Fontana v. Haskin
| Citation | 262 F.3d 871 |
| Decision Date | 22 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,No. 99-56629,99-56629 |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 2001) MIA FONTANA,, v. D.E. HASKIN, |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Shelley Kaufman, Geragos & Geragos, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Vladmir M. Shalkevich, Office of the Attorney General, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Alicemarie H. Stotler, District Court Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV-98-00704-AHS
Before: Procter Hug, Jr. and Betty B. Fletcher, Circuit Judges and Samuel P. King,* District Judge.
OPINION
The district court dismissed this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983. We disagree with the district court's narrow reading of the complaint. It adequately alleged a violation of Fontana's civil rights. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In the early morning of August 22, 1997, Mia Fontana ("Fontana" or "plaintiff") was involved in a car accident on a Southern California freeway that left her vehicle off the road. California Highway Patrol ("CHP") Officer Dana Haskin ("Haskin" or "defendant") and Officer Deschepper responded to the scene. They suspected that Fontana was under the influence of alcohol and administered field sobriety tests. Based on these tests, they arrested Fontana for drunk driving, handcuffed her, placed her in the back of their vehicle and drove her to the Orange County jail.
This appeal is primarily about what happened on the ride to the jail. In her complaint Fontana alleges that:
On the way to the station, defendant Haskin sat in the back seat, right next to plaintiff, while his partner drove. During the ride to the station, defendant Haskin wrongfully and inappropriately touched and sexually harassed plaintiff. His conduct included the following: telling plaintiff she had nice legs; telling plaintiff that he could be her "older man"; putting his arm around plaintiff; massaging her shoulders. Defendant's conduct persisted, even after plaintiff asked him to stop. At the police station, defendant Haskin continued making sexual comments to plaintiff, including offering to "help her" in the restroom.
Complaint for Damages ¶¶8. She also testified, in a deposition, that he repeatedly remarked how "she looked like the allAmerican girl, with light eyes, blond hair, the perfect body and nice legs." He also asked her if she had a boyfriend and tried to find out where she lived. Fontana testified that she was "not certain that the officers were planning to bring her to the police station and felt that they could have been driving around in circles until she accepted Officer Haskin's advances."
Almost a month after she was booked and released, 1 Fontana wrote a letter to the CHP challenging the circumstances of her arrest, but making no allegations about Haskin's behavior. About a month later she made a formal citizen's complaint to the CHP against Haskin for his sexual advances in which she revealed her intention to sue.
Fontana sued Haskin in federal district court. She alleged three causes of action, the first "for Violation of Civil Rights" based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the second and third based on California tort law. The district court granted Haskin's motion for summary adjudication dismissing the first cause of action with prejudice, and dismissing the two state causes of action without prejudice for want of supplemental jurisdiction. Fontana appeals from this ruling. She has concurrently re-filed her remaining claims in state court (after adding several new claims), where the matter is stayed by stipulation pending this appeal.
Subject matter jurisdiction over Fontana's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 claim is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§§§ 1331 and 1343. The district court exercised its supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a) over the state-law claims. Final judgment was entered on August 11, 1999, and the plaintiff timely filed her notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291.
A grant of a motion for summary adjudication is reviewed de novo. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998). The appellate court's review is governed by the same standard used by the trial court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1997). The appellate court must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Id.
The district court held that Fontana had not "stated a claim for sexual harassment under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983. " This holding is in error. The first cause of action in the complaint is entitled "By Plaintiff Mia Fontana against Defendant D.E. Haskin for Violation of Civil Rights."2 The first paragraph of this section "incorporates and realleges" all of the paragraphs that preceded it in the complaint. Paragraph eight that we quote above, which describes Haskin's allegedly harassing behavior, is incorporated by this language. Paragraph 17 is in addition to the incorporated paragraphs:
17. By reason of defendant's conduct, plaintiff was deprived of rights, privileges, and immunities secured to her by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by, inter alia, (a) arresting plaintiff without reasonable suspicion or probable cause; (b) subjecting plaintiff to an illegal search and seizure; (c) depriving plaintiff of her constitutionally protected rights; (d) submitting false and inaccurate police reports leading to the malicious prosecution of plaintiff; and (e) engaging in conduct of abuse of power and authority which shocks the conscience.
We hold that this paragraph and the supporting allegations sufficiently allege a section 1983 cause of action premised on Haskin's allegedly sexually harassing conduct.
Pleadings that set forth a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). "All pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), and "[n]o technical forms of pleading . . . are required." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). Specific legal theories need not be pleaded so long as sufficient factual averments show that the claimant may be entitled to some relief. Am. Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 690 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1982).
In light of these liberal pleading standards, the district court misconstrued Fontana's complaint. The first cause of action incorporates every allegation of Haskin's alleged sexual predation of Fontana. It alleges a deprivation of Fontana's civil rights and lists five Constitutional theories as the source of the rights that were deprived. Plaintiffs are not required to allege legal theories, id., but doing so makes it more likely that the opposing party will have notice and better understanding of what is at issue. Two of the complaint's theories, (a) and (d), can be read to refer only to Fontana's cause of action for false arrest, which is not part of this appeal. However, the other three theories, (b), (c), and (e)(2), suffice to put Haskin on notice that they refer to what allegedly happened in the back seat of the highway patrol car and at the station. Most notable in this regard is "(e) [defendant ] engag[ed] in conduct of abuse of power and authority which shocks the conscience." The phrase "abuse of power and authority which shocks the conscience," in context, refers to the allegations of sexual harassment and cannot be read so narrowly as to refer only to the allegations of police report falsification.
We reject Haskin's argument that Fontana's second and third causes of action -which explicitly allege Haskin's sexual misbehavior -limit her first cause of action. His premise is flawed because Fontana incorporated paragraph eight, in which she alleged that Haskin sexually harassed her, into all three of her causes of action. The fact that the first count contains no express, independent allegations of sexual harassment is irrelevant. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly allow adoption by reference, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), and do not distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated allegations. Alternatively pled claims need not even be consistent with one another. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Moreover, given paragraph eight and the sweeping theories of paragraph seventeen, to hold that Fontana did not expressly address Haskin's sexual advances in her first cause of action would be inconsistent with the requirement that we construe pleadings"as to do substantial justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f).
We reject the district court's construction of Fontana's first cause of action; the complaint was sufficient, on its face, to allege a section 1983 cause of action for deprivation of civil rights stemming from Haskin's sexually harassing behavior toward Fontana while she was under restraint.3
Haskin argues further that, as a matter of law, his alleged sexual behavior did not violate any of Fontana's Constitutional rights. He therefore asks us to affirm the district court's grant of summary adjudication of Fontana's first...
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