Ford Motor Co. v. Jackson

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: COLEMAN; Williams; LEVIN; RYAN; WILLIAMS; KAVANAGH
• Citation: Ford Motor Co. v. Jackson, 249 N.W.2d 29, 399 Mich. 213 (Mich. 1976)
• Decision Date: 30 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 13,13
• Parties: FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald W. JACKSON et al. (Claim of Bania and Claim of Mohammed), Defendants-Appellees, and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendant-Appellee. 399 Mich. 213, 249 N.W.2d 29

Page 29

249 N.W.2d 29

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald W. JACKSON et al. (Claim of Bania and Claim of Mohammed), Defendants-Appellees and Michigan Employment Security Commission Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13.

399 Mich. 213, 249 N.W.2d 29

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 30, 1976.

Wright Tisdale, Dearborn, for appellant Ford Motor Co.; Joseph A. O'Reilly, Richard A. Fellrath, Dearborn, of counsel.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty., Gen. of Mich., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Felix E. League, Asst. Atty. Gen., Detroit, for Michigan Employment Security Commission.

John A. Fillion, Jordan Rossen, Detroit, for individual defendants-appellees (claimants); Edwin G. Fabre, Leonard R. Page, M. Jay Whitman, Detroit, of counsel.

COLEMAN, Justice.

Claim of Bania

This is one of a series of test cases in which the Court interprets from varied factual situations the concept of back-to-work pay as provided in the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA).

The specific question assigned to the claim of Bania against Ford Motor Company (Ford) is:

Does the payment of vacation pay during a period of unemployment commencing with a layoff under the provisions of § 27(c)(2) of MESA have any effect upon the computation of time necessary to qualify for a back-to-work payment?

We find that the designated paid vacation period cannot be calculated in determining qualification for back-to-work pay. Also, in this case claimant was notified well in advance that he would be laid off as of Monday, July 15, 1968, so regardless of the computation of vacation time, he was not laid off in excess of three weeks.

I. Facts

Claimant Bania and others in the same plant were notified on March 12 and April 29, 1968 that there would be a layoff and vacation shutdown of the plant beginning Monday, July 15, 1968. The notice relative to Bania read:

'The VACATION and LAYOFF Schedule shall begin:

Week of July 15, 1968 as a LAYOFF Week of July 22 and 29th as a VACATION SHUTDOWN.'

Claimant Bania was laid off beginning July 15 for a period of two weeks. He requested and received one week of vacation beginning July 29. He returned to work on Monday, August 5. Claimant's vacation (full) pay had been received with his last paycheck on July 12. The Michigan Employment Security Appeal Board in addition awarded Bania back-to-work benefits, which decision was reversed by the Ingham Circuit Court. ¹ The Court of Appeals in turn reversed the Ingham Circuit Court. 47 Mich.App. 700, 209 N.W.2d 794 (1973). Ford now appeals.

II. Michigan Employment Security Act

M.C.L.A. § 421.27(c)(2); M.S.A. § 17.529(c)(2):

'When an individual has had a period of unemployment: (i) For which he has been paid benefits for 1 or more weeks or has received credit for a waiting week, (ii) which commenced with a layoff by an employing unit that continued with such employing unit for more than 3 weeks, and (iii) which has been terminated by his accepting and engaging in full-time work with an employing unit within the 13 weeks immediately following his last week of employment with such employing unit, such individual shall be paid, for the most recent week in such period for which benefits are payable or where paid to him or for which he was entitled to credit for a waiting week, an amount equal to his currently applicable weekly benefit rate in addition to any benefits otherwise payable or paid to him for such week.'

M.C.L.A. § 421.48; M.S.A. § 17.552:

'All amounts paid to a claimant by an employing unit or former employing unit for a vacation or a holiday, and amounts paid in the form of retroactive pay, or in lieu of notice, Shall be deemed remuneration in determining whether an individual is unemployed under this section and also in determining his benefit payments under section 27(c), for the period designated by the contract or agreement providing for the payment, or if there is no contractual specification of the period to which such payments shall be allocated, then for the period designated by the employing unit or former employing unit.'

III. Vacation Pay

Ford claims that the Court of Appeals erred because § 27(c)(2) does not provide for back-to-work pay under the stated circumstances. Ford argues that claimant had not had a period of unemployment which commenced with a layoff and which lasted in excess of three consecutive weeks. Bania was on vacation and received vacation pay for one week which was included by claimant in his computation of time.

Claimant Bania argues that layoffs are measured from the last day of work ² to the first day of return and that he is eligible for back-to-work pay because he was laid off, although not unemployed, in excess of three weeks. But this computation included vacation time plus the Saturday and Sunday before the layoff as noticed.

Applying the rationale of test case General Motors Corp. v. Erves, we proceed to an analysis based upon the economic (wage) impact.

Justice Williams, writing in a related opinion, Brown v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 394 Mich. 702, 232 N.W.2d 656 (1975), states:

'That the employer may lawfully designate a period during a layoff for the allocation of vacation pay has been settled in this state. See Malone v. Employment Security Commission, 352 Mich. 472, 90 N.W.2d 468 (1958).'

Of specific relevancy are the parts of § 48 which read:

'An individual shall be deemed 'unemployed' with respect to any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no remuneration is payable to him.'

Claimant's one week of vacation pay is treated as remuneration under § 48, thus leaving him with two weeks of unemployment. ³

In accordance with Brown, claimant Bania lost two weeks of wages and he also was 'unemployed' for two weeks. Claimant, however, would have his cake and eat it too. He wishes full pay for the week of vacation and also to have that week credited for back-to-work benefits. Such a result would do violence to the intent of the act which speaks throughout to 'unemployment'. The title declares that it is an act 'to provide for the protection of the people of this state from the hazards of unemployment.' The declaration of policy speaks solely of 'unemployment' (I.e., 'Economic insecurity due to unemployment', 'Involuntary unemployment', 'unemployed worker' etc.) and provides for the systematic setting aside of funds to provide benefits for 'periods of unemployment'. M.C.L.A. § 421.2; M.S.A. § 17.502.

It is highly unlikely that in this context the Legislature intended a 'windfall', as it has been aptly designated.

However, claimant Bania still is not entitled to back-to-work pay regardless of whether one accepts his rationale of this battle of semantics.

Notice well in advance was given to claimant of the layoff beginning Monday, July 15, 1968. Such advance notice was certainly in his best interest. Bania then returned to work in exactly three weeks after July 15. Even if we accepted claimant's argument (which we do not) that he actually was laid off on Friday because he conceivably could have been called in for work during the week-end, claimant fails. His logic is defective on its face. If he were laid off Friday, he would not have been called in for work Saturday or Sunday. If layoff status began on Monday, under his argument he would have been available for week-end work. He is either laid off on Friday or he is not. We find that he was not.

It is a heady experience for any of us to be in a situation of 'Heads I win, tails you lose', but if business is to thrive so that jobs will be available, a sound business and common sense approach must be applied.

From whatever aspect the circumstances of this case is viewed--whether it be the intent of the act, the application of logic or common sense or a balanced weighing of the common welfare--claimant Bania did not qualify for back-to-work benefits. ⁴

The Court of Appeals is reversed.

Claim of Mohammed

The question assigned to this case is:

Can a 'class action' appeal including a successful Michigan Employment Security Commission claimant in one county filed before an appeal by the unsuccessful employer in another county, force dismissal of the second appeal while the first is pending?

Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the Ingham County appeal should not have been dismissed and therefore we reverse the Court of Appeals.

I. Facts

Mohammed, a resident of Wayne County, was employed at Ford's Sterling plant when he and others were notified that the plant would be shut down from July 22 through August 9, 1968. Although Mohammed's last day of work was Friday, July 19, 1968, he had received notice that the layoff would begin Monday, July 22. He returned to work on Monday, August 12. ⁵ He received no vacation pay. Nevertheless, he was administratively awarded back-to-work benefits.

The MESC Appeal Board affirmed the referee's ruling that Mohammed and other test claimants were entitled to back-to-work benefits. Ford appealed.

Prior to Ford's appeal to the Ingham Circuit Court, Mohammed joined with five others ⁶ in filing (with later amendment) a 'class action' appeal in Wayne Circuit Court. Of these, two resided in other counties and four were successful claimants. Wayne Circuit Judge O'Hair eventually dismissed the Wayne claims for lack of jurisdiction, adding that the arguments for 'class action' also failed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and this Court denied appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the Ingham appeal on the basis that the Wayne appeal was still pending.

Other questions arising from the facts of the Mohammed claim are answered in other test cases, so we adhere solely to the assigned question as stated.

II. Abatement of Appeals

The Court of Appeals, in dismissing Ford's Ingham County appeal, cited GCR 1963, 116.1(4):

'In a party's first responsive pleading, or by motion filed not later than his first responsive pleading, a party may demand that service of process be quashed or that...