Fontenot v. Taser Int'l, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | 3:10-cv-125-RJC-DCK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | TAMMY LOU FONTENOT, as Administratrix of the Estate of DARRYL WAYNE TURNER, deceased Plaintiff, v. TASER INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant. |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Tammy Lou Fontenot's ("Plaintiff") Declaration, (Doc. No. 171), and Defendant's response, (Doc. No. 172).
On March 27, 2012, this Court entered an Order granting in part and denying in part TASER International, Inc.'s ("TASER") July 19, 2011 Oral Post-Trial Motion, seeking Rule 50 Judgment as a Matter of Law Not Withstanding the Verdict ("JNOV"), Rule 59 New Trial, or Remittitur. See (Doc. No. 141). The Court denied TASER's Motion for JNOV and New Trial, but remitted of the jury's $10 million award to $4,372,399, after deducting Plaintiff's settlement with the City of Charlotte and workers compensation award. (Doc. No. 170).
Plaintiff's Declaration took exception to the Court's description of a certain pacemaker study and the Court's discounting methodology used in calculating the present monetary value of the decedent, Darryl Turner, to his parents. (Doc. No. 171). Plaintiff's arguments are well taken on both points. The Court has amended its description of the pacemaker study at issue below. See III.A.2. As to Plaintiff's discounting argument, the Court previously estimated that the highest value the jury could have determined Turner to be worth to his parents over their projected final forty years was $7.5 million. The Court erred in simply reducing this amount to afigure that would yield $7.5 million if invested at 1% over 40 years. In Barnes v. Town of Wilson, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was "erroneous" to use the entire period of the expectancy to determine the present value of periodic income because the contemplated payments would not have been postponed until the end of the recipient's life. 7 S.E.2d 359, 363 (N.C. 1940). Instead, the Court should have used a present value formula that took into account the contributions Turner would have made throughout his parents' lives on a yearly basis.1
TASER now argues that the Court should have used North Carolina's statutory annuity table. (Doc. No. 172) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-47). TASER cites a 1906 North Carolina Supreme Court case to support this method. (Id. at 3 n.1) (citing Poe v. Raleigh & A.A. L.R. Co., 54 S.E. 406 (N.C. 1906)). However, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected application of the state's annuity tables in Poe and again six years later in 1912. See Ward v. North Carolina, 76 S.E. 717, 720 (N.C. 1912); Poe, 54 S.E. at 408.
TASER's argument does, however, indicate its agreement with Plaintiff's requested formula. The statutory annuity table that TASER offers uses the same formula that Plaintiff asks the Court to use. The only difference is that the table uses a 6% interest rate, while Plaintiff's calculations incorporate the Court's 1% figure. Therefore, the Court will use the parties' agreed formula and a 1% real interest rate as the discount rate.2
As Justice Frankfurter observed, "[w]isdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late." Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Therefore, the Court has amended its March 27 Order and enters this Order in its place nunc pro tunc. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES TASER's Motion for JNOV and New Trial, but orders remittitur of the jury's $10 million award to $5,491,503.65, and if Plaintiff accepts remittitur, the Court will ultimately order judgment in that amount.
On March 20, 2008, 17-year old Darryl Turner ("Turner") died shortly after being hit in the chest with a TASER Model X26 electrical control device ("ECD").4 Earlier that day, Turner, a bagger-cashier at a Food Lion supermarket in Charlotte, was confronted about stealing food from the store and ultimately fired for insubordination. Turner refused to leave the store, so after contacting the store manager and observing Turner's defiant and confrontational behavior, the Customer Service Manager placed a 911 call to police to request his removal. (7/12 Tr. at 494).
When Officer Jerry Dawson ("Officer Dawson") of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department ("CMPD") arrived on the scene, he found Turner yelling and cursing at the Store Manager and was concerned that Turner was going to hit him. (7/11 Tr. at 118). Prior to Officer Dawson's arrival, Turner had shoved a Western Union display off the counter, which hit the wall next to the manager, threw an umbrella at the manager, and advanced upon the manager, who had retreated behind the counter. At trial, the manager testified that he was concerned for his safety, and for the safety of others around him. (7/15 Tr. at 1137). Officer Dawson issued some kind of command to Turner, and although the witnesses have different recollections of what exactly was said,5 it is undisputed that when Turner moved towards Officer Dawson, the officer fired his X26 ECD. While the ECD was discharging, Turner continued to walk forward, and he grabbed a small rack and threw it to the floor. Then Turner collapsed on the floor, never to rise again.6 As a readout on the ECD reflects, the trigger of the ECD had been held down continuously for 37 seconds.7 Officer Dawson testified that Turner was walking for all of those 37 seconds except for the precise moment when he fell, after which Dawson let go of the trigger.(7/11 Tr. at 125).
A second officer, Joseph Pryor, arrived right after Turner collapsed, and he ordered Turner to put his hands behind his back for cuffing. Turner did not move or respond to orders, so Officer Dawson gave him another shock, this time for the standard five-seconds. (7/11 Tr. at 127). The jury found that at some point while Turner was being tased, he went into ventricular fibrillation ("VF"), the lethal arrhythmia caused by electric shock. Firefighters and paramedics arrived, but despite CPR and defibrilation, Turner was not revived and was later pronounced dead at the hospital.
After a six day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and against TASER in the amount of $10 million. After the jury returned its verdict, TASER filed its timely Motion for JNOV under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 and alternative Rule 59 Motion for New Trial or Remittitur. (Doc. No. 141). Plaintiff responded, (Doc. No. 148), TASER replied, (Doc. Nos. 149; 150), Plaintiff filed an "affidavit" in surreply, (Doc. No. 152), and TASER filed a surreply, (Doc. No. 154). The matter is now ripe for adjudication.
TASER moves for a JNOV pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), or, in the alternative, remittitur of the jury's $10 million verdict. (Doc. No. 141).
"When evaluating a Rule 50(b) motion, the court does not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses, but must grant the motion where it finds that 'substantial evidence does not support the jury's findings.'" Trident Enters., Ltd. v. Airtronic USA, Inc., No.01:09-cv-1355, 2011 WL 2160953, at *3 (E.D. Va. May 31, 2011) (quoting Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999)). A Rule 50(b) "motion must be granted 'if a reasonable jury could only reach one conclusion based on the evidence or if the verdict in favor of the non-moving party would necessarily be based upon speculation and conjecture.'" Id. (quoting Myrick v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc., 395 F.3d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 2005)). Thus, "[i]f reasonable minds could differ, [the court] must affirm the jury's verdict." Pitrolo v. Cnty. of Buncombe, 407 F. App'x 657, 659 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Although a court is "'compelled to accord the utmost respect to jury verdicts and tread gingerly in reviewing them,' "a court is 'not a rubber stamp convened to merely endorse the conclusions of the jury, but rather has a duty to reverse the jury verdicts if the evidence cannot support it.'" Trident, 2011 WL 2160953, at *3 (quoting Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1250 (4th Cir. 1996)). A court "will grant motion for judgment as a matter of law 'if the nonmoving party failed to make a showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he had the burden of proof.'" Id. (quoting Wheatley v. Wicomico Cnty., 390 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2004)). The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lack, 240 F.3d at 259. "Because federal courts do not directly review jury verdicts, constrained, as we are, by the Seventh Amendment, the [moving party] bears a hefty burden in establishing that the evidence is not sufficient to support the awards." Price, 93 F.3d at 1249.
Under Rule 59(a), a new trial may be granted in an action in which there has been a trial by jury "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions atlaw in the courts of the United States." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). "On a Rule 59(a) motion, a district court may set aside the jury's verdict and grant a new trial only if '(1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.'" Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 305 (4th Cir. 1998). In considering a Rule 59 motion, courts may make credibility judgments in determining the clear weight of the evidence. Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 647 (4th Cir. 2001).
As an alternative to ordering a new trial, a court may order a remittitur....
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