FOLSOM INVESTMENTS v. City of Scottsdale, No. Civ-85-1078 PHX. WPC.
| Court | United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. District of Arizona |
| Writing for the Court | William E. Farrell, Scottsdale City Atty., Scottsdale, Ariz., for defendants |
| Citation | 620 F. Supp. 1372 |
| Parties | FOLSOM INVESTMENTS, INC., a Texas corporation, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE, a municipal corporation of the State of Arizona; Herbert R. Drinkwater; Jean L. Black, James Bruner, Diane D. Cusack, Billie Axline Gentry, Bill Walton, and Rene Wendell, in their official capacities as duly elected members of the City Council of Scottsdale, Arizona, Defendants. |
| Decision Date | 29 October 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ-85-1078 PHX. WPC. |
620 F. Supp. 1372
FOLSOM INVESTMENTS, INC., a Texas corporation, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF SCOTTSDALE, a municipal corporation of the State of Arizona; Herbert R. Drinkwater; Jean L. Black, James Bruner, Diane D. Cusack, Billie Axline Gentry, Bill Walton, and Rene Wendell, in their official capacities as duly elected members of the City Council of Scottsdale, Arizona, Defendants.
No. Civ-85-1078 PHX. WPC.
United States District Court, D. Arizona.
October 29, 1985.
Neil Vincent Wake, Phoenix, Ariz., and Joseph W. Geary, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiffs.
William E. Farrell, Scottsdale City Atty., Scottsdale, Ariz., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
COPPLE, District Judge.
I. FACTS
The following facts are undisputed and are set forth in the Stipulation of Facts.
On December 30, 1983, Folsom Investments purchased a tract of land located within the corporate limits of the City of Scottsdale. At the date of purchase, the land was zoned R1-43 which allows construction of one single-family home per lot of 43,000 square feet.
On November 1, 1983, the Scottsdale City Council directed the City Planning Staff to begin analysis of planning and zoning for property that included Folsom's.
On September 27, 1984, Folsom submitted a preliminary plat application to the City of Scottsdale. The application satisfied all existing zoning and legal requirements, with the exception of drainage problems. Any potential drainage concerns with the preliminary plat would not have delayed the preliminary or final plat approval. By letter dated October 26, 1984, plaintiff was notified that the Project Review Director for the City of Scottsdale recommended denial of the preliminary plat application pursuant to Section 12-220(b)(2) of the Scottsdale City Code, which provides for denial based upon "existing and proposed zoning and land use of the tract and its environs." Plaintiff appealed to the Scottsdale Zoning and Planning Commission and the Scottsdale City Council. The Scottsdale Planning Commission denied the appeal on November 13, 1984 and the Scottsdale City Council on November 20, 1984 based upon the recommendation of the Project Review Director that the plat did not conform with proposed zoning.
On December 17, 1984, the Scottsdale City Council adopted Resolution 2518, amending the Scottsdale General Plan for the relevant area. The amendment recommended a less dense zoning for the area. On March 15, 1985, the Scottsdale City Council adopted Ordinance No. 1699, which decreased the density of residential development from one single-family home per 43,000 square feet to one single-family home per 70,000 square feet.
If plaintiff's preliminary plat application had been approved when initially applied for, plaintiff would have begun construction on the property within eight to twelve weeks of November 20, 1984 (January 16 or February 13 of 1985).
Plaintiff and defendants have both filed motions for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is addressed only to the Arizona zoning/subdivision regulation law theories and due process theories of relief and requests a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. Plaintiff does not address the equal protection theories of relief and the amount of damages that may be owing. Defendants are asking for partial summary judgment on the due process and equal protection theories of relief.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Predicated upon Arizona
The City's denial of plaintiff's plat application on November 20, 1985, was based upon the Scottsdale City Code § 12-220(b)(2), which provides in pertinent part:
B. The Department shall distribute copies of the plat to the following reviewing offices:
* * * * * *
2. Plan Director for compliance to public objectives, giving special attention to design principles and standards as set forth in Chapter 3 of this title; street and thoroughfares as related to the City streets and highway plans and to neighborhood circulation; utility methods and systems; existing and proposed zoning and land use of the tract and its environs; and, land required for schools, parks and other public facilities.
Id. (emphasis added).
The preliminary plat application was denied because the Project Review Director determined that the plat did not conform with proposed zoning. Statement of Stipulated Facts at ¶ 5.
Plaintiff argues that it was entitled to approval of its preliminary plat application as a matter of Arizona zoning and subdivision regulation law. Plaintiff argues that Section 12-220(b)(2) exceeds the authority delegated to the City by the State and conflicts with controlling state statutes. The regulation is therefore argued to be void.
The municipal power to zone land and to regulate the subdivision of land exists by virtue of state enabling legislation. City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court in and for Maricopa County, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290, 293 (1968). The state enabling act for municipal subdivision regulations is Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 9-463 et seq. Municipal subdivision regulation must be authorized by Section 9-463 et seq. to be valid. Bella Vista Ranches, Inc. v. City of Sierra Vista, 126 Ariz. 142, 613 P.2d 302, 303 (Ct.App.1980). Section 9-463.01 provides the relevant enabling municipal authority provisions:
A. Pursuant to the provisions of this...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Southwest Soil Remediation v. Tucson, No. 2 CA-CV 00-0219.
...issue to the Board in order to exhaust its administrative remedies. ¶ 26 SSR relies on Folsom Investments, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 620 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Ariz.1985); Robinson v. Lintz, 101 Ariz. 448, 420 P.2d 923 (1966); and Town of Paradise Valley v. Gulf Leisure Corp., 27 Ariz. App. 600,......
-
Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, No. 1
...Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 113, 231 P.2d 450, 452 (1951); see also Folsom Page 1313 [179 Ariz. 8] Invs., Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 620 F.Supp. 1372, 1375 (D.Ariz.1985) ("The courts are to interfere only when the ordinance enacted pursuant to the grant is arbitrary and unreasonable."); City ......
-
Golden Sands Dairy LLC v. Town of Saratoga, Case No.: 2015AP1258
...permit can be revoked if the property is rezoned—even if construction has already begun. Folsom Invest., Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 620 F.Supp. 1372, 1376 (D. Ariz. 1985). Courts applying the majority rule look for "substantial money expenditures, considerable contractual commitments, and ......
-
Southwest Soil Remediation v. Tucson, No. 2 CA-CV 00-0219.
...issue to the Board in order to exhaust its administrative remedies. ¶ 26 SSR relies on Folsom Investments, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 620 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Ariz.1985); Robinson v. Lintz, 101 Ariz. 448, 420 P.2d 923 (1966); and Town of Paradise Valley v. Gulf Leisure Corp., 27 Ariz. App. 600,......
-
Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, No. 1
...Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 113, 231 P.2d 450, 452 (1951); see also Folsom Page 1313 [179 Ariz. 8] Invs., Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 620 F.Supp. 1372, 1375 (D.Ariz.1985) ("The courts are to interfere only when the ordinance enacted pursuant to the grant is arbitrary and unreasonable."); City ......
-
Golden Sands Dairy LLC v. Town of Saratoga, Case No.: 2015AP1258
...permit can be revoked if the property is rezoned—even if construction has already begun. Folsom Invest., Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 620 F.Supp. 1372, 1376 (D. Ariz. 1985). Courts applying the majority rule look for "substantial money expenditures, considerable contractual commitments, and ......