Forbes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

Docket Number1:20-cv-00479-SLC
Decision Date09 August 2022
PartiesDENNIS L. FORBES, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, sued as Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration,[1] Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
OPINION AND ORDER

Susan Collins United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Dennis L. Forbes appeals to the district court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying his application under the Social Security Act (the “Act”) for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF 1). For the following reasons, none of Forbes's arguments are persuasive, and thus, the Commissioner's decision will be AFFIRMED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Forbes applied for DIB and SSI on July 9, 2018, alleging disability as of January 29, 2016. (ECF 17 Administrative Record (“AR”) 15, 299, 337). His claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (AR 112-43, 146-75). After a timely request (AR 234-35), a hearing was held on April 21, 2020, before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) William Pierson, at which Forbes, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (AR 44-95).

On May 6, 2020, the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision to Forbes, concluding that he was not disabled because he could perform a significant number of jobs in the economy despite the limitations caused by his impairments. (AR 12-37). Forbes's request for review was denied by the Appeals Council (AR 1-6), at which point the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.

Forbes filed a complaint with this Court on December 21, 2020 seeking relief from the Commissioner's decision. (ECF 1). In his appeal, Forbes alleges that the ALJ erred “by failing to incorporate the effects of . . . permanent lung impairment into [his] residual functional capacity (RFC) including failing in a logical bridge related thereto, and failing the interrelated credibility analysis-with disability due because claimant could not perform medium-level work.” (ECF 27 at 15). Breaking that argument down into subparts, the Court discerns Forbes's arguments as: (1) the ALJ applied the wrong standard when determining whether Forbes engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) after his alleged onset date, (2) the ALJ made inconsistent findings regarding the severity of Forbes's chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (“COPD”); (3) the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Vijay Kamineni's examining opinion; and (4) the ALJ's assessment of Forbes's symptom testimony and RFC formulation-specifically his determination that Forbes could perform medium rather than sedentary work-is not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 15-26).

At the time of the ALJ's decision, Forbes was fifty-nine years old, had received at least a high school education, and had relevant work experience as a boat assembler, driver, machinist, and forklift operator. (AR 35; see also AR 384). In his applications, Forbes alleged disability due to depression, anxiety, suicidal thoughts, trouble breathing, deteriorating discs in back, high blood pressure, and acid reflux. (AR 113, 129, 382).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 405(g) of the Act grants this Court the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner . . ., with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court's task is limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The decision will be reversed “only if [it is] not supported by substantial evidence or if the [ALJ] applied an erroneous legal standard.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

To determine if substantial evidence exists, the Court “review[s] the entire administrative record, but do[es] not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869 (citations omitted). “Rather, if the findings of the Commissioner . . . are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive.” Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “In other words, so long as, in light of all the evidence, reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the claimant] is disabled, we must affirm the ALJ's decision denying benefits.” Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 1996).

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Law

Under the Act, a claimant seeking DIB or SSI must show an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ....” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A physical or mental impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).

The Commissioner evaluates disability claims pursuant to a five-step evaluation process, requiring consideration of the following issues, in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently unemployed in substantial gainful activity, (2) whether he has a severe impairment, (3) whether his impairment is one that the Commissioner considers conclusively disabling, (4) whether he is incapable of performing his past relevant work; and (5) whether he is incapable of performing any work in the national economy.[2] Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A negative answer at any point other than step three stops the inquiry and leads to a finding that the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden of proof lies with the claimant at every step except the fifth, where it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.

B. The Commissioner's Final Decision

On May 6, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision that ultimately became the Commissioner's final decision. (AR 12-42). At step one, the ALJ concluded that Forbes had engaged in SGA since January 29, 2016, his initial alleged onset date. (AR 17).[3] In particular, the ALJ noted that Forbes worked as a skid load driver from December 2016 through 2017, earning approximately $1,600 to $2,900 per month. (AR 17-18; see AR 359). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Forbes was not disabled through December 2017. (AR 18). At step two, the ALJ found that Forbes had the following severe impairments: substance induced mood disorder, opioid use disorder, alcohol use disorder, depression and anxiety disorders of varying diagnoses, cervical degenerative disc disease, and COPD. (Id.).

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Forbes did not have an impairment or combination of impairments severe enough to meet or equal a listing. (AR 19). The ALJ then assigned Forbes the following RFC:

[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except the following: the claimant is limited to lifting, carrying, pushing and pulling twenty-five (25) pounds frequently and fifty (50) pounds occasionally. The claimant can sit at least six (6) hours in an eight- (8-) hour work day and stand and/or walk six (6) hours in an eight- (8-) hour work day. The claimant should not climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. The claimant can frequently kneel, crouch, and crawl and frequently bend and stoop, in addition to what is required to sit. The claimant can occasionally use ramps and stairs. The claimant can perform the balance required of such activities. The claimant is unable to perform complex or detailed tasks. The claimant can perform simple, routine tasks, and instructions throughout the workday. The tasks contemplated are [Specific Vocational Preparation] 1 and 2 type tasks that can be learned within a short period through short demonstration, or when beyond short demonstration, within up to thirty (30) days. The tasks may be a[s] simple and as mundane as taking and packing the same item all day every day, or a task that is simple in nature but completed before moving to the next task, such as picking up one (1) item, inspecting it for a flaw-such as a bur and place it into places or boxes all day everyday or such as vacuuming, then emptying trash cans and then dusting, in one (1) office or room before moving to the next office or room. However, the type of tasks remain the same from day to day. The claimant can respond or adapt to the changes, cope with the stress and engage in the decision making required of such tasks. The claimant can engage in the superficial interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public in a manner consistent with SVP 1 and 2 type tasks in which prolonged or intense conversation is not required for task completion. With such limitations in place, the claimant can maintain the concentration, persistence, adaptation and even the pace required of such tasks for two (2) hour increments, and for eight- (8-
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