Ford Motor Co. v. Burson

• Decision Date: 07 September 1971
• Citation: 3 Pack 486,225 Tenn. 486,470 S.W.2d 941
• Parties: , 225 Tenn. 486 FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. Mrs. Leo BURSON et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 941

470 S.W.2d 941

3 Pack 486, 225 Tenn. 486

FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. Mrs. Leo BURSON et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Sept. 7, 1971.

William Moore, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Employment Security, George E. Barrett, of Barrett & Mitchell, Nashville, for appellants.

Wilson Sims and Otto B. Gerlach, III, Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, for appellee.

OPINION

McCANLESS, Justice.

The Commissioner of Employment Security of Tennessee and one hundred eighty-two employees of Ford Motor Company at its Nashville glass plant have appealed from a decree of the Chancery Court which reversed and disallowed an award of unemployment benefits by the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security.

On September 7, 1967, their labor contracts having expired, the employees of all Ford Motor Company plants in the United States, numbering one hundred or more, went on strike. Their representative and bargaining agent nationally and locally was the United Automobile Workers.

Negotiations for new contracts, which had been in progress since July, continued on both the national and local levels and on October 22nd the company and the union reached an agreement, subject to local ratification, on a master contract. In the meantime the company and the local had agreed on the local issues at the glass plant. On October 25th the members of the local ratified both the national and the local contracts, and the officers of the local withdrew the pickets and notified the company that their members were 'ready, able, and willing' to resume their employment. Limited production commenced but the plant did not resume full operation until November 11th.

The employees, who are appellants, seek benefits for the period from October 25th to November 11th, contending that their unemployment during that time was involuntary and was under circumstances which entitle them to benefits. The company, on the other hand, contends that such unemployment resulted from a labor disute in active progress and the employees are disqualified to receive benefits under the terms of Section 50--1324, subd. D., T.C.A., which provides that an employee shall be disqualified: 'for any week with respect to which the commissioner finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is in active progress * * *.'

The Board of Review found that the labor dispute had ceased to exist when all national and local issues were settled between the glass plant and its employees and that after that date the appellants' unemployment was not due to the existence of a labor dispute in active progress.

Ford Motor Company sought a review of the Board's action by certiorari in the Chancery Court. The Chancellor, reversing the Board, in his memorandum opinion said:

'What was the cause of complainants' unemployment? The unemployment in the case of Davis v. Aluminum Company of America, 204 Tenn. 135 (316 S.W.2d 24), cited by both parties, was due to the time required to repair damages done to the plant as a result of the labor dispute, after all negotiations had ceased and all matters in dispute had been settled. The unemployment in the case of Special Products Company v. Jennings, 209 Tenn. 316 (353 S.W.2d 561), was due to the fact that there were no jobs available at the time the strike ended, since jobs had been previously filled. The unemployment of complainants in the case at bar must be viewed in the light of the complex and highly integrated operations of Ford, the structure of the bargaining procedure and the settlement agreement. It is thus clear that the unemployment of the complainants at the Ford Glass Plant in Nashville resulted from active labor disputes in other locals.

'The Court holds that those unemployed at the Nashville Plant before November 11, 1967, were unemployed because of the continued existence of a labor dispute in active progress, which dispute terminated on November 11, 1967, by the terms of the settlement agreement.'

The appellants have assigned error by which they have challenged the Chancellor's decree on two grounds: (1) that he erred in making a factual determination different from the facts as determined by the Board of Review, and (2) in allowing a waiver by the union in its master contract of the appellants' unemployment compensation benefits.

There is no disputed fact in this record though the Chancellor reached a different legal conclusion from his consideration of the facts than the Board had reached from their consideration of them. As this Court said in Aladdin Industries v. Scott, 219 Tenn. 71, 407 S.W.2d 161 (1965):

'The appellant here contends that the chancellor erred in his holding that the question of whether work offered the employee was suitable was a factual issue and not a legal issue. As stated before, it is our opinion from reading this record that the issue was legal rather than factual. There was no disagreement or dispute about the facts.'

That the conclusions of the Chancellor differed from those of the Board indicate only that he reached different legal conclusions and not that he found the facts to be different. The facts, undisputed, were the same.

The employees of Ford Motor Company are bound by the terms of the contracts that their union entered into with the company and which they ratified. Bridges v. Cavalier Corp., 212 Tenn. 237, 369 S.W.2d 548. One of the stipulations of the master contract, by which they are bound and of which they are beneficiaries, appears in Section 5:

'The term 'the Effective Date' as used in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and any other agreement, letter or other document supplementary or related thereto or associated therewith, shall be deemed to mean the date upon which the strike is terminated at all locations whenever such term is used in conjunction with the establishment of an effective date for a change stated in terms of 'ninety days after the Effective Date'.

'The Company will waive the provision of the new Collective Bargaining Agreement prohibiting or limiting the right to strike with respect to each plant where the strike continues for the duration of the...