FORD BY FORD v. Sully, Civ. A. No. 90-2359-0.

• Decision Date: 15 August 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 90-2359-0.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
• Parties: Jeff FORD, A Minor Child, By His Next Friend, Vickie FORD; Sean Jordan, A Minor Child, By His Next Friend, Cheryl Jordan; Mario Sanders, A Minor Child, By His Next Friend, Jerome Sanders; and Michael Shelby, Jr., A Minor Child, By His Next Friend, Michael Shelby, Sr., Plaintiffs, v. Owen SULLY, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wyandotte County, Kansas, and his agents, subordinates and employees, and The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Wyandotte, Joe Dick, Verdis Robinson, and Kay Nies, individually and in their official capacity as Board of County Commissioners of the County of Wyandotte, and John Doe, Defendants.

773 F. Supp. 1457

Jeff FORD, A Minor Child, By His Next Friend, Vickie FORD; Sean Jordan, A Minor Child, By His Next Friend, Cheryl Jordan; Mario Sanders, A Minor Child, By His Next Friend, Jerome Sanders; and Michael Shelby, Jr., A Minor Child, By His Next Friend, Michael Shelby, Sr., Plaintiffs, v. Owen SULLY, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wyandotte County, Kansas, and his agents, subordinates and employees, and The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Wyandotte, Joe Dick, Verdis Robinson, and Kay Nies, individually and in their official capacity as Board of County Commissioners of the County of Wyandotte, and John Doe, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 90-2359-0.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

August 15, 1991.

William D. Peters, Jr., Kansas City, Kan., Thomas D. Munro, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiffs.

Terri L. Bezek, James R. Gohen, Deryl W. Wynn, McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, Kan., Carl A. Gallagher, Atty. General's Office, Kansas Judicial Center, Topeka, Kan., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EARL E. O'CONNOR, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss. Wyandotte County Sheriff Owen L. Sully (hereinafter "Sully") and the Board of Wyandotte County Commissioners (hereinafter "board") argue that the claims asserted by plaintiffs Jeff Ford (hereinafter "Ford"), Sean Jordan (hereinafter "Jordan"), Mario Sanders (hereinafter "Sanders") and Michael Shelby, Jr. (hereinafter "Shelby") are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The defendant board and Sully also assert that plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from litigating their claims. In addition, defendants contend that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. For the reasons stated below, the court will deny defendants' motion.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Ford, Jordan, Sanders, and Shelby are juveniles who have been detained pending trial, or have been adjudicated as juvenile offenders and are awaiting commitment to a state youth facility. They were confined to the old Wyandotte County jail pursuant to standing orders of the Wyandotte County District Court. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have operated the county jail and county juvenile detention center in such a manner as to violate their First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The juvenile detainees further claim that violations of their constitutional rights have resulted in a substantial breakdown in the provision of basic services and humane treatment to juveniles in the county's custody.¹

Sheriff Sully and the defendant board contend that plaintiffs are precluded under the doctrines of standing, collateral estoppel, mootness and res judicata from litigating their claims. Defendants argue that plaintiff's complaint is merely a "carbon copy" of grievances asserted by inmates at the county jail in February of 1985. In that case, Woodson v. Quinn, No. 85-3049, "adult citizens" alleged that they were subjected to illegal and unconstitutional conditions at the county jail. The Woodson court found that the jail was "an outdated facility that lacks the capacity to serve the needs of a county confinement center."

The parties in Woodson consented to the entry of a judgment and decree which outlined affirmative steps for defendants to take in order to address allegations asserted by the adult inmates. The decree included plans and specifications for the construction of a new detention facility.² Defendants in Woodson were required to file quarterly reports with the court which describe operation of the new jail facility. In several of the quarterly reports, the defendant board and sheriff stated:

The juvenile detention facility is not included in the Woodson lawsuit and therefore not under the Court's present jurisdiction. Consequently, the operations and procedures policies and the staffing and training plans prepared and implemented by defendants concern only the new Wyandotte County jail and not the juvenile detention facility.

See, e.g., Defendants' Tenth Quarterly Reports at 5 n. 7 and Defendants' Thirteenth Quarterly Report at 5 n. 6 in Woodson v. Quinn, No. 85-3049.

The adult population at the Wyandotte County jail was transferred to the new detention complex in March of 1990. Juveniles in custody of the county, however, remained at the old jail.³ Juvenile detainees were not removed from the jail until October because the state withheld certification and licensure of the new juvenile facility as a result of construction and design deficiencies.⁴ On October 9, 1990, juvenile detainees were transferred from the old jail to the detention complex. Plaintiffs Sanders and Ford were among the juvenile detainees moved on October 9, 1990.⁵ Orders of release entered by the Wyandotte County District Court indicate that Ford and Sanders have been detained in more than one instance at the new complex.⁶ Most recently, Sanders was incarcerated in August of 1991 and Ford was imprisoned during November of 1990.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Barber v. General Elec. Co., 648 F.2d 1272, 1276 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1981); Mahomes-Vinson v. United States, 751 F.Supp. 913, 916 (D.Kan.1990).⁷ A moving party who bears the burden of proof at trial is entitled to summary judgment only when the evidence indicates that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Maughan v. S.W. Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir. 1985); see also 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.04 (1990) (court is authorized to examine materials outside complaint to determine whether there is genuine issue of material fact to be tried). If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof, he must show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This burden is met when the moving party identifies those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 752 F.Supp. 989, 993 (D.Kan.1990).

Once the moving party meets these requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion, who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis added). It is not enough for the party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment to "rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading." Id. Genuine factual issues must exist that "can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511; Tersiner v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 740 F.Supp. 1519, 1522-23 (D.Kan.1990).

III. DOCTRINE OF STANDING

Defendants contend that Ford, Jordan, Sanders, and Shelby do not have standing to assert their claims. The standing doctrine "is designed to determine who may institute the asserted claim for relief." O'Connor v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 894 F.2d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting ACORN v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 835 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir.1987)).⁸ In order to avoid futile proceedings, the court must determine whether the asserted injury was the consequence of defendants' actions and whether prospective judicial relief will remove the harm.⁹

Standing problems are currently analyzed by the Supreme Court in terms of two inquiries: (a) "whether the party alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise," and (b) "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests sought to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."

Citizens Concerned v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 628 F.2d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir.1980) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963, 101 S.Ct. 3114, 69 L.Ed.2d 975 (1981); see also Tribe, Constitutional Law, Standing, § 3-17, at 79-80 (1978).

The court has no trouble concluding that plaintiffs have a sufficient stake in this case to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. We have carefully read the deposition testimony of Ford, Jordan, Sanders and Shelby. All four plaintiffs testified that the conditions of their confinement or the facilities in which they were detained were inadequate in the following particulars: toilets and other fixtures such as sinks and showers were filthy and inoperable; infestation of insects; delayed and deficient medical care; and insufficient supervision. All of the plaintiffs, with the exception of Ford, stated that their cells were unbearably hot. Shelby, Jordan and Ford added that they were deprived of the opportunity to participate in recreational activities and that they were not provided with clean clothing. Every juvenile detainee, except Jordan, testified that the quality or quantity of food furnished by defendants was meager. Three of the plaintiffs also stated that the lighting in their cells was substandard.

More specifically, Jordan testified that defendants would not provide him with clean underwear and other clothing. Jordan added that he saw roaches every day where he slept. Sanders said that his arm "swelled up" from insect bites. Ford claimed that defendants failed to provide timely treatment for broken bones in his left hand. Ford and Sanders allege that they did not receive medical treatment until at least one week after they reported their injuries. Ford also testified that he did not receive "fair" treatment in the county's new detention facility. Further, plaintiffs state that defendants were deliberately indifferent to grievances that...