Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield

• Decision Date: 13 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 67758,67758
• Citation: 171 Ga.App. 331,319 S.E.2d 470
• Parties: FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. STUBBLEFIELD et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 470

319 S.E.2d 470

171 Ga.App. 331

FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. STUBBLEFIELD et al.

No. 67758.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 13, 1984.

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1984.

Certiorari Denied Sept. 7, 1984.

Ben L. Weinberg, Jr., John E. Talmadge, M. Diane Owens, Atlanta, for appellant.

Foy R. Devine, Albert Sidney Johnson, Irwin W. Stolz, Jr., Wade H. Watson III, Atlanta, Seaton D. Purdom, Decatur, for appellees.

SOGNIER, Judge.

This wrongful death action arising out of an automobile collision was brought by William O. Stubblefield, individually and as administrator of the estate of his minor child, and by Linda P. Standley, individually and as natural mother of the deceased minor child. Suit was filed originally against multiple defendants, but during trial plaintiff-appellees voluntarily dismissed their complaint against all defendants except appellant Ford Motor Company. The sole theory of liability against Ford was its alleged negligence in the design of the automobile in which 15-year-old Terri Stubblefield was a passenger when she was fatally injured. William O. Stubblefield prayed for recovery in his individual capacity for medical, hospital and funeral expenses, and in his capacity as administrator sought damages for personal injury, pain and suffering and an award of punitive damages and expenses of litigation. Linda P. Standley sought damages for the wrongful death of her daughter. The death resulted from injuries sustained in a collision occurring July 10, 1977, when the 1975 Ford Mustang II in which Terri Stubblefield was riding was struck from behind while stopped in traffic by another car traveling at an estimated speed of 56 to 65 m.p.h. A "ball of fire" engulfed the rear of the Mustang II at impact and Terri, who was sitting in the back seat, was severely burned.

The question presented to the jury was whether Ford, through the negligent design and placement of its fuel system in the 1975 Mustang II, exposed the occupants of this automobile to unreasonable risk of injury and, insofar as punitive damages were concerned, whether Ford's management acted with that entire want of care which would give rise to conscious indifference to the consequences in marketing the automobile. The jury found in favor of appellees on all counts. Ford appeals the judgment entered on the verdict, enumerating as error the failure of the trial court to direct a verdict in its favor on the issues of negligence and causation, liability for punitive damages, and expenses of litigation including attorney fees; and in refusing to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative a new trial, on these issues. In particular, Ford contends that the improper admission of the following evidence was harmful and prejudicial: (1) permitting appellees' expert witnesses to express opinions as to the ultimate issue in the case that Ford had acted negligently, deliberately and callously; (2) permitting these experts to read selectively from Ford documents and give their opinions as to the intent of the authors; (3) admitting into evidence an irrelevant transcript of a so-called "Nixon tape," without proper foundation, for the purpose of prejudicing the jury; and (4) admitting tests, reports, documents, films and other materials generated after the date of manufacture of the 1975 Mustang II, or pertaining to vehicles dissimilar to the 1975 Mustang II.

1. Appellees presented copious documentary exhibits, internal memoranda and confidential corporate reports reflecting the course of Ford's research and development of the Mustang II, which were explained and interpreted to the jury by two expert witnesses. Ford does not challenge the expertise of these witnesses, Frederick Arndt (automobile engineering) and Dr. Leslie Ball (systems safety analysis), on their respective subject matters but insists that their testimony presented conclusions as to the ultimate issue which jurors could ordinarily draw for themselves, and was therefore outside the parameters of the rule set forth in Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981) in regard to the admissibility of such evidence.

"The opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade or like questions shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses." OCGA § 24-9-67. The negligence issue in this case turned on an evaluation of mass production engineering design and policy objectives. Dr. Ball explained that a safety systems program is divided into several functions and procedures such as (1) the setting of policies and objectives, generally imposed by management; (2) the development of the program; (3) the release to production, at which point catastrophic hazards are reviewed in conjunction with recommended controls; (4) production activities and quality control; (5) support activities (warnings, instructions, etc.); and (6) response to user experience. In his function as a safety systems scientist, Dr. Ball studied hundreds of Ford's technical internal documents recording decisions and recommendations from various engineers and executives in regard to design of the Mustang II dating from 1968 to 1977, and determined how each fit within the analysis as a constituent factor in Ford's organization in the six categories of safety management functions. After giving a detailed analysis, Dr. Ball was asked to give his opinion as to whether he thought Ford had responded reasonably in its decision making process from the standpoint of safety science management, and he was of the opinion that it had not.

Mr. Arndt, who had worked in research projects devoted specifically to the motor vehicle "crash fire problem," reviewed a multitude of crash tests and internal Ford memoranda, using his engineering expertise to simplify technical terms and explain such factors as the formation of vapor clouds and resulting fireballs; friction ignition; basic crash mechanics; crash similarities between 1974, 1975 and 1976 Mustang II's; characteristic fuel tank crush features of that model; the predictable role of axle-housing intrusion; various types of crash tests (sled, moving barrier, fixed barrier, actual); corresponding crash standards; inertial forces upon the fuel in the fuel tank during the collision phase (accelerative followed by decelerative) and their relationship to tank penetrations caused by axle-housing intrusion; available design alternatives and solutions, and the effects of each. After this analysis Mr. Arndt stated that in his opinion the design utilized by Ford in the Mustang II was not reasonably safe.

The jury was required to determine from this complicated decision-making process, described by Ford as "a morass of conceptual, political and practical issues," whether the design of the Mustang II was unsafe, and if so, whether Ford had knowledge of the hazardous aspects and under the circumstances acted reasonably in marketing the automobile without changing the design. The opinions which Dr. Ball and Mr. Arndt offered the jury were not mere speculations regarding Ford's intent, but were based upon their professional analyses of the process by which the corporate decisions regarding the 1975 Mustang II were made. Our review of the voluminous documentary evidence and testimony convinces us that without the extensive and detailed analyses provided by these experts, together with their opinions based upon these constituent factors which must be deemed highly technical, sophisticated and peculiarly within the specialized science of these experts, the ultimate issue would have been " 'beyond the ken of the average layman.' " Smith v. State, 247 Ga. at 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, supra. Accord, Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328 (10), 304 S.E.2d 713 (1983). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of their opinions. See Coursey Bldg. Assoc. v. Baker, 165 Ga.App. 521(2), 301 S.E.2d 688 (1983); Pembrook Mgt. v. Cossaboon, 157 Ga.App. 675(5), 278 S.E.2d 100 (1981).

2. Ford contends that the trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial because sufficient competent evidence was not presented to support the verdict on the issue of negligence or to establish that any act or omission on its part was the proximate cause of appellees' alleged damages. Ford relies on evidence that it tested and experimented with several devices to protect the fuel tank from rear-end impact hazards, but was unable to develop an acceptable design alternative to improve fuel system integrity prior to the sale of appellees' vehicle in September of 1974. However, the evidence also showed that a management decision was made during that time period to delay implementation of protective hardware for the Mustang II's fuel tank until "required by law," even though the body design and fuel tank location of both the Pinto and the Mustang II caused the fuel tank to jam into the rear axle when struck from behind. Ford's internal documents referred to this as a "failure mode," and the problem was known and documented as early as 1968 when Ford analyzed the hazard of post-crash, fuel-fed automobile fires as shown by accident data. When Ford engineers sought guidance from company management as to what should be done, Ford's executives decided to "defer adoption" of any protective devices until 1976, enabling it to "realize a design cost savings of $20.9 million as compared to incorporation in 1974." A directive was issued implementing this decision which stated that "actual hardware will not be added until required by law..." Ford finally adopted a polyethylene shield which was installed in the fall of 1976 on the 1977 model Mustang II, but no effort was made to inform owners of older models of the dangers of post-collision fire.

The instant case was tried on a theory of negligence rather than of strict liability (see OCGA § 51-1-11). ¹ Appellees alleged...