Fontana v. Caldera

• Decision Date: 05 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 00-1732.,CIV. A. 00-1732.
• Citation: 160 F.Supp.2d 122
• Parties: John FONTANA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Louis CALDERA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Page 122

160 F.Supp.2d 122

John FONTANA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Louis CALDERA, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. A. 00-1732.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 5, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles William Gittins, Law Offices of Charles W. Gittins, P.C., Middleton, VA, Louies Bouscaren McKnew, Rockville, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Stacey M. Ludwig, Paul Mussenden, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SULLIVAN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs John Fontana and Kevin Murphy filed motions for preliminary and permanent injunction, seeking to prevent enforcement of a decision of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records ("ABCMR"), endorsing the Army's calculation of their separation from service date. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After filing stipulations, the Magistrate Judge treated the party's filings as cross-motions for summary judgment, and found in favor of the plaintiffs. Before the court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, defendant's objections thereto, and plaintiffs' reply. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction or summary judgment is DENIED; plaintiff Fontana's motion for temporary restraining order is DENIED.

I. Background

Plaintiffs are lieutenant colonels currently serving on active duty in the Army as medical doctors at Walter Reed Medical Center ("WRMC"). They commenced their military careers at the United States Military Academy at West Point ("West Point") in 1979, when they signed an agreement to complete an Active Duty Service Obligation ("ADSO") in return for their undergraduate education ("West Point Service Agreement"). After graduating in 1983, plaintiffs signed another agreement upon entering the Uniform Services University of Health Sciences ("USUHS"), incurring additional ADSOs, in exchange for medical training that ultimately resulted in both obtaining medical degrees ("USUHS Service Agreement").

Though plaintiffs performed some active duty after graduating from USUHS independent of their graduate education, they also completed an internship, a residency and a fellowship, all pursuant to separate ADSO agreements with the Army. Each of those graduate ADSO agreements provided an anticipated separation from service date, and additional conditions on the service of the new ADSOs incurred.¹ Though they signed these agreements, plaintiffs submitted written protests regarding both the separation from service date and the additional conditions. Plaintiffs also allege that the Army's interpretation of their separation from service dates has been inconsistent.

In May of 1999, plaintiffs submitted their resignations. Though each plaintiff's commanding officer recommended approval, the Department of Army Personnel Command refused to accept the resignations. Plaintiffs filed applications for correction of their personnel records with the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in November 1999, and both applications were denied in May and June of 2000.

Plaintiffs dispute the manner in which the Army has calculated their ADSOs. The parties do not dispute the aggregate of ADSOs incurred, but only when and if those ADSOs were fulfilled. Plaintiffs contend that the West Point ADSOs were fulfilled during their required active duty service at USUHS. Defendants dispute this interpretation of the two service agreements and related statutes and regulations, arguing that both preclude concurrent service of the ADSO while plaintiffs attended USUHS.

Plaintiffs further contend that the service agreements they signed at the inception of their internships, residencies, and fellowships, barring the toll of ADSOs for the duration of each, were in conflict with relevant statutes and cannot be enforced. The defendants dispute this interpretation, and further argue that the letters the plaintiffs sent regarding the unenforceability of the service agreements are not relevant and should not affect the court's holding. Plaintiffs contend they had fulfilled their ADSOs on the date they submitted their resignations. However, according to the Army, Lt. Fontana is not due to be released from service until April 1, 2005, and Lt. Murphy is not due for release until March 29, 2006.

After the case was referred to Magistrate Judge John Facciola, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and Local Rule 72,3(a), the Magistrate Judge obtained stipulated facts from the parties on critical issues and subsequently treated plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction as a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge filed his Report and Recommendations on May 14, 2001, defendants filed their objections on May 29, 2001, and plaintiffs filed their reply on June 11, 2001.

Plaintiff Fontana filed a motion for Temporary Restraining Order on May 25, 2001, asking the court to restrain the Army from executing a permanent change of duty station order, removing him to Fort Bragg in North Carolina. Defendants agreed to stay the execution of the order pending a decision by the court on the merits of the pending issues.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

1. Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation Must Be Reviewed De Novo on All Dispositive Issues Raised by the Opposing Party in Their Objections.

Defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation must be reviewed de novo by this Court. The district court judge "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations to which objection is made ..." L.Cv.R. 72.3(c) (2001); See also Fed. R. Civil P. 72 (2001); Aikens v. Shalala, 956 F.Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C.1997) (objections to a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge on an SSA claim must be reviewed de novo). Defendants raised objections to the standard of review applied by the Magistrate Judge, as well as the Magistrate Judge's application and interpretation of the relevant service agreements, 10 U.S.C. § 4348, 10 U.S.C. § 2114, Army Regulation 350-100, and D.O.D. Directive 6000.2. All issues raised by the defendants in their objections shall be reviewed de novo by this Court.

2. ABCMR's Determination is Based on Statutory and Regulatory Interpretation to Which Considerable Deference Should be Given Instead of the De Novo Standard of Review Applied in the Magistrate's Order.

The Army Board for Correction of Military Records is composed of civilians who evaluate service-members' claims of error or injustice in their military records. See Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396, 1399 (D.C.Cir.1995). The ABCMR derives its authority, as do similar boards in the other military branches, from 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1), which states:

The Secretary of a military department may correct any military record of the Secretary's department when the Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice ... [S]uch corrections shall be made by the Secretary acting through boards of civilians of the executive part of that military department.

10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) (2000). Under the statute, the Secretary has discretion to correct military records when he "considers it necessary to correct an error," but is not automatically required to correct a record when there is an error. Id. Despite this grant of discretion, courts have held that a decision by the ABCMR to correct or not to correct a military record pursuant to this authority is a reviewable agency action under the APA.² Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 176 (D.C.Cir.1997) (ABCMR decision that failed to respond to two of plaintiff's arguments for rescission of Officer Effectiveness Report is arbitrary capricious and contrary to law under the APA); Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396, 1404 (D.C.Cir.1995) (ABCMR decision not to grant waiver of three year limitation on applications for review is arbitrary and capricious under the APA); Kreis v. Secretary of Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1514 (D.C.Cir.1989).

Decisions of the ABCMR are reviewable under § 706 of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). Section 706 provides that a reviewing court should overturn agency action it finds to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. The Supreme Court has explained that this language does not require the same standard of review to be applied to all types of agency decisions in all contexts. Rather, in reviewing agency decisions under § 706, the standard of review to be applied depends on whether the question decided by the agency was one of fact, law, or the application of law to facts and whether the agency was interpreting a statute or rule. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (clarifying scope of Chevron); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (articulating standard for rule interpretation); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (explaining standard for statutory interpretation). Determining the proper standard to be applied to the ABCMR's decision by this Court requires a close analysis of exactly what issues are in dispute here.

The issues in dispute in this case are questions of law, not fact. Plaintiffs and defendants have stipulated to the basic facts of this case. See Joint Stipulation and Statement of Material Facts and Issues. The parties disagree as to the proper interpretation of the applicable statutes, Army regulations, and the Service Agreements between plaintiffs and the Army. Thus, this Court must apply the appropriate standard of review for agency interpretations of statutes and regulations that occur in a decision-making process such as the one employed by the ABCMR.

a. Chevron applies to the ABCMR's Statutory Interpretation.

The Plaintiffs challenge the ABCMR's statutory interpretation here,...