Fonville v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 22 August 2006
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 02-2353 (EGS).
• Citation: 448 F.Supp.2d 21
• Parties: Charles L. FONVILLE, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

448 F.Supp.2d 21

Charles L. FONVILLE, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 02-2353 (EGS).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

August 22, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Phoebe Leslie Deak, Law Offices of Leslie Deak, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Elizabeth C. Burke, Office of the Corporation Counsel, George E. Rickman, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Leah Brownlee Taylor, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SULLIVAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Charles Fonville, brings this action pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was deprived of liberty and property interests when he was demoted from the rank of Commander in the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") to the rank of Captain without a hearing or any other means of redress.

Pending before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of defendant's motion, the response and reply thereto, and the entire record, the Court determines that plaintiffs claims are not barred by administrative claim preclusion, that he had a property interest in the Commander position, and that plaintiff satisfies the standard for a reputation-plus claim. Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff joined the MPD in 1972. Plaintiffs Opposition ("Opp.") at Ex. 18. He was promoted to Captain in 1995 and, on March 7, 1999, he was promoted directly from Captain to Commander, skipping over the rank of Inspector. Opp. at Ex. 21, Ex. 18.

Later in 1999, plaintiff was involved in an incident with officers of the Federal Protective Service ("FPS"), in which the FPS officers claimed that plaintiff was parked illegally. Compl. at ¶¶ 8-9. Plaintiff, off-duty and in plain clothes at the time, was arrested for assaulting a police officer. Compl. at ¶¶ 8, 12-15. He was handcuffed and detained in an FPS vehicle for two hours before eventually being released. Id. Plaintiff was never charged with any crime nor did he receive a parking or traffic citation. Compl. at ¶ 16. After a thorough investigation of the incident, the MPD Office of Internal Affairs determined that plaintiff did not engage in conduct unbecoming of a police officer and that the allegations of assault were unfounded. Opp. at Ex. 8.

On November 29, 1999, Chief Ramsey reviewed the investigation of the incident and demoted plaintiff to the rank of Captain. Dep. of C. Fonville, Defendant's Motion ("Def.") at Ex. D at 92-92; Dep. of C. Ramsey, Opp. at Ex. 6 at 158. The demotion was reported in the Washington Post and the Washington Times on November 30, 1999. Opp. at Ex. 11. The articles attributed comments to Chief Ramsey that plaintiff had engaged in "unacceptable behavior" and conduct that "was not consistent with what I expect from a command member of my staff." Id. Chief Ramsey did not deny making those statements. Opp. at Ex. 5.

After his demotion, plaintiff was transferred to the Third District to serve as a patrol section captain, and he decided to retire after he completed a year in grade based on the date of his promotion to Commander. Fonville Dep. at 86-89. Plaintiff testified that he felt belittled and humiliated by the demotion, that he could not continue working as a supervisory officer, and he had no choice but to retire. Id. at 90-91.

Plaintiff appealed his demotion to the Office of Employee Appeals ("OEA") in December of 1999. In a three page motion to dismiss, defendant argued that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was an "at will" employee and, therefore, he had no right to appeal his demotion. Opp. at Ex. 13 (citing District Personnel Manual ("DPM") § 872.5 (providing that Assistant Chiefs of Police, Commanders, and Inspectors are positions from which officers may be demoted at the will of the Chief of Police)). OEA set a briefing schedule on the jurisdictional issue and stayed all other proceedings, even though plaintiff had already served discovery requests upon defendant. Opp. at Ex. 14, 15. In his response to defendant's motion, plaintiff argued that DPM § 872.5 is invalid because it conflicts with D.C.Code §§ 1-616.51 and 1-616.52, which provides that the only three positions to serve at the pleasure of the Mayor were Assistant Chiefs, Deputy Chiefs of Police, and Inspectors. Opp. at Ex. 16. Defendant replied with a brief that raised new factual issues and provided new evidence, including the affidavit of Lieutenant Richard F. Mattiello, which it argued proved that the Deputy Chief and Commander positions were the same. Opp. at Ex. 17. Based solely on these briefings, 0EA held that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed that case. Def's Mot at Ex. E. Plaintiff timely filed the instant case after OEA's decision became final.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment should be granted only if the moving party has shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991 (D.C.Cir.2002). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party's opposition, however, must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Defendant raises three arguments in support of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. First, defendant argues that plaintiffs complaint is barred by administrative claim preclusion. Defendant next contends that even if the OEA's decision does not preclude plaintiffs claim, the Court must conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff was an at-will employee and, therefore, he is not entitled to due process. Finally, defendant argues that plaintiffs liberty interest argument fails as a matter of law because any public statements attributed to defendant do not satisfy the standard to maintain a "reputation plus" claim. None of these arguments persuades the Court that summary judgment is appropriate.

A. The OEA administrative judge's findings that the Commander position is "at will" do not preclude litigation of that issue in this Court

Unlike Title VII claims, administrative agency decisions have preclusive effect for employment discrimination claims raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). Administrative agency determinations are given preclusive effect when 1) the agency is acting in a judicial capacity, and 2) the litigants had a fair opportunity to litigate all the issues. Id. Actual litigation means that the parties have had the opportunity for a full adversary hearing, including representation by counsel, presentation of direct and rebuttal evidence, presentation of witnesses and cross-examination of opposing-party's witnesses, and the opportunity to present arguments and briefs. Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 264 (D.C.Cir.1987).

The parties agree that the OEA judge was acting in a judicial capacity. The issue of whether the Commander position was "at will," however, was not fully litigated in the administrative proceedings. In the OEA case, defendant introduced new arguments and evidence in its reply brief, including affidavits, to which plaintiff had no opportunity to respond. Opp. at Ex. 17. The discovery requests plaintiff had served on the defendant were unanswered because OEA stayed all proceedings in order to allow the filing of briefs on the jurisdictional issue. Opp. at Ex. 14, 15.

Defendant argues that the issue of whether the positions are equivalent is a purely legal issue and, therefore, further discovery is irrelevant. The OEA decision itself, however, refutes this point. The OEA found that the "Commander" position was the same as the "Deputy Chief' position because plaintiff failed to provide evidence that D.C. City Council intentionally omitted the Commander title when the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act ("CPMA") was enacted. OEA decision, Def.'s Ex. E at 5. The OEA judge also relied upon "uncontested Agency documents" indicating that the Commander position was introduced at the same time the deputy chief position was eliminated. Id. See Aff. of Richard F. Mattiello, Opp. at Ex. 18. The Court cannot conclude that plaintiff could have fairly contested Agency documents when discovery was not permitted. The Court is also troubled by the defendant's apparent contention that, even though it was the party that introduced the affidavit of MPD Lieutenant Richard F. Mattiello in its reply brief, the burden is on plaintiff to either attempt¹ to file a surreply or risk an AJ finding that Lieutenant Mattiello's statements were "uncontested" and a proper basis for the AJ's decision.

In sum, the issue of whether the Commander position was "at-will" has not been fully litigated, and the OEA's decision does not preclude litigation of plaintiffs claims before this Court.

B. Plaintiff has a valid property interest in his position because he was a Career Service employee of the District of Columbia, not an "at will" employee under D.C.Code § 4-104 (1992 Repl.)

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the federal government from depriving its citizens of property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under certain circumstances, an individual's employment with a state or local government constitutes a property interest. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105...