Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie

Decision Date13 November 1950
Docket NumberNo. 17218,17218
Citation62 S.E.2d 209,207 Ga. 464
PartiesFORD MOTOR CO. v. ABERCROMBIE et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The cardinal or pre-eminent rule governing the construction of statutes is to carry into effect the legislative intent and purpose if that is within constitutional limits. On application of that rule, the intent of the 1937 act, Ga.L.1937, p. 806, as expressed in section 2 thereof, requires a construction of the portion found in Code (Ann.Supp.) § 54-610(d) that will deny benefits thereunder to any unemployed who is so unemployed due to his own voluntary action. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the Hapeville and the Dearborn plants are both devoted to the one job of manufacturing Ford automobiles, they are inseparable and together constitute one 'factory, establishment, or other premises,' as contemplated by Code (Ann.Supp.) § 54-610(d).

2. Members of the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-CIO, in virtue of becoming members of one of the locals of that union, including Local No. 882 at the Hapeville plant, thereby appointed and empowered the officers of the union as the agents of each individual member, to exercise all powers vested in them by the constitution of the union. Therefore, in authorizing a strike in the parts-producing plant in Dearborn, Michigan, in virtue of those constitutional powers, the union officers acted as the authorized agents of all members, including these claimants. Obviously, since the parts-producing plant was closed with full knowledge and the deliberate intent to thereby close the Hapeville plant, which would inevitably cause the unemployment for which compensation is here sought, it was neither involuntary nor due to causes other than the claimant's fault and was therefore not compensable.

3. The provision in Code (Ann.Supp.) § 54-612, Ga.L.1937, p. 814, that all claims paid during appeal, if held invalid on final appeal, shall not be charged to the account of the employer, prevents this case from becoming moot although all claims which are involved and which we have held invalid were paid during appeal as provided in the above Code section. We make no ruling on the validity of the portion of the act authorizing such payments, but on that question see Const. art. 7, § 1, par. 1, Code (Ann.) § 2--5402(1), Ga.L.1945, p. 57; Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 156 Ga. 789, 120 S.E. 120; Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E.2d 221.

This case is one involving unemployment compensation and is before this court on a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. A complete statement of facts, together with the contentions of the employer and the employees, may of found in Abercrombie v. Ford Motor Co., 81 Ga.App. 690, 59 S.E.2d 664, and, for this reason, only those facts pertinent to our decision will be given here.

Ford Motor Company, the employer, was involved in a labor dispute at its assembly plant in Dearborn, Michigan, and the employees at its parts-producing plant, also in Dearborn, went out on strike in sympathy with the assembly employees, which resulted in a work stoppage at its assembly plants throughout the United States. This work stoppage resulted in unemployment of employees of that company at Hapeville, Georgia and the main and only question involved is whether or not these employees ore eligible for unemployment compensation under the Georgia law. The claimants for unemployment compensation are members of a local union which holds its charter from the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-CIO, the bargaining agent for all the employees of Ford Motor Company throughout the United States. As such the International Union negotiated and executed the contract of employment for all the employees of the company, including those employed at the Hapeville plant.

Under the constitution of the International Union each member of every local is a mumber of the International Union and is bound by the provisions of its constitution, and the International Union is constituted the exclusive authorized agent of every employee for the execution and negotiation of employment contracts; adjustment of all working conditions; appearances before boards, courts, committees, or other tribunals in any matter affecting the status of each member as an employee; and the settlement of all grievances, complaints, or disputes arising out of the employer-employee relationship--all of the above as fully and to all intents and purposes as the employee might or could do if personally present. The constitution sets forth how the International Union shall be governed; how it shall meet in convention; the number of delegates from each local and how they shall be elected; how its officers shall be elected, their various duties, qualifications, and salaries; and the method of handling all contracts and negotiations. It sets forth how local unions may be formed, how charters are to be issued, and the internal management of such unions. Article 42 Explains the handling of strikes and how approval must be obtained from the officials of the International Union. It is here shown that the officials of the International Union must approve a strike, are empowered to order a return to work, and in the event of a refusal may order the charter forfeited. In certain cases of emergency the officials may call a general strike with a later vote by the membership. As the exclusive agent of the members and locals, it has complete control of a strike once it is called and may order a return to work at any time. It also controls the calling of a strike by the fact that it must approve it. In effect, the International Union, as disclosed by the constitution, is a mere combination of all the locals to form one integrated autonomous organization for the solidification of its employee members to improve their working conditions.

In the present case a local union voted a strike in Michigan, which was approved by the International Union, although it resulted in a work stoppage to the entire Ford Motor Company establishment and resulted in widespread unemployment at various Ford assembly plants throughout the country, including the assembly plant at Hapeville, Georgia. The strike was the result of a labor dispute, growing out of a contention made on the assembly line at the Dearborn plant, which was as essential and as vital of the assembly plant employees at other locations as to those at the Dearborn plant. Since the parts-producing employees voluntarily left their employment at Dearborn with the consent and approval of the International Union, the result was a work stoppage, within a very short time, at all the assembly plants throughout the United States. There was evidence submitted to the fact-finding board that the company requested that, since only about 5000 men were directly involved, and the strike by the parts-producing employees resulted in more than 102,000 employees being out of employment, the International Union permit 'all Ford workers to return to their jobs, except those in the buildings directly involved.' The union refused and in answerstated: 'They [the Ford workers] recognize * * * they are all directly affected by the basic principle of whether or not the company shall have the right to speed them up whenever it wants to.' In addition, there was other evidence showing the solidarity of the entire membership in support of the strike.

MacDougald Troutman, Same & Schroder and Wm. H. Schroder, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Poole, Pearce & Hall, Warren E. Hall, Jr., J. R. Goldthwaite, Jr., Clifford Walker

and J. Benton Evans, all of Atlanta, Jerome Cooper, Birmingham, Ala., for defendants in error.

DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice.

1. Numerous decisions of administrative boards and courts of other jurisdictions including many growing out of the same strike that is here involved, are cited in the brief of counsel for claimants, and they all held that the claimants there involved were entitled to unemployment compensation under State laws similar to our own. On the other hand, counsel for the employment have cited in their brief decisions of other jurisdictions where, under facts and law similar to that with which they are now dealing, it was held that the claimants to compensation were disqualified. While we have carefully examined all authorities cited and even more, the decisions of other jurisdictions are helpful to us in arriving at a proper decision only to the extent that they are well reasoned and the grounds upon which they are placed appear to us to be sound; but, after all, we must construe our own law by applicable controlling rules of construction and apply the facts as shown by the record to the law as thus construed. It is inadmissible to mutilate a statute by lifting a mere segment out of its context, and construe it without consideration of all other parts of the act. Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883. The cardinal rule to guide the construction of law is, first, to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the law, and then to give it that construction which will effectuate the legislative intent and purpose. This rule is well stated in the early case of Erwin v. Moore, 15 Ga. 361(1), as follows: 'The intention of the legislature is the cardinal guide to a construction of statutes; and when plainly collected, should be carried into effect, though contrary to the literal sense of terms.' [Italics ours.] The unmistakable legislative intent is plainly spelled out by the legislature itself in section 2 of the act, Ga.L.1937, p. 806, which we are now construing--that intent being to pay unemployment compensation during periods of unemployment to those workers whose unemployment is involuntary and...

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