Folks v. Marion County
Decision Date | 26 September 1935 |
Citation | 121 Fla. 17,163 So. 298 |
Parties | FOLKS et al. v. MARION COUNTY. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Suit by the County of Marion against T. F. Folks and the State of Florida, wherein T. F. Folks intervened. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant and intervener appeal.
Affirmed.
BROWN and BUFORD, JJ., dissenting in part. Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; W. S. Bullock, judge.
A. P Buie, of Ocala, for appellants.
Norris F. Baskin, or Ocala, for appellant intervener.
Wallace E. Sturgis, of Ocala, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court for Marion county rendered on March 25, 1935, validating an issue of county refunding bonds.
The question involved on this appeal, stated in general terms, is whether or not 'homesteads,' as defined by article 10, § 7, of the Constitution, being the constitutional amendment adopted on November 6, 1934, are subject to taxation for the payment of county refunding bonds authorized and issued after the adoption of said homestead exemption amendment; such refunding bonds being in renewal or extension of the obligation evidenced by county bonds issued prior to the adoption of said amendment, at a time when 'homesteads,' as so defined, were subject to taxation for the payment of such original obligation.
The petition for validation shows that on February 19, 1935, the board of county commissioners of Marion county adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance of $110,000 of Refunding Road Bonds, Serics B, to be dated July 1, 1935, bearing interest at 5 per cent. per annum, to refund 50 per cent. of $220,000 of road bonds issued in July, 1920, and falling due July 1, 1935. The resolution states that the county will not have on hand when the original bonds mature sufficient funds to pay more than one half the amount then falling due; hence the necessity for issuing the refunding bonds, under authority of chapter 15772, Laws of 1931, Ex Sess. to take care of the other half.
The form of the refunding bonds, as provided in the resolution reads in part as follows:
There is a provision in the bonds giving the county the option to redeem on any interest date upon notice given. Then follows a paragraph which contains this clause.
'That provision has been made for the levy and collection of a direct annual tax upon all property within said County, except only such property as would be exempt from taxation under the provisions of the laws and Constitution of Florida which were in force and effect at the time of the creation of the indebtedness refunded hereby, sufficient to pay the principal and interest of this bond as the same shall fall due.'
The resolution provides for a sinking fund to pay the bonds at maturity, requiring prescribed payments into such fund annually commencing in 1945. Paragraph 7 reads as follows:
Section 10 of the resolution reads as follows:
(Italics supplied.)
Section 15 reads thus:
It will be noticed that the italicized portion of section 10 would permit the board of county commissioners to order the sale of any of said bonds 'in the manner provided by said General Refunding Act of 1931,' which is said chapter 15772.
The Refunding Act of 1931, referred to, is quite broad and comprehensive in its terms, and in section 8 thereof provides that the refunding bonds issued thereunder 'may be exchanged for not less than an equal principal amount and/or accrued interest of indebtedness to be retired thereby, including indebtedness not yet due, if the same be then redeemable or if the holders thereof be willing to surrender the same for retirement, but otherwise shall be sold and the proceeds thereof shall be applied to the payment of such indebtedness and/or accrued interest due or redeemable which may be so surrendered. ' (Italics supplied.) We will discuss the effect of this section later on.
Section 22 of said act provides that: 'In each year while any of the bonds shall be outstanding there shall be levied by or under the authority of the governing board upon all taxable property in the unit, an ad valorem tax sufficient to pay the interest and principal of such refunding bonds,' etc. (Italics supplied.) Does this language limit the levying 'in each year' of a tax to pay the refunding bonds to a tax on all property which is taxable under the laws existing at the time the levy is made, or may the words 'all taxable property' be reasonably construed to mean all property which is lawfully and properly taxable for the payment of the refunding bonds, including, if it may be done, all property which was taxable for the payment of the original bonds thus refunded? The answer to this question evidently turns upon the answer to the main question in this case, which concerns what property is 'taxable property' for the payment of refunding bonds, of the kind authorized by the act and provided for by the resolution adopted by the county commissioners in this instance.
The language used in section 23 of said Refunding Act is somewhat different from that used in section 22, but as that section is limited to bonds issued by municipalities, it does not affect the provisions of section 22 above pointed out.
The petition for validation was resisted in the court below, both by the state through its state attorney, A. P. Buie, and by T. F. Folks, a citizen, taxpayer, and homestead owner of Marion county. Each denied that chapter 15772 authorized the issuance of the refunding bonds in the manner proposed, and alleged that the resolution, and the issuance of the bonds thereunder, would violate the homestead exemption amendment of November 6, 1934, which amendment exempts 'from all taxation, other than special assessments for benefits' the homestead as defined in article 10 of...
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