Foor v. City of Cleveland
| Decision Date | 14 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:12 CV 1754 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
| Parties | Scott Foor, Plaintiff, v. The City of Cleveland, Defendant. |
Memorandum of Opinion and Order
This matter is before the Court upon plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) and defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38). This case arises out of a Notice of Liability plaintiff received from the City of Cleveland in May 2011 for a speeding violation under the automated traffic enforcement camera system. For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion is DENIED and defendant's motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Scott Foor filed his Class Action Complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court ofCommon Pleas against defendant City of Cleveland.1 The matter was removed to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
The underlying facts as generally set forth by defendant are not in dispute. On June 22, 2005, the City of Cleveland passed emergency Ordinance No. 1183-05 in order to amend Cleveland Codified Ordinance (C.C.O.) § 413.031. C.C.O. §413.031 concerns the use of automated cameras to impose civil penalties upon red light and speed violators. C.C.O. § 413.031 established the locations for the automated traffic enforcement camera system and located a camera on Chester Avenue at East 71st Street. C.C.O. § 413.031 also established an appeals process to contest tickets issued under the automated traffic enforcement camera system and allowed adverse decisions to be appealed. Ohio Revised Code § 2506.01 provides that a party may appeal a quasi-judicial administrative determination to the court of common pleas. Carroll v. City of Cleveland, 2013 WL 1395900 (6th Cir. April 5, 2013).
On May 4, 2011, plaintiff, a resident of Perrysburg, Ohio, was traveling eastbound within the City of Cleveland on Chester Avenue near the intersection of East 71st Street. The posted speed limit on Chester Avenue near the intersection is 35 mph. Plaintiff was traveling at 47 mph as he passed through the intersection of East 71st Street at 3:56 p.m. On May 25, 2011, plaintiff received a Notice of Liability under C.C.O. § 413.031. Plaintiff was cited for speeding and fined $100.00 for the violation. At deposition, plaintiff stated that he did not dispute that he owned the vehicle and was driving the vehicle at the time of the infraction, or that he was traveling in excess of 35 mph.
Plaintiff requested a hearing before the Parking Violations Bureau to contest histicket. The hearing took place on June 21, 2011 and was heard by a City of Cleveland hearing examiner/officer. At the hearing, the hearing examiner presented evidence in the form of the Notice of Liability to support the infraction. Plaintiff presented his defense to the infraction and argued that the correct speed limit at the intersection is 50 mph because Chester Avenue is a state highway within a municipal corporation. The hearing examiner rejected this argument and found plaintiff liable for the citation.
Plaintiff filed for an administrative appeal of the hearing officer's decision to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on July 20, 2011. Plaintiff argued in his brief that the posted speed limit of 35 mph at the intersection is unlawful because the correct prima facie speed limit is 50 mph given that Chester at East 71st Street is a state route outside an urban district and the City had failed to file the required procedure for altering that speed limit. Plaintiff also argued that C.C.O . § 413.031 is unconstitutional. By journal entry of February 8, 2012, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas dismissed plaintiff's administrative appeal. The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction under Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.) § 2505.07 to hear the appeal because service on the City's Parking Violations Bureau was not timely achieved. The court dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Plaintiff did not further appeal the decision. He then paid the $100.00 fine.
The First Amended Class Action Complaint sets forth ten claims: unjust enrichment, restitution, conversion, injunction, procedural due process2 , substantive due process, declaratory relief, civil conspiracy, joint enterprise, and negligence.
This matter is now before the Court upon plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Summary Judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). The burden of showing the absence of any such genuine issues of material facts rests with the moving party:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits," if any, which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A fact is "material only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Once the moving party has satisfied its burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings, but [his response], by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is genuine issue for trial. If he does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
The court must afford all reasonable inferences and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cox v. Kentucky Dep't. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6thCir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557, 562 (6th Cir. 1985). However, the nonmoving party may not simply rely on its pleading, but must "produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a jury." Cox, 53 F.3d at 150.
Summary judgment should be granted if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of his case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Accordingly, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 52 (1986)). Moreover, if the evidence is "merely colorable" and not "significantly probative," the court may decide the legal issue and grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citation omitted).
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment solely on the issue of the speed limit at the subject intersection of Chester Avenue and East 71st Street. In sum, plaintiff argues as follows. Ohio Revised Code sets forth prima facie speed limits which cannot be modified by the City unless certain specified procedures are followed. As applicable here, state routes within municipal corporations outside urban districts are 50 mph. Chester is a state route within a municipal corporation and is outside an urban district. Ohio Revised Code defines "state route" as "every highway that is designated with an official state route number and so marked." Chester meets these requirements. Chester is a state route because it has been designated as such by the state ofOhio as evidenced by 1) the 1969 Ohio Department of Highway's Listing of Ohio Route Numbers which lists Chester, aka U.S. 322, as a state route and 2) the 1993 Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) publication entitled Route Number Cross References which includes Chester in its states routes chapter under the column heading State Route Number. Chester has been marked as a state route because 1) there exits a "S.R. 322" sign along Chester and 2) according to plaintiff's expert, the U.S. Route 322 shield sign is a type of state route sign. Ohio Revised Code defines "urban district" as the "territory contiguous to and including any street or highway which is built up with structures devoted to business, industry, or dwelling houses situated at intervals of less than one hundred feet for a distance of a quarter of a mile or more, and the character of such territory is indicated by official traffic control devices." Because the buildings within a quarter of a mile of Chester and East 71st are predominately spaced more than 100 feet apart, Chester in the vicinity of the intersection is outside an urban district. In other words, because the structures surrounding the intersection are spaced further than 100 feet apart for a quarter mile or more along Chester, it is outside an urban district. Thus, because the applicable speed limit is 50 mph and the City did not follow the procedures for modifying it, the posted speed limit of 35 mph is void and plaintiff was unlawfully ticketed as was the proposed class consisting of people who were operating their vehicles between and including 35 mph and 50 mph on Chester at East 71st Street. The City's actions are unlawful under Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33 (2008), which held that "[a]n Ohio municipality does not exceed its home rule authority when it creates an automated system for enforcement of traffic laws that imposes civil liability upon violators, provided that the municipality does not alter statewide traffic regulations."...
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