Follo v. Laborers Int'l Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local Union 137

• Decision Date: 15 September 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:11-CV-04486 (DMC)(JAD)
• Parties: CATHY FOLLO and GREG TARANTINO, Plaintiffs, v. LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL UNION 137, LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, EXECUTIVE BOARD, LOCAL UNION 137, LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, and ROBERT LIGUORI, Business Manager, Local Union 137, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

CATHY FOLLO and GREG TARANTINO, Plaintiffs, v. LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO LOCAL UNION 137, LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA AFL-CIO, EXECUTIVE BOARD, LOCAL UNION 137 LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO and ROBERT LIGUORI, Business Manager, Local Union 137, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:11-CV-04486 (DMC)(JAD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: September 15, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh

OPINION

DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH, U.S. District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion to remand this action to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and for fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). No oral argument was heard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion to remand to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County is granted and Plaintiffs' motion for fees is denied.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Cathy Follo and Greg Tarantino ("Plaintiffs") are employed as Pari-Mutuels for New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority ("NJSEA") at the Meadowlands Racetrack in East Rutherford, New Jersey. (Pl. Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 2, Aug. 24, 2011, ECF No. 8). Plaintiffs are members of Local Union 137, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, ("Defendant Union 137"), a local chapter of Laborers' International Union of North America ("LiUNA Defendant"), an international labor organization. Id. Defendant Union 137 has been the exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the Meadowlands Racetrack since its opening in 1976. Id.

On or about July 15, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and proposed Order to Show Cause in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County. This complaint arises out of Defendant Union 137's alleged failure to present a proposed collective bargaining agreement to union membership for an informed vote, thereby denying the members their ratification rights.¹ (Pl.'s Complaint 22, Jul. 20, 2011, ECF No. 8-4). Plaintiffs further alleged that such failure breached the local and international constitutions, the Union's duty of fair representation, and the Union's fiduciary duty to its membership as its collective bargaining agent. (Pl. Compl. 24).

In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Union charged excessive or discriminatory fees, constituting a violation of the Union Constitution as well as an Unfair Labor Practice under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158 and 159. (Pl. Complaint 26).

On July 28, 2011, Plaintiffs and Defendants appeared before the Honorable Maurice Gallipoli in New Jersey Superior Court regarding Plaintiffs' request for temporary restraints associated with their complaint. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 7, Aug. 24, 2011, ECF No. 8). Following the hearing, Judge Gallipoli granted an Order to Show Cause with Interim Restraints, temporarily restraining and enjoining Defendant Union 137 from acting on any proposed contract pending the return date of the Order, set for August 31, 2011. Id.

On August 2, 2011, Defendant LiUNA filed a timely Notice of Removal of the instant case from the Superior Court to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. (Def.'s Notice Removal, Aug. 2, 2011, ECF No. 1). As the specified grounds for removal, Defendant provided "29 U.S.C. § 185 - Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement." Id. On August 8, 2011, Honorable Faith Hochberg of the United States District Court of New Jersey issued a Standing Order Requiring Submission of Information Regarding Removal. (Order, Aug. 8, 2011, ECF No. 3). Defendant thereafter filed a Motion for Dissolution of Injunctive Relief. (Defs.' Mot. Dissolution, Aug. 24, 2011, ECF No. 7) On the same day, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand the case to State Court. (Pls.' Mot. Remand, Aug. 24, 2011, ECF No. 8). These motions now come before this court on an Order to Reassign. (Ord. Reassign., Aug. 26, 2011, ECF No. 12).

Defendants assert that removal is proper on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331. ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, law or treaties of the United States."). Defendants provide two separate grounds for removal. First, Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' claims of breach of the Union Constitutions are cognizable under Section 301, and are thereby completely pre-empted bySection 301. (Heineman Letter Setting Forth Defs.' Position on Mot. Remand 8, Aug. 25, 2011, ECF No. 13). Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of duty of fair representation arise from Defendant's status as exclusive representative of the employees under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), and therefore arise under federal law. Id. at 4.

Plaintiffs argue that removal was improper because the claims have not been completely pre-empted by Federal law, nor do they independently raise questions of federal law. (Pls.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 14, Aug. 24, 2011, ECF No. 8) Plaintiffs maintain that this case should be remanded as Defendants have failed to fulfill their heavy burden in demonstrating that removal was proper. Id.

Upon consideration, this court finds that removal was improper and hereby remands this case to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County

DISCUSSION

In reviewing a motion for remand, the Court must construe the removal statutes strictly and resolve all doubts in favor of remand. See Shamrock & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941); Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 1996); Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992) (removing party carries a "heavy burden of persuasion"); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987)); Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985); North Jersey Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 125 F.R.D. 96, 100 (D.N.J. 1988).

A defendant may remove a claim from a state court to a federal district court pursuant to28 U.S.C. §1441 and 28 U.S.C. §1446. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that "any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1997).

28 U.S.C. §1446(a) states:

[a] defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.

Defendant bears the burden of proving that removal was proper. Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp. 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d. Cir. 1990).

In this case, Defendant LiUNA bases removal on federal question jurisdiction. The presence of federal question jurisdiction as the basis for removal is governed by the well pleaded complaint rule. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936). Plaintiff is the master of the claim and may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusively relying on state law. Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 252. (3d Cir. 2004) A plaintiff may not, however, avoid federal jurisdiction through artful pleading if, pursuant to the complete pre-emption doctrine, their claim is one that belongs in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). The doctrine of complete pre-emption is satisfied if

the pre-emptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint doctrine. Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law isconsidered, from its inception, a federal claim and therefore arises under federal law.

Id. Citing Metro. Life Ins. Co v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987), Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

Defendant LiUNA provides two separate bases of support in its assertion that this court has original jurisdiction over this case. First, Defendants allege that the claims presented in Plaintiffs' complaint are completely pre-empted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.² Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claims present federal questions under the National Labor Relations Act ("LMRA"). We address these assertions in turn.

1. Section 301 of Labor Management Relations Act

Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' claims of breach of collective bargaining agreement and Union Constitution have been completely pre-empted under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Section 301 provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce...or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

Although Section 301 has been found to hold pre-emptive force, such pre-emptive force has been limited to claims which rely upon the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. SeeFranchise Tax Board...