff.

S Lincoln and W.H. Coolidge, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

A corporation is liable in damages for the publication of a libel as it is for its other torts. Whitfield v. Railroad Co., El.Bl. & El. 115; Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202; Samuels v. Mail Co., 75 N.Y. 604 affirming dissenting opinion in 9 Hun, 294. To establish its liability, the publication must be shown to have been made by its authority, or to have been ratified by it, or to have been made by one of its servants or agents, in the course of the business in which he was employed. In the present case we think there was evidence against the defendant upon each of these grounds, which should have been submitted to the jury for their consideration.

It was admitted that a libelous extract from a newspaper was kept posted 40 days in a conspicuous place in the defendant's office in Boston, which was arranged especially for the sale and advertising of railroad tickets, and was in the immediate charge of one of the defendant's employes. The plaintiff was a railroad ticket broker, doing business on the same street. The statements in the libel indicated that he was not a safe and reliable person from whom to buy tickets. From the evidence in the case, the jury might have inferred that the defendant's office was used, not merely for advertising tickets, but for advertising and publishing any other information of interest to persons about to purchase tickets, which would be likely to induce them to buy at the defendant's office rather than elsewhere. One who maintains a place of business may be presumed to have general knowledge of what is done there. The jury might properly have found that the defendant, having its principal terminus and the offices of its principal managing agents in Boston, had knowledge from time to time of what kinds of advertisements and notices were posted in its ticket-office there, and that the libel would not have remained so long in that conspicuous place, if the corporation had not originally authorized or afterwards ratified the act of posting it.

But there was additional evidence of ratification of this publication by the defendant. We have the letter of the defendant's general passenger agent, written nearly a month before the publication was discontinued, in which he declined to interfere with it. This agent "was in general charge, on behalf of said corporation, of all the tickets, and sales of tickets, for the transportation of passengers over the road of the defendant corporation and its connections, and had the general control and supervision of all the offices used for, and the agents employed by, said corporation in the sale of said tickets." He was the representative of the corporation, to determine in its behalf what kinds of notices should be posted in its ticket-offices. His determination to permit the libel to remain before the eyes of the...