Foley v. Wesson Mem'l Hosp.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1923
• Citation: 246 Mass. 363,141 N.E. 113
• Parties: FOLEY v. WESSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL. MORGAN v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

246 Mass. 363

141 N.E. 113

FOLEY

v.WESSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL.

MORGAN

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Oct. 10, 1923.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampden County; Henry A. King, Judge.

Actions of tort by Agnes Foley, by her next friend, and by Margaret Morgan, by her next friend, against the Wesson Memorial Hospital, for personal injuries. Directed verdict for defendant in each action, and plaintiffs bring exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

Plaintiffs were injured while walking on the sidewalk, when defendant's ambulance ran over the curbing and struck them. Each declaration alleged negligence, and by amendment a second count was added, alleging willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct. The answers, among other defenses, alleged that defendant was a public charitable corporation and not liable.

P. L. Cohn, of Springfield, for plaintiff Foley.

G. J. Callahan, of Springfield, for plaintiff Morgan.

DECOURCY, J.

The plaintiffs were struck and injured by an ambulance belonging to the defendant and operated by its employee. The parties agree that the defendant is a public charitable organization, and that the ambulance was owned by it and was being used at the time of the accident in connection with its work as a hospital. Admittedly there was evidence for the jury of the due care of the plaintiffs and of negligence on the part of said employee. Verdicts for the defendant were directed by the court. The only question raised by the exceptions is whether the defendant is exempt from liability.

[1] The doctrine of the nonliability of a charitable corporationfor the negligence of its servants was fully considered, and the authorities in this and other jurisdictions reviewed, in the recent case of Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 69, 126 N. E. 392, 393 (14 A. L. R. 563). It was there said:

‘The specific ground on which the immunity of hospitals for negligence of servants rests has been discussed only in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, among our adjudications. That decision was put squarely on the foundation that the funds of a public hospital are devoted to a charitable trust and that to subject them to the payment of a judgment for negligence of its servants would be an unlawful diversion of the trust. That is the ground upon which that decision rests.’

And it was held that such exoneration existed ‘from liability for negligence of the managers in selecting incompetent subordinate agents, as well as for the negligence of such subordinate agents selected with care.’ The same basis for nonliability was recognized in the later case of Kidd v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hospital, 237 Mass. 500, 130 N. E. 55. In each of these cases the plaintiff was a recipient of the charity. But the same principle has been applied in case of injuries to a servant. Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E. 855,7...