Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., Inc.

Decision Date16 July 1982
Docket Number81-4202,Nos. 81-4187,s. 81-4187
Citation681 F.2d 673
PartiesFed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,767 Merrill M. FOLLANSBEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVIS, SKAGGS & CO., INC., a Delaware Corporation, and Chester T. Bjerke, Jr., Defendants-Appellants. Merrill M. FOLLANSBEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVIS, SKAGGS & CO., INC., a Delaware Corporation, and Chester T. Bjerke, Jr., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Eric G. Wallis, Jay R. Martin, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Oakland, Cal., for Davis, Skaggs & Co.

Thomas C. Perkins, Sacramento, Cal., for Follansbee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Northern California.

Before HAYNSWORTH, * Senior Circuit Judge, and CHOY and SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges.

HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge:

In September, 1975 Follansbee filed this action against Davis, Skaggs & Co. and Chester Bjerke, a broker employed by Davis, Skaggs, for churning his securities account and for making investments that were unsuitable for him. Following a trial before the court, the district court found for Follansbee on his churning claim and for the defendants on the unsuitability claim. Both Follansbee and the defendants have appealed.

I.

Follansbee graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles with a B.A. degree in Economics. The next several years he spent in seminaries, earning a Bachelor of Divinity degree, and he became an ordained Presbyterian minister. After earlier pastorates, he became an administrator of education programs for the United Presbyterian Church.

Before the death of his father in 1966, Follansbee had purchased several small blocks of stock. He kept close watch on the performance of those stocks. He served as executor of his father's estate, and, after payment of taxes and all expenses, divided the remainder among his sister, his brother and himself. In this distribution he received securities valued at approximately $145,000.

Beginning in January 1967, the plaintiff maintained an active trading account with Dean Witter. Late in 1967, however, his brother sent him a book written by Edward Jensen and entitled Stock Market Blueprints. Follansbee was impressed with the book and wanted someone with Jensen's philosophy to handle his account. His brother, who knew Jensen, obtained a recommendation of Chester Bjerke, who had helped in writing Jensen's book. Bjerke was conveniently located in the Sacramento office of Merrill Lynch.

In February 1968, Follansbee met with Bjerke to discuss a transfer of his account. The plaintiff testified that he told Bjerke that he wanted to be conservative and to protect his capital. On a new account form, however, Bjerke checked "Quality Growth" as the plaintiff's investment objective, rather than "Safety of principal and income." This was after the plaintiff had told Bjerke that he wanted his account handled more actively than it had been, and there was a discussion between the two of the general investment philosophy to be followed. Bjerke recommended that they buy stocks of companies in emerging industries and hold them for some six months or longer until the stock peaked. Bjerke expressed the view that the returns from a more conservative approach would not keep pace with inflation. The plaintiff expressed agreement with that approach, and he transferred securities worth approximately $138,000 to Merrill Lynch to be handled by Bjerke.

Follansbee's account was handled by Bjerke at Merrill Lynch for approximately one year. During that time there were 39 trades, and most of the sales were of stocks held for less than six months. During that time, however, the value of the plaintiff's portfolio increased by approximately $25,000. The plaintiff, of course, was highly pleased. During the early years of their association, he introduced Bjerke to friends as "the boy wonder of Wall Street." When Bjerke transferred from Merrill Lynch to Davis, Skaggs, the plaintiff went with him.

In the spring of 1969, Bjerke and the plaintiff discussed strategy in the handling of plaintiff's account. They were predicting a generally declining market. They envisioned the realization of capital gains only by purchasing securities in the short-term troughs and riding the short-term wave to its peak. This would result in average holding periods of substantially less than six months as, of course, had been the case at Merrill Lynch. The plaintiff approved and agreed to that strategy.

Moreover, because they foresaw a generally declining market, Bjerke suggested that profits might be made through short selling. The plaintiff agreed and there were some short sales protected by stop-loss purchase orders.

Thus, there were frequent transactions in the account at Davis, Skaggs, just as there had been at Merrill Lynch.

The plaintiff continued to read and study investment materials. Bjerke organized a seminar group which met once a week for an hour. The plaintiff testified that he attended approximately 65 per cent of those meetings. Collectively, the group subscribed to a number of investment advisory reports and each of these was circulated among the members. During the meetings the discussions were wide-ranging and included discussions of the prospects of particular industries and of particular companies within an industry. With this and the plaintiff's reading of reports of financial services, the plaintiff from time to time was able to suggest to Bjerke further investigation of potential investment prospects.

Among the companies discussed during the meetings of the seminar was one known as Optical Coating. Bjerke regarded it as an emerging growth company. It had been thoroughly investigated by Davis, Skaggs and by Bjerke, and Bjerke himself, had been in touch with its management. The plaintiff, too, studied its financial statements and became excited about it. There were several acquisitions of its stock until it became a major part of the portfolio. The plaintiff still owned 700 shares of that stock at the time of commencement of this action, though its market value then was substantially less than the plaintiff's cost.

During another of the seminars there was a discussion of a tax-sheltered, limited partnership venture in the cattle feeding business. The plaintiff also became excited about that. Bjerke, however, cautioned the plaintiff that he should not purchase a limited partnership interest in Cal-Calf if his marginal income tax bracket was less than 39 per cent and that he should first discuss it with his accountant. The plaintiff's marginal income tax bracket was less than 39 per cent, but, in answering a written questionnaire from Bjerke, he falsely stated that his marginal bracket was more than that. Without having discussed the matter with his accountant, he invested $10,000 in the venture.

The investment later became a total loss after imposition of a price freeze upon beef without a freeze of the cost of cattle feed.

The plaintiff maintained meticulous records of his financial transactions. From his confirmation slips he carefully recorded every purchase and sale. When a purchase was closed out with a sale, he carefully noted whether, for income tax purposes, it was a long-term or short-term capital gain or loss. The amount of the gain or loss, of course, was recorded. He checked the accuracy of the monthly reports he received against his own records, and, habitually, he would value each item in his portfolio and the total valuation on a weekly basis.

From time to time the plaintiff withdrew cash from his account. The aggregate total of those withdrawals was approximately $61,000. They were used by the plaintiff in part for educational expenses of his children, for the purchase of two automobiles one of which was a Mercedes, and for the construction of a swimming pool. The plaintiff, however, did not wish his trading account to be reduced by these withdrawals. For that reason, the advances to him were set up as loans by Davis, Skaggs to Follansbee, and the securities were placed in a margin account to secure repayment of the loans. As interest charges accrued and the market value of the securities in the account declined, the plaintiff in late 1973 began receiving calls to put up additional margin. In June 1974 it was agreed that Follansbee's indebtedness would be reduced by the application of the proceeds of some sales. In July 1974 an obviously unhappy Follansbee requested the return of his stock certificates, an act which the district judge found to betray "a certain degree of naivete." Of course, Bjerke explained to him that they had to be retained since the stock secured the repayment of the loans.

In August 1974 Follansbee directed Bjerke to close his account. The loans were repaid out of the proceeds of the sale of all of the plaintiff's stock except for 700 shares of Optical Coating and 800 shares of Keystone S-3 mutual fund.

II.

It is settled that when a broker, unfaithful to the trust of his customer, churns an account in the broker's control for the purpose of enhancing the broker's commission income and in disregard of the client's interest, there is a violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq., and Securities and Exchange...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • In re Catanella and EF Hutton and Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • April 9, 1984
    ...(7th Cir.1983); Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416-17 (11th Cir.1983); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., Inc., 681 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir.1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer, 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir.1981); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814, 820......
  • Duffy v. Cavalier
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • November 27, 1989
    ...verbatim restatement of the language in several of the federal cases cited and relied on by appellants. (Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., Inc. (9th Cir.1982) 681 F.2d 673, 676-677; Carras v. Burns (4th Cir.1975) 516 F.2d 251, 258-259; David K. Lindemuth Co. v. Shannon Financial Corp. (N.D......
  • Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 84SC58
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • May 12, 1986
    ...and exercise independent judgment as to those recommendations can be viewed as controlling the account. Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.1982); Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 413 F.Supp. 377 (N.D.Okla.1975). Thus, for example, the court in Leib consider......
  • Duffy v. Cavalier
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • May 31, 1989
    ...verbatim restatement of the language in several of the federal cases cited and relied on by appellants. (Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., Inc. (9th Cir.1982) 681 F.2d 673, 676-677; Carras v. Burns (4th Cir.1975) 516 F.2d 251, 258-259; David K. Lindemuth Co. v. Shannon Financial Corp. (N.D......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT