Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ryan, 09AP-501
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Citation | 2010 Ohio 4601 |
Docket Number | No. 09AP-555,No. 10AP-263,No. 06CV05-6659,No. 09AP-501,No. 10AP-274,09AP-501,09AP-555,10AP-263,10AP-274,06CV05-6659 |
Parties | Ford Motor Credit Company, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James M. Ryan et al., Defendants, (James M. Ryan, Defendant-Appellant), Carolyn P. Ryan et al., Third Party Defendants, (Carolyn P. Ryan, Third Party Defendant- Appellant), (Automobile Recovery Services of Cincinnati, Inc., Third Party Defendant- Appellee), v. Bob-Boyd Lincoln Mercury, Inc., Third Party Defendant- Appellee. |
Decision Date | 28 September 2010 |
Frantz Ward LLP, Brett K. Bacon and Timothy J. Richards, for appellee Ford Motor Credit Company.
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Michael J. Valentine, for appellee Automobile Recovery Service of Cincinnati, Inc.
Stockamp & Brown, LLC, David A. Brown, Deanna L. Stockamp and Stephen D. Brown, for appellee Bob-Boyd Lincoln Mercury, Inc.
Carolyn P. Ryan, pro se.
James M. Ryan, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, James M. Ryan ("James"), and third party defendantappellant, Carolyn P. Ryan ("Carolyn"), appeal multiple decisions of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
{¶2} On August 10, 2005, plaintiff-appellee, Ford Motor Credit Company ("Ford"), brought a breach of contract action against James and Ryan and Ryan, Inc. ("RRI") in the Franklin County Municipal Court. Ford alleged that James and RRI had failed to pay amounts due under a motor vehicle lease agreement that James and RRI had entered into when they co-leased a 2002 Ford Windstar. James and RRI answered the complaint, and James filed a counterclaim. Because the damages sought in the counterclaim exceeded the municipal court's monetary jurisdiction, the municipal court transferred the case to the common pleas court.
{¶3} In the common pleas court, Ford sought and received leave to file an amended complaint and a third party complaint. In the amended complaint, Fordasserted three more breach of contract claims against James and RRI. These claims alleged that James and RRI failed to pay amounts due under: (1) a retail installment contract that James and Ryan and Ryan Real Estate Company ("R&R")1 had entered into when co-purchasing a 2004 Mercury Monterey, (2) a retail installment contract that James and R&R had entered into when co-purchasing a 2004 Mercury Mountaineer, and (3) a retail installment contract that James and R&R had entered into when co-purchasing a 2004 Mercury Mountaineer Premier ("Premier").2
{¶4} In its third party complaint, Ford asserted a breach of contract claim against James' wife, Carolyn. Ford alleged that Carolyn had failed to pay amounts due under a retail installment contract that she had entered into when she purchased a 2004 Mercury Grand Marquis.3
{¶5} At the time Ford filed its amended complaint and third party complaint, it had already repossessed the vehicles at issue in those pleadings. Ford had hired Automobile Recovery Services of Cincinnati, Inc. ("ARS") to accomplish each of the repossessions. Ford and ARS had a contractual arrangement whereby ARS provided Ford with repossession services. In the contract, ARS agreed to: (1) forgo any repossession that would involve a breach of peace, and (2) indemnify Ford for allexpenses incurred in connection with legal claims that related to ARS' performance of its contractual obligations.
{¶6} ARS repossessed four of the Ryans' vehicles without incident. However, during the repossession of the Premier, James and the ARS agent engaged in a verbal and physical altercation. James' counterclaim had asserted multiple tort claims against Ford based on the actions of ARS' agent. Therefore, in addition to naming Carolyn, Ford's third party complaint also named ARS as a third party defendant. Ford alleged breach of contract and indemnity claims against ARS.
{¶7} In response to Ford's amended and third party complaints, James and Carolyn each filed an answer and counterclaim.4 James and Carolyn asserted claims against Ford for: (1) conversion, (2) trespass, (3) assault, (4) breach of peace, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) invasion of privacy, (7) violation of 42 U.S.C.1983 ("Section 1983"), (8) breach of contract, (9) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"), (10) violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, R.C. 1345.01, et seq. ("CSPA"), and (11) violation of the Ohio Retail Installment Sales Act, R.C. 1317.01, et seq. ("RISA"). James alone also asserted a claim for negligence against Ford.
{¶8} Both James and Carolyn brought a cross-claim against ARS. The crossclaims stated claims for: (1) conversion, (2) trespass, (3) assault, (4) breach of peace, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) invasion of privacy, (7) violation of Section 1983, (8) violation of the FDCPA, and (9) violation of the RISA.
{¶9} Additionally, both James and Carolyn named Bob-Boyd Lincoln Mercury, Inc. ("Bob-Boyd") as a third party defendant. The Ryans had leased or purchased each of the vehicles at issue in the instant case from Bob-Boyd. James and Carolyn asserted claims against Bob-Boyd for: (1) breach of contract, (2) violation of the CSPA, and (3) estoppel.
{¶10} Ford, ARS, and Bob-Boyd moved for summary judgment on all the claims that James and Carolyn had asserted against them. Ford also moved for summary judgment as to its breach of contract claim against Carolyn, as well as its four breach of contract claims against both James and RRI. In three different judgment entries, the trial court granted all of the summary judgment motions. James and Carolyn separately appealed the three judgments to this court.
{¶11} On appeal, James and Carolyn pointed out to this court that the trial court's grant of summary judgment had not resolved all of the claims pending before the court. Despite the existence of unresolved claims, two of the judgments—those granting Ford and Bob-Boyd's summary judgment motions—did not contain Civ.R. 54(B) language. James and Carolyn argued that, absent Civ.R. 54(B) language, those two judgments did not constitute final appealable orders.
{¶12} This court stayed the two appeals, and remanded the matter to the trial court so that it could address the remaining claims. The trial court responded by again entering judgment in Ford and Bob-Boyd's favor on their summary judgment motions, but this time, including Civ.R. 54(B) language in the judgment entries. Both James and Carolyn then filed additional appeals from the amended judgment entries. We have consolidated all the appeals.
{¶13} In their first appeals (designated as appeal Nos. 09AP-501 and 09AP-555), James and Carolyn assign the following errors: 5
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