Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 2014–1726.
| Decision Date | 03 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–1726.,2014–1726. |
| Citation | 811 F.3d 1371 |
| Parties | FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Plaintiff–Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit |
Stephanie A. Douglas, Bush Seyferth & Paige, PLLC, Troy, MI, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by Matthew Caligur, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Houston, TX.
Justin Reinhart Miller, International Trade Field Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, New York, NY, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by Amy M. Rubin, Jeanne E. Davidson, Joyce R. Branda.
Before NEWMAN, DYK, and O'MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK.
Ford Motor Company ("Ford") appeals from a final judgment of the Court of International Trade ("CIT") dismissing all of its claims. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 992 F.Supp.2d 1346 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2014) ("Ford III "). The CIT dismissed some of Ford's claims as barred by the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i) and declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief for the remainder of Ford's claims.
We hold that we need not address the statute of limitations issue because the statute is not jurisdictional. We further hold that the CIT did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue declaratory relief. While the CIT did not reach the declaratory judgment issue with respect to some of Ford's claims, we conclude that the CIT would have denied all claims on that ground, and that a remand is therefore unnecessary. Accordingly, we affirm.
In 2004 and 2005, Ford imported Jaguar-brand cars from the United Kingdom into the United States. On the cars' entry into the United States, Ford deposited estimated duty payments with Customs and Border Protection ("Customs"). Ford later concluded that it overpaid the duty actually owed because its estimates had been too high. Ford then filed nine reconciliation entries with Customs between June 2005 and October 2006, seeking a total refund of about $6.2 million.
Customs may liquidate an entry, which involves a determination of the amount of duty owed, based on any "just, impartial, and uniform appraisement" prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. 19 U.S.C. § 1502. Customs has one year from the time of filing to liquidate an entry under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a). It may extend that period if it needs additional information to properly appraise or classify the imported merchandise or if the importer requests an extension and demonstrates good cause. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b). Customs is entitled to a maximum of three one-year extensions. 19 C.F.R. § 159.12(a), (d), (e). If not extended before the expiration of any one-year period, the entry "shall be deemed liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity and amount of duties asserted by the importer of record." 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(1). Similarly, if Customs has not liquidated an entry after the maximum extended period of four years, it is deemed liquidated by operation of law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b) ; 19 C.F.R. § 159.12(f). When an entry is deemed liquidated, Customs forfeits the ability to recalculate the duty owed; instead, the duty is calculated based on the importer's own asserted rate, value, and quantity. See 19 C.F.R. § 159.12(f). Here the rate "asserted" by the importer is the rate asserted in its reconciliation entries rather than the rate asserted at the time of original entry.1 Customs seeks to recalculate the duty owed, urging that the original rate was correct.
On April 15, 2009, Ford filed suit in the CIT to challenge Customs' treatment of its nine reconciliation entries, arguing that Customs had failed to properly extend the liquidation period in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1504(b) and therefore could not recalculate the duty.2 Customs contended that it had extended the liquidation periods, which did not expire until between June 29, 2009, and October 4, 2010, four years after entry. At the time Ford filed suit, Customs had yet to liquidate any of Ford's nine entries. Because there were no liquidation decisions to protest under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), Ford brought its challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). The CIT's residual jurisdiction provision is available only when jurisdiction under subsections (a) through (h) of § 1581 is not available.3
Ford sought a declaratory judgment that its entries had deemed liquidated as a matter of law, and, therefore, that it was entitled to a $6.2 million refund based on its duty calculation asserted in the reconciliation entries. During the pendency of that action, Customs liquidated five of the nine entries. The government moved to dismiss Ford's claims for lack of jurisdiction. The CIT granted the government's motion as to those entries that had already liquidated, ruling that § 1581(a), not § 1581(i), was the proper basis to challenge those entries. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 716 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1310 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010) ("Ford I "). As to the four entries that remained unliquidated, the CIT recognized that § 1581(i) jurisdiction was proper but declined to issue discretionary declaratory relief, explaining that Ford would have ample opportunity to assert claims for those entries in a future § 1581(a) action.
Shortly after Ford I, Customs liquidated Ford's remaining entries, declining to provide Ford with any refund. Ford protested the merits of all nine of Customs' liquidations. Customs denied the protest for Ford's 2005 entries, and Ford commenced a separate court action challenging that denial under § 1581(a), which is pending as of the time of this appeal. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, Ct. Int'l Trade No. 10–00138. Ford's protest for its 2006 entries is currently held before Customs pending the outcome of this appeal.
Ford appealed from the CIT's decision in Ford I dismissing its claims for a declaratory judgment that its entries had deemed liquidated as a matter of law at Ford's asserted rate. See Ford II, 688 F.3d at 1321. We reversed the CIT's dismissal on jurisdictional grounds of those claims relating to the five entries that were liquidated during the pendency of the CIT action. Id. at 1324. We held that, based on the "time-of-filing rule," "the government's post-filings actions in liquidating the entries may have opened up a new avenue for judicial review under [28] U.S.C. § 1581(a), but the actions cannot defeat subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i)." Id. at 1327. We vacated the CIT's discretionary dismissal of Ford's claims that remained unliquidated because the CIT's analysis "extended in significant part from its flawed jurisdictional analysis." Id. at 1330. We explained that the CIT "retains authority, but no obligation, to revisit [its declaratory judgment authority] on remand." Id.
On remand at the CIT, the government again moved to dismiss, this time arguing that Ford's claims directed to its 2005 entries were barred by the two-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i), which governs § 1581(i) actions. The CIT again granted the government's motion to dismiss for all claims directed to the 2005 entries except Claim 5, finding that Ford's action was barred by the two-year limitations period, having been commenced more than two years after Ford reasonably should have known about the existence of those claims. Ford III, 992 F.Supp.2d at 1356–57. Regarding Claim 5 and the claims directed to Ford's 2006 entries—as to which there was no statute of limitations issue—the CIT recognized that § 1581(i) jurisdiction was available but again declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. See id. at 1359.
The CIT explained that "adjudicating the claims would not be an efficient and effective use of the court's time and resources," because Ford "retains the ability to seek relief" for all of its claims in its pending protest and § 1581(a) action. Id. The CIT further explained that "[t]he § 1581(a) case will allow [Ford] to challenge not only the question of whether the entries in question were deemed liquidated, but the substance of any actual liquidations or reliquidations that occurred (i.e., the merits of [Ford's] reconciliation claims), an option not available in this declaratory judgment case." Id. Ford appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). We review the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Heartland By–Prods., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1244, 1250 (Fed.Cir.2005). We review the CIT's decision not to issue declaratory relief for abuse of discretion. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289–90, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995) ; Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1288 (Fed.Cir.2007).
As to Claims 1–4 and 6 concerning Ford's 2005 entries, we first consider whether the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2636(i) is jurisdictional, such that we must address it before considering the merits. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Ford argues that our mandate in Ford II precluded the CIT from considering the statute of limitations because we reversed the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the statute of limitations is jurisdictional. The government argues that the CIT was "powerless to adjudicate Ford's claims" because they fell outside of the CIT's authority under § 2636(i), and that the mandate in the original appeal is not a bar even though "the statute of limitations is ... jurisdictional." Appellee's Br. at 31. We disagree with both parties. Section 1581(i)'s two-year statute of limitations is not jurisdictional.
Section 2636(i) of title 28 provides that a "civil action of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction under section 1581 of this title, other than an action specified in subsections (a)-(h) of this section, is barred...
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