Forbes v. Town of Suffield

• Decision Date: 27 October 1908
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: FORBES v. TOWN OF SUFFIELD.

70 A. 1023

81 Conn. 274

FORBES

v. TOWN OF SUFFIELD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Oct. 27, 1908.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Howard J. Curtis, Judge.

Personal injury action by William G. Forbes against the town of Suffield. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The complaint contains no allegation upon the subject of written notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the plaintiff's injuries. The demurrer asserts the insufficiency of the complaint for the reason that it does not appear therein that prior to the institution of the action such notice of said injuries and a general description of the same and the cause thereof and the time and place of its occurrence was given within the time and in the manner required by law, and the court so ruled. The injury is alleged to have been received on September 15, 1907, and the officer's return states that the service of the writ and complaint was made upon the first selectman of the defendant on November 14, 1907. The complaint describes the injury the plaintiff claims to have received, its alleged cause, and the time and place of its occurrence. The alleged defect did not consist of snow or ice, or both. The plaintiff claimed that the service of the complaint within GO days after the injuries were received, it being made upon a selectman and conveying all the information specified for the statutory notice, satisfied the requirement of the statute in the matter of such notice, and was a full equivalent for that requirement.

Benedict M. Holden, for appellant.

Hugh M. Alcorn, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J. (after stating the facts as above). The right to maintain an action against a municipality for the recovery of damages for personal injuries resulting from defective highways exists only by force of section 2020 of the General Statutes of 1902, which defines and limits the right and prescribes the conditions under which it may exist. One of these conditions is the giving to the municipality within a prescribed time of a written notice containing certain prescribed information. The giving of this notice is expressly made a condition precedent to any right of action. Until it is given, no such right exists. The statute recognizes no equivalents, and it is not competent for the courts to extend the right given beyond the limits fixed by the General Assembly, or to create a right not contemplated by the Legislature and contrary to its peremptory mandate....