Folta v. Ferro Eng'g

Citation43 N.E.3d 108
Decision Date04 November 2015
Docket NumberNo. 118070.,118070.
PartiesEllen FOLTA, Indiv. and as Special Adm'r of the Estate of James Folta, Deceased, Appellee, v. FERRO ENGINEERING, a Division of ON Marine Services Company, Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

43 N.E.3d 108

Ellen FOLTA, Indiv. and as Special Adm'r of the Estate of James Folta, Deceased, Appellee
v.
FERRO ENGINEERING, a Division of ON Marine Services Company, Appellant.

No. 118070.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 4, 2015.


43 N.E.3d 109

Joshua G. Vincent, Craig T. Liljestrand, Kimberly A. Jansen, Paul M. Markese, Jr., and Abigail M. Higgins, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago, for appellant.

J. Timothy Eaton and Jonathan B. Amarilio, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, and Nicholas J. Vogelzang, Connelly & Vogelzang LLC, Chicago, and Donald P. Blydenburgh and Jerome H. Block, Levy

43 N.E.3d 110

Phillips & Konigsberg LLP, New York, New York, for appellee.

Robert C. Johnson and Steven L. Merouse, Dentons US LLP, Chicago, for amici curiae American Insurance Association et al.

Kirk C. Jenkins, Sedgwick LLP, Chicago, for amici curiae Caterpillar Inc., et al.

Craig L. Unrath, Brad A. Elward and Melissa N. Schoenbein, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, and Patrick W. Stufflebeam, Drew Kemp and Julie K. Brown, HeplerBroom LLC, Edwardsville, for amicus curiae Illinois Defense Trial Counsel.

L. Elizabeth Coppoletti, Nyhan, Bambrick, Kinzie & Lowry, P.C., and Larry Krause, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Self-Insurers' Association.

Michael V. Oltmann, Goldenberg Heller Antognoli & Rowland, P.C., Edwardsville, and Joel A. D'Alba, Asher, Gittler & D'Alba, Ltd., Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois AFL–CIO.

Kathy Byrne, Cooney & Conway, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.

John Simmons and Ted N. Gianaris, Simmons Hanly Conroy, Alton, for amicus curiae Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization.

OPINION

Justice THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In this case we are asked to consider whether an employee can bring an action against an employer outside of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2010)) and the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. (West 2010)), when the employee's injury or disease first manifests after the expiration of certain time limitations under those acts. For the following reasons, we hold that under these circumstances, the employee's action is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of those acts.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 For four years, from 1966 to 1970, James Folta was employed as a shipping clerk and product tester for defendant Ferro Engineering. During that time period, as part of his job duties, he was exposed to products containing asbestos. Forty-one years later, in May 2011, James was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease associated with asbestos exposure. One month later, he brought a civil action in the circuit court of Cook County against 15 defendants, including Ferro Engineering, to recover damages for the disease he developed allegedly as a consequence of his exposure to the asbestos-containing products while employed by Ferro Engineering. James specifically sought relief against Ferro Engineering under several theories, including, inter alia, negligence.

¶ 4 Thereafter, Ferro Engineering filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9) (West 2010)), arguing, inter alia, that James's claims against it were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2010)) and the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/5(a), 11 (West 2010)). In response, James maintained that his action fell outside the exclusive remedy provisions because his claims were not “compensable” under the acts. He asserted that since the symptoms of his injury did not manifest until more than 40 years after his last exposure to asbestos, and any potential asbestos-related compensation claim was barred before he became aware of his injury under the 25–year limitation provision in section 6(c) of the

43 N.E.3d 111

Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2010)), his cause of action in circuit court was not barred.

¶ 5 During the pendency of the litigation, James died and his widow, Ellen Folta (Folta), was substituted individually and as special administrator of James's estate. The complaint was later amended to assert a claim for wrongful death against Ferro Engineering and the other defendants under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 2010)).

¶ 6 The circuit court granted Ferro Engineering's motion to dismiss, holding that the action was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions. Specifically related to this appeal, the court found that the running of the limitations period did not render the cause of action noncompensable under the acts. Following the resolution of the claims against the remaining defendants, which were dismissed after settlement or otherwise, Folta appealed from the dismissal of the claims against Ferro Engineering.

¶ 7 The appellate court reversed and remanded. 2014 IL App (1st) 123219, 383 Ill.Dec. 434, 14 N.E.3d 717. Relying on this court's ruling in Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill.2d 455, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d 1222 (1990), the appellate court explained that an injured employee may bring a common-law action against his employer where “the injury is not compensable under the Act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 2014 IL App (1st) 123219, ¶ 27, 383 Ill.Dec. 434, 14 N.E.3d 717. The appellate court determined that the term “compensability” must relate to the “ability to recover under the Act.” Id. ¶ 31. It found that Folta's injury was “quite literally not compensable” under the Workers' Compensation Act because all possibility of recovery was foreclosed due to the nature of his injury and the fact that his disease did not manifest until after the statute of repose expired. Id. ¶ 36 (“Through no fault of his own, [he] never had an opportunity to seek compensation under the Act.”). Accordingly, the appellate court held that Folta's suit against Ferro Engineering was not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act and the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 44.

¶ 8 We allowed Ferro Engineering's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). We additionally allowed amici curiae briefs in support of both parties.1 Ill. S.Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 This case requires us to interpret the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2010)), and the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/5(a), 11 (West 2010)). Specifically, we are asked to consider whether these provisions bar an employee's cause of action against an employer to recover damages for a disease resulting from asbestos exposure which arose out of and in the course of employment even though no compensation

43 N.E.3d 112

is available under those acts due to statutory time limits on the employer's liability. The question is one of law, which we review de novo. Cassens Transport Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 218 Ill.2d 519, 524, 300 Ill.Dec. 416, 844 N.E.2d 414 (2006).

¶ 11 To answer this question, we begin with a brief overview of the well-established purpose of the acts. The Workers' Occupational Diseases Act provides compensation for diseases arising out of, and in the course of, employment. 820 ILCS 310/1(d) (West 2010). That Act is modeled after and designed to complement the Workers' Compensation Act, which provides financial protection for accidental injuries arising out of, and in the course of, employment. See 820 ILCS 305/1(d) (West 2012). In enacting these statutes, the General Assembly established a new framework for recovery to replace the common-law rights and liabilities that previously governed employee injuries. Sharp v. Gallagher, 95 Ill.2d 322, 326, 69 Ill.Dec. 351, 447 N.E.2d 786 (1983) ; Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill.2d 29, 44, 206 Ill.Dec. 625, 645 N.E.2d 877 (1994) (“[t]he [Act] reflects the legislative balancing of rights, remedies, and procedures that govern the disposition of employees' work-related injuries”); Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill.2d 15, 18, 253 N.E.2d 373 (1969) (“ ‘The act was designed as a substitute for previous rights of action of employees against employers and to cover the whole ground of the liabilities of the master, and it has been so regarded by all courts.’ ” (quoting Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378, 382, 120 N.E. 249 (1918) )).

¶ 12 In exchange for a system of no-fault liability upon the employer, the employee is subject to statutory limitations on recovery for injuries and occupational diseases arising out of and in the course of employment. The acts further provide that the statutory remedies “ ‘shall serve as the employee's exclusive remedy if he sustains a compensable injury.’ ” Sharp, 95 Ill.2d at 326–27, 69 Ill.Dec. 351, 447 N.E.2d 786 (quoting McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill.2d 352, 356, 53 Ill.Dec. 207, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981) ). Accordingly, both acts contain an exclusive remedy provision as part of the quid pro quo which balances the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • Roberson v. Maestro Consulting Servs. LLC, Case No. 20-CV-00895-NJR
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
    • 14 Diciembre 2020
    ...N.E.2d 198, Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co. , 139 Ill.2d 455, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d 1222 (1990), and Folta v. Ferro Eng'g , 397 Ill.Dec. 781, 43 N.E.3d 108 (Ill. 2015). Defendants fail to point out that more than 50 years after Gannon , in Folta , the Illinois Supreme Court explaine......
  • Jeana K. Reinbold, Not Individually But of the Estate of Sandburg Mall Realty Mgmt. LLC v. Kohansieh (In re Sandburg Mall Realty Mgmt. LLC)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Central District of Illinois
    • 31 Enero 2017
    ...the possibility of liability after a defined period of time, after which there is no longer a recognized right of action. Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070, ¶ 33, 397 Ill.Dec. 781, 43 N.E.3d 108 (2015). As explained by the Supreme Court, a statute of repose puts an outer limit on t......
  • McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 3 Febrero 2022
    ...2019. 2020 IL App (1st) 192398, ¶ 8, 447 Ill.Dec. 561, 174 N.E.3d 578. Citing this court's decision in Folta v. Ferro Engineering , 2015 IL 118070, 397 Ill.Dec. 781, 43 N.E.3d 108, the appellate court held that, to determine whether an employer's liability is governed exclusively by the pro......
  • Glenn v. Cavalry Invs. LLC (In re Glenn)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 5 Enero 2016
    ...after a fixed period of time, regardless of when the action accrued.Id . (emphasis added); see also Folta v. Ferro Eng' g, 2015 IL 118070, 397 Ill.Dec. 781, 43 N.E.3d 108 (2015) ("In contrast to a statute of limitations, which determines the time within which a lawsuit may be brought after ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT