Foote v. Simmonds Precision Products Co., Inc., No. 90-182

Docket NºNo. 90-182
Citation158 Vt. 566, 613 A.2d 1277
Case DateMay 08, 1992
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Vermont

Page 1277

613 A.2d 1277
158 Vt. 566, 10 IER Cases 1689
Fletcher E. FOOTE
v.
SIMMONDS PRECISION PRODUCTS CO., INC., Robert Morris, Paul
Brace and Anthony Panella.
No. 90-182.
Supreme Court of Vermont.
May 8, 1992.
Motion for Reargument Denied June 22, 1992.

Page 1278

[158 Vt. 567] Thomas Z. Carlson, Langrock, Sperry & Wool, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee.

Craig Weatherly, Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for defendant-appellant.

Before [158 Vt. 566] ALLEN, C.J., DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ., and PECK, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

[158 Vt. 567] JOHNSON, Justice.

The primary issue before us is whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel may modify an employment contract that is otherwise terminable at will. We hold that it may and affirm.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict for plaintiff, Fletcher Foote, against his former employer, Simmonds Precision Products Co., Inc. Plaintiff was discharged from his employment as a computer operator after approximately twenty years of service. Defendant claimed that plaintiff was fired for falsifying his time card. Plaintiff alleged that his discharge was the result of [158 Vt. 568] his efforts to use the grievance procedure published in the company's employee handbook. The procedure assured employees that "[i]f you follow these steps, you cannot be criticized or penalized in any way." Plaintiff claimed that he relied on this promise of nonretaliation. Defendant pointed to another passage in the employee handbook, which stated that "[t]he employment relationship between the company and you may be terminated by either party at any time." On that basis, it contended that plaintiff was an at-will employee and it was entitled to discharge him.

The evidence showed that, prior to his use of the grievance procedure, plaintiff had an excellent work history as a senior computer operator at Simmonds. His periodic evaluations were consistently very good to outstanding. In the late summer of 1986, he and other operators became concerned about the hiring of a supervisor whom they considered unqualified, and about changes in pay and benefit practices. Although plaintiff wanted to pursue these problems through defendant's grievance process, he was concerned about losing his job. He consulted an employee relations manager about how to pursue grievances within the company's policy. The manager referred him to the "Problem-Solving Procedure" in the employee handbook, containing the language that employees could not be criticized or penalized in any way if they complied with the procedures. Defendant's personnel manager testified that the company intended that employees rely on the statement.

Plaintiff attempted to follow the procedure, but was met with increasing irritation by his supervisors. In December 1986, plaintiff suffered a poor work evaluation, which he claimed was unjustified. Three months later, he was discharged. According to defendant, plaintiff recorded hours on his time card that he had not actually worked. Plaintiff contended he was relying on a policy that allowed computer operators to leave before the end of their shifts. Defendant claimed it had discontinued the policy and specifically notified plaintiff.

The jury believed plaintiff's side of the story. Although plaintiff proceeded on express and implied contract theories, as well as promissory estoppel, the jury based its verdict solely on promissory estoppel. Its verdict was reflected in a series of interrogatories. The relevant interrogatories and answers were:

[158 Vt. 569] 1. At the time of termination of employment of Fletcher Foote, was there an employment contract that could be terminated at will by the employer? Yes.

2. At the time of termination of employment, was there an employment contract that required good cause for termination of employment by the employer? No.

3. Did Simmonds Precision Products Co., Inc. breach a contract of employment when Fletcher Foote was terminated from employment? No.

4. Was Fletcher Foote terminated from employment by Simmonds Precision Products Co., Inc. for good cause? No.

Page 1279

5. Were Fletcher Foote's grievances the real reason leading to termination and the real reason for termination was not any false time card and the employer should be estopped from saying he was properly terminated? Yes.

7. What damages do you find, if any, for breach of contract? $150,000.00.

After the jury returned its verdict, an additional interrogatory was submitted and answered, as follows:

Is the damage amount of $150,000.00 for damages proximately caused by the promissory estoppel answer of question # 5. Yes.

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Although variously phrased, defendant's arguments boil down to three--promissory estoppel should not have been charged as an independent cause of action that may modify an at-will employment contract, the jury's answers to the interrogatories are legally inconsistent, and alternatively, that the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of promissory estoppel. 1

The legal question raised by motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under [158 Vt. 570] V.R.C.P. 50 is the same. The question is whether the result reached by the jury is sound in law on the evidence produced. Kinzer v. Degler Corp., 145 Vt. 410, 412, 491 A.2d 1017, 1018 (1985). In reviewing the denial of these motions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and exclude the effect of any modifying evidence. Center v. Mad River Corp., 151 Vt. 408, 413, 561 A.2d 90, 93 (1989). If any evidence fairly or reasonably supported a lawful theory of the plaintiff, then the trial court acted properly in denying the motions. Id.

I.

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46 practice notes
  • McKenny v. John V. Carr & Son, Inc., No. 2:94-CV-30.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. District of Vermont
    • March 20, 1996
    ...is an independent cause of action, and may be used affirmatively, if the elements are present." Foote v. Simmonds Precision Products Co., 158 Vt. 566, 571, 613 A.2d 1277 (1992). To survive a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence on each element of his promi......
  • Marcoux-Norton v. Kmart Corp., Civ. A. No. 5:91-CV-308.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. District of Vermont
    • May 26, 1993
    ...substantive limitation on the right of contracting parties to modify terms of their arrangement. Foote v. Simmonds Precision Products Co., 158 Vt. 566, 613 A.2d 1277, 1279 (1992) (citing Sherman, 146 Vt. at 207, 500 A.2d 230). For example, a contract may not be considered terminable at will......
  • Nelson v. Town of St. Johnsbury Selectboard, No. 13–386.
    • United States
    • Vermont United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • January 16, 2015
    ...of promissory estoppel as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981). See Foote v. Simmonds Precision Prods. Co., 158 Vt. 566, 573, 613 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1992). According to the Restatement, “[a] promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a ......
  • Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor in Hawaii, No. 23505.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Hawai'i
    • November 27, 2002
    ...terminable at will. See, e.g., Lord 58 P.3d 1226 v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 399 (Del.2000); Foote v. Simmonds Precision Prods. Co., 158 Vt. 566, 613 A.2d 1277, 1278 (1992). A promise can be made during the course of employment that does not specifically change the at-will relationship and doe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
46 cases
  • McKenny v. John V. Carr & Son, Inc., No. 2:94-CV-30.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. District of Vermont
    • March 20, 1996
    ...is an independent cause of action, and may be used affirmatively, if the elements are present." Foote v. Simmonds Precision Products Co., 158 Vt. 566, 571, 613 A.2d 1277 (1992). To survive a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence on each element of his promi......
  • Marcoux-Norton v. Kmart Corp., Civ. A. No. 5:91-CV-308.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. District of Vermont
    • May 26, 1993
    ...substantive limitation on the right of contracting parties to modify terms of their arrangement. Foote v. Simmonds Precision Products Co., 158 Vt. 566, 613 A.2d 1277, 1279 (1992) (citing Sherman, 146 Vt. at 207, 500 A.2d 230). For example, a contract may not be considered terminable at will......
  • Nelson v. Town of St. Johnsbury Selectboard, No. 13–386.
    • United States
    • Vermont United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • January 16, 2015
    ...of promissory estoppel as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981). See Foote v. Simmonds Precision Prods. Co., 158 Vt. 566, 573, 613 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1992). According to the Restatement, “[a] promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a ......
  • Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor in Hawaii, No. 23505.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Hawai'i
    • November 27, 2002
    ...terminable at will. See, e.g., Lord 58 P.3d 1226 v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 399 (Del.2000); Foote v. Simmonds Precision Prods. Co., 158 Vt. 566, 613 A.2d 1277, 1278 (1992). A promise can be made during the course of employment that does not specifically change the at-will relationship and doe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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